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Chapter 1
Dissertation Introduction
”Labor was the first price, the original purchase money
that was paid for all things.”
Adam Smith
The compensation of labor is one of the most fundamental questions in economics. There-
fore, it is not surprising that economists have also been interested in the distribution of labor
earnings, and more generally income, for a long time, with descriptions of their distributions
dating at least back to the late 17th century. At the time, the British statistician Gregory
King published his social tables, a quantitative description of the social conditions in pre-
industrialised England, which the author described as a Scheme of the Income and Expenses
of Several Families of England.1 Despite its long tradition, the study of income distributions
had not been at the center of economic research for a long time, presumably due to its
close relationship with normative questions (Sandmo, 2015). Against the background of a
sharp rise in wage and income inequality in the U.S. and other countries around the globe in
1In an earlier, though less known work, similar calculations were already performed in the mid 17th
century by William Petty. For a more detailed description, see, e.g., Holmes (1977) and Slack (2004).
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recent decades, the question gained considerable attention and resulted in a rapidly growing
literature (see Katz and Autor, 1999, and Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 for wages, and Piketty
and Saez, 2014 for income). Simultaneously, a more general and controversial debate on the
distribution of income and wealth has emerged among both policymakers and the general
public.
For the analysis in this doctoral thesis, it is crucial to distinguish the different forms of
income, most importantly labor income or earnings as opposed to capital income. The
present work is solely dedicated to the first aspect and focuses on gross labor earnings,
i.e. redistributive effects of the tax and transfer system are not part of the analysis. The
second important distinction for the further reading is the one between the terms wages
and earnings. Throughout this thesis, wages refer to the compensation received per hour
worked, whereas earnings refer to the total compensation received over a longer time period,
e.g. a day, year or up to a certain age. A more in-depth definition of the wage and earnings
measures used is also provided in the different chapters. At this point, it is important to
note that the present thesis is restricted to a rigorous econometric analysis of the German
wage and earnings distribution as well as the ongoing distributional changes. Consequently,
it does not attempt to answer any of the normative questions, e.g. on the socially optimal
level of inequality, commonly raised in the public discussion.
In recent years, increasing wage and earnings inequality have been accompanied by declining
labor income shares in many OECD countries including Germany. Nevertheless, the share
of labor income, defined as the ratio of total labor compensation to GDP, still amounted
to about 60 percent in Germany in 2016 and remained the by far most important form
of income (OECD, 2018). At the same time, previous studies showed rising inequality in
labor earnings to be the decisive factor in explaining increasing income inequality (see Daly
and Valletta, 2006 for the U.S. and Biewen and Juhasz, 2012 for the German case). The
literature further shows that the distribution of income has an impact on outcomes beyond
individual consumption possibilities. For example, existing studies point towards a positive
2
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relationship between income and health (von Gaudecker and Scholz, 2007, Chetty et al.,
2015). From a macro perspective, high levels of income inequality are potentially linked
to weak economic growth (Ostry et al., 2014) as well as political polarization (Duca and
Saving, 2016, Winkler, 2019). Although some of these studies consider different measures
of income, e.g. also including non-labor income or measuring income at the household level,
they underline the importance of wage and earnings distributions, given that labor earnings
constitute the primary source of income for a major part of the population.
As this doctoral thesis exclusively uses data from Germany, it is insightful to start with a
description of the most important trends in the German wage and earnings distribution as
well as a number of special features related to the German labor market. Germany has
traditionally been characterized by a rather stable wage distribution and an in international
comparison relatively low level of wage inequality. In the 1980s, inequality started to rise
but only at the at top of the distribution (Dustmann et al., 2009). Contrary to the U.S., the
bottom half of the wage distribution remained stable during the 1980s as a likely consequence
of a traditionally strong role of unions played in the wage setting process (Fitzenberger,
1999). Though delayed in international comparison, inequality in the lower half of the
wage distribution equally started to increase in the early 1990s. Overall, wage inequality in
Germany has increased sharply in all parts of the distribution in recent decades (Dustmann et
al., 2009, Card et al., 2013), but seems to have stagnated or even moderately declined after
2010 (Felbermayr et al., 2016, Mo¨ller, 2016). Nevertheless, inequality levels in Germany
remain significantly lower compared to the U.S. (Krueger et al., 2010). The latter equally
observed a sharp and even more pronounced increase in the dispersion of wages starting
already in the late 1970s in all parts of the distribution. Contrary to Germany, inequality in
the upper part of the U.S. wage distribution has continued to increase to the day (e.g., Autor,
2014, Antonczyk et al., 2018 and, for recent numbers, Gould, 2019). At the same time, the
pattern of distributional changes also differ between both countries. Changes in the U.S.
during the 1990s were characterized by an increasing polarization in the sense that both the
3
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upper and the lower end of the distribution gained relative to the middle (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011). Despite some evidence in favor of job polarization, the literature on Germany
does not find similar changes in the distribution of wages. Instead, these were characterized
by a monotonic development with gains at higher and losses at lower quantiles. In this
regard, they rather resembled the distributional changes in the U.S. during the 1980s (Goos
et al., 2009, Dustmann et al., 2009).
Simultaneously with this development, the German labor market experienced a sharp in-
crease in the dispersion of lifetime earnings, which nearly doubled between men born in the
early 1960s and their parental generation and hence, exceeded the increase in cross-sectional
wage or earnings inequality (Bo¨nke et al., 2015a). A similar and even more dramatic de-
velopment has also been described by Guevenen et al. (2017) for the U.S. Taking on a
cohort perspective and looking at lifetime as opposed to cross-sectional earnings is very
insightful from a theoretical perspective. This is due to the fact that cross-sectional wages
reflect a single point-in-time observation within each individual’s employment biography.
However, from the perspective of consumption theory and under the assumption of per-
fect capital markets, individual consumption possibilities are rather determined by lifetime
than short-term earnings as outlined in more detail by Corneo (2015). Against this back-
ground, the literature on lifetime earnings inequality describes another important dimension
of distributional changes in the German wage and earnings distribution.
A distinguishing feature of the German labor market is a persistent West-East difference
in the standard of living as a consequence of the German division. Despite major political
efforts and some convergence between the formerly separated parts, significant differences
in wages, earnings and unemployment rates remain to the day (Smolny, 2009, Schnabel,
2016). At the same time, East Germany equally faced a strong catch-up in terms of wage
inequality. Starting from very low levels as a consequence of the egalitarian wage policy
followed in the former German Democratic Republic, inequality levels (among men) roughly
reached the level of West Germany by the turn of the millennium (Franz and Steiner, 2000).
4
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Besides increasing inequality, the German labor market was characterized by very modest
increases in real wages between the late 1990s and the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008,
also referred to as the German wage moderation (see, e.g., Bofinger, 2015). In its course,
Germany even experienced a period of falling real median wages in the early 2000s as shown,
for example, in Dustmann et al. (2014). In recent years, real wages have been increasing
though, given the fast recovery and strong employment growth following the financial crisis,
at a moderate pace (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018). Moreover, the German labor market has
been subject to profound institutional reforms (the so-called Hartz reforms) which, against
the background of weak GDP growth and high unemployment rates, aimed at increasing
Germany’s international competitiveness via a flexibilization of the labor market. In fact,
both factors are seen as a main reason for the dramatic reduction in unemployment since
the early 2000s - a time when Germany was considered the sick man of Europe (Dustmann
et al., 2014). The literature argues that the previously described wage moderation also
contributed significantly to the exceptional robustness of the German labor market against
the consequences of the financial crisis (Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll, 2010, Burda and Hunt,
2011). At the same time, both factors favored the emergence of a large low-wage sector
comparable to Anglo-Saxon market economies such as the U.K. or Ireland (Kalina and
Weinkopf, 2017). This development played an important role in the public debate on
minimum wages which ultimately resulted in the introduction of a statutory minimum wage
of 8.50 euro per hour in January 2015. In consequence of its recent introduction and the
fact that both the administrative and official data used in the following studies are only
available with considerable delay, the distributional effects of the minimum wage are not
subject of the analysis in this thesis. However, recent work by Caliendo et al. (2017, 2018)
provides first evidence for positive short-term wage effects at the bottom of the distribution,
which were accompanied by minor employment losses only.
As it is common practice in the literature, the vast majority of the cited studies focuses
on the wage and earnings distribution among men. An important reason for this is the
5
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significantly lower labor market participation rate among women, which, from the viewpoint
of an econometrician, potentially causes non-random selection into the labor market and
the estimation sample. For example, it is well-known that employment rates among women
tend to increase with the level of education and equally vary over the life-cycle. Moreover,
these selection patterns are also changing over time due to an increasing labor market
participation among women of later birth cohorts, which inherently complicates any inter-
temporal comparison. To underline the necessity to account for this type of selectivity,
it is insightful to take a closer look at women’s labor market participation in Germany.
Traditionally, women are less likely to participate in the labor force compared to men not
only in Germany, but around the globe. Despite a significant catching-up of women in recent
decades, labor force participation rates continue to differ between both genders with overall
numbers for 2013 amounting to 73% and 63%, respectively. At the same time, part-time
employment rates among German women are high in international comparison. About half
of all women employed work part-time, whereas the same holds true for only one out of
nine men (Brenke, 2015). As a consequence, large differences in full-time employment rates
persist until today. For this reason, two of the subsequent studies (chapters 2 and 3) on
changes in the wage and lifetime earnings distribution are restricted to men only. The third
study (chapter 4), on the other hand, explicitly addresses the effect of women’s selection
into full-time employment on the distributional gender pay gap.
From a statistical point of view, the availability of sophisticated decomposition methods is
essential for an accurate description of differences in the distribution of wages and earnings.2
For a long time, most studies were restricted to explaining differences in mean outcomes,
building on the widely used decomposition method by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).
It has remained popular to the day, likely due to it’s simplicity and easy interpretability. The
technique assumes the conditional expectation E(Y |X) to be linear in parameters, allowing
an estimation by OLS. It equally enables a detailed decomposition, i.e. changes in mean
2I only outline some of the most important methods here. A more comprehensive discussion is provided
in the literature, e.g. in Fortin et al. (2011).
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outcomes can be linked to individual covariates and can be further split up into a part due to
changes in the distribution of individual covariates (composition effect) as well another one
due to changes in their returns (wage structure effect). Variance decomposition extends this
idea by using the well-known statistical property of the variance being separable into a within
and a between group component but does not provide a comparable detailed decomposition.
Also, general inequality measures like the variance cannot explain changes in specific parts
of a distribution which is often particularly relevant from a policy perspective (Fortin et al.,
2011).
In the light of rising U.S. wage and earnings inequality and a stronger focus of the liter-
ature on distributional aspects, a number of new decomposition techniques have emerged
during the last three decades that overcome some of the previous restrictions. Most import-
antly, more recent decomposition techniques (e.g. Juhn et al., 1993, DiNardo et al., 1996,
Machado and Mata, 2005, Melly, 2005, Firpo et al., 2009, 2018, Chernozhukov et al., 2013)
enable an analysis of inequality measures beyond the mean, including quantile differences.
Chapters 2 and 4 of the present work provide two applications of the from my viewpoint still
underused Recentered-Influence-Function (RIF) decomposition (Firpo et al., 2009, 2018).
The method represents a generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allowing for
a detailed decomposition, both in terms of composition and wage structure effects, of any
distributional statistic of interest that does not depend on the ordering of factors. In this
regard, the method is superior to the other commonly applied techniques which are restric-
ted in different ways. The methods by Juhn et al. (1993), Machado and Mata (2005)
and Melly (2005) do not allow for a detailed decomposition of distributional changes, which
limits their usefulness for research questions intending to link observed changes to specific
covariates of interest. This problem is overcome by the decomposition technique suggested
in DiNardo et al. (1996). The authors use semi-parametric inverse probability weighting
which allows to determine detailed effects by sequentially changing the distribution of in-
dividual covariates. As the major disadvantage relative to RIF decomposition, the results
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depend on the sequential ordering of the covariates included and the interpretation of res-
ults is only valid for a specific sequence. In principle, this problem can be moderated by
calculating average effects for the different groups of covariates over all possible sequences.
This idea is known as the Shapley decomposition (Shorrocks, 2013) and has, among others,
been applied by Biewen and Plo¨tze (2019) for a small number of groups. However, such an
approach easily becomes computationally very costly as the number of groups increases. For
example, the analysis in chapter 2 studies the impact of seven groups of covariates resulting
in a total of 5040 potential sequences. Moreover, the DiNardo et al. (1996) method cannot
be extended to a detailed decomposition of wage structure effects which are potentially a
similar important source of distributional changes. Both arguments equally apply to the
method suggested more recently in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). On the downside, RIF
decomposition only yields a local approximation of the underlying effects given the linear
specifications of the RIFs. This is potentially problematic in long-run distributional ana-
lyses where observed changes are typically large. To overcome this shortcoming, chapter
2 suggests a step-wise implementation which is aggregated to the overall long-run effect.
To conclude this introduction, I want to give an overview of the three studies this doctoral
thesis comprises.
Unions, Internationalization, Tasks, Firms, and Worker Characteristics: A Detailed Decom-
position Analysis of Rising Wage Inequality in Germany
In chapter 2, we study changes in the wage distribution among German men. The main focus
of the analysis is a quantitative assessment of competing factors associated with the rise in
male wage inequality in Europe’s largest economy over the period 1995-2010. The analysis
uses a unified framework which considers an extensive set of explanatory factors including
personal characteristics, measures of internationalization, task composition, union coverage,
industry, region and firm characteristics. In contrast to most of the literature on Germany,
the analysis relies on four waves of the German Structure of Earnings Surveys (GSES)
which allows to focus on hourly wages (rather than daily earnings) which are not censored
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at the social contributions threshold. Another unique feature of the data is the inclusion
of information on unionization at the individual as opposed to the firm-level information
provided in all other data sets for Germany. These differences are carefully evaluated and
we show that previous studies on German wage inequality most likely underestimated the role
of de-unionization as important parts of de-unionization occur within establishments. As the
second most important factor, we identify compositional effects of personal characteristics
such as age and education. This finding is in line with the SBTC hypothesis in the sense
that the increasing demand for higher skills was matched by a rising supply due to both
educational upgrading as well as the aging of the workforce. At the same time, we find only
moderate effects linked to internationalization, firm heterogeneity, task changes and regional
convergence. The econometric analysis uses RIF Decomposition (Firpo et al., 2009, 2018)
which is, following the arguments above, particularly well-suited to simultaneously control
for a large number of covariates and to quantify their relative importance. Moreover, the
chapter addresses some issues regarding the practical implementation of RIF decomposition
and provides a supplementary analysis of unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Increasing Inequality in Lifetime Earnings: A Tale of Educational Upgrading and Changing
Employment Patterns
Taking on a cohort perspective, chapter 3 aims at explaining the rising inequality in lifetime
earnings in Germany by means of a detailed decomposition analysis. The study adds to
a still comparably small but growing literature which documented rising lifetime earnings
inequality for both Germany and the U.S. (Bo¨nke et al., 2015a, Guevenen et al., 2017),
but still lacks an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes. To address this blind spot, the
study uses the high-quality administrative data of the Sample of Integrated Employment
Biographies (SIAB) which are used to construct individual employment biographies. The
empirical analysis is restricted to West German men born between the years 1955 and 1974
as the SIAB does not provide any information on East Germany prior to the year 1991.
The analysis uses the concept of up-to-age X earnings (UAX) known from the literature
9
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and mostly focuses on earnings until the age of 40, which have been shown to be a good
proxy for lifetime earnings (as well as changes in their distribution) and, at the same time,
allow to include a reasonable number of birth cohorts. The findings suggest that significant
parts of rising lifetime earnings inequality among West German men can be attributed to
a lower labor market participation as a consequence of longer periods of both part-time
and non-employment as well as the educational expansion among later cohorts. However,
they can only partly explain losses at the bottom of the distribution and therefore suggest
some similarities with the U.S., where the major part of earnings losses among later cohorts
occurred conditional on working (Guevenen et al., 2017). The study also points towards
potentially important changes in the penalty linked to employment interruptions but only
finds a moderate impact of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) beyond educational
upgrading. Finally, the analysis equally reveals that later cohorts did not only face an
increase in inequality, but also a stagnation in earnings for a major part of their career. The
latter trend is found not to be a direct consequence of a delayed labor market entry (due
to educational upgrading), but is even stronger when looking at the development within
education groups.
Counterfactual Quantile Decompositions with Selection Correction Taking into Account
Huber/Melly (2015): An Application to the German Gender Wage Gap
Finally, chapter 4 proposes a novel technique for the estimation of counterfactual quantile
decompositions with selection correction. In doing so, we directly build on previous
contributions by Buchinsky (1998, 2001) as well as Albrecht et al. (2009). Using a
control function approach, the Buchinsky method allows to control for both selection on
observables and unobservables in the context of conditional quantile regression and is
commonly used in applied research. A particularly important application is the Albrecht
et al. (2009) decomposition method for the estimation of counterfactual distributions
with selection correction, which builds itself on the decomposition by Machado and
Mata (2005). A recent paper by Huber and Melly (2015) has criticized the use of the
10
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Buchinsky correction by pointing out that it assumes a form of conditional independence
that may be easily violated in applications. Therefore, we propose to transform the original
quantile model in order to eliminate potential problems with the conditional independence
assumption. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically that this transformation can
make the Huber/Melly test pass when it rejects in the untransformed model. Applying the
technique to the gender pay gap in Germany, we find evidence for a strong positive selection
of women into full-time employment in line with previous evidence on other countries (see,
e.g., Albrecht et al., 2009 for the Netherlands and Chzhen and Mumford, 2011 for the
U.K.). The results also point towards important effects linked to unobservable selection
which have not been documented in the previous literature on Germany and potentially
bias estimates of the gender pay gap downwards. Moreover, we also show that unobserved
selection may in fact be underestimated in applications where conditional independence is
violated.
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Chapter 2
Unions, Internationalization, Tasks,
Firms, and Worker Characteristics: A
Detailed Decomposition Analysis of
Rising Wage Inequality in Germany∗
2.1 Introduction
An extensive literature has documented a steady increase in wage inequality since the early
1980s in many countries around the world (see Katz and Autor, 1999, and Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011 for surveys, and Dustmann et al., 2009, for the German case). Different
explanations have been proposed for this trend. The most prominent explanation are changes
∗This chapter is based on:
Biewen, M., and M. Seckler (2019): Unions, Internationalization, Tasks, Firms, and Worker Characteristics:
A Detailed Decomposition Analysis of Rising Wage Inequality in Germany. The Journal of Economic
Inequality. Advance online publication. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-019-09422-w.
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in demand and supply across skill groups connected to skill-biased technological change
(Katz and Murphy, 1992, Juhn et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, Goldin and Katz, 2008,
among others). Observing that more recent changes in the US wage distribution were not
uniformly favoring higher skills, the basic SBTC hypothesis was refined by the task-based
approach (Autor et al., 2003, 2008, Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). This more refined version of
the SBTC hypothesis explains further inequality increases by falling demand for non-manual
routine occupations in the middle of the distribution which fall back when compared to
manual routine occupations at the bottom and non-manual analytic occupations at the top
of the distribution. At the same time, a number of researchers have criticized the focus
on the SBTC hypothesis suggesting that compositional and institutional changes such as
de-unionization and changes in the minimum wage account for a substantial part of the
inequality increase (DiNardo et al., 1996, Card and DiNardo, 2002, Lemieux, 2006). The
third line of explanation, international trade, was identified as less important in earlier studies
(e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992) but has been taken up again as a potentially important factor
more recently (Autor et al., 2014, Ebenstein et al., 2014, Firpo et al., 2014). Finally, a
number of recent contributions have emphasized the potential role of growing heterogeneity
between firms for the rise in wage inequality (e.g., Card et al., 2013, Barth et al, 2016,
Baumgarten et al., 2018, and Song et al., 2019).
In order to evaluate these explanations in a more general sense, it is important to look
at the relevance of these factors for a range of countries. A particular interesting case is
Germany, given its large degree of integration in the world economy and its relative economic
importance within the European Union. Adding to previous research on the German wage
distribution (Dustmann et al., 2009, Antonczyk et al., 2010, Card et al., 2013, see more
detailed literature review below), this paper makes the following contributions. First, we
use a different data set than most of the other studies that have examined the German
wage distribution. We use data from the mandatory German Structure of Earnings Surveys
(GSES) conducted by the German Federal Statistical Office, which, compared to the widely
13
Chapter 2. Unions, Internationalization, . . . 2.1. Introduction
used administrative data sets provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB),
includes information on hourly wages (instead of daily or monthly earnings), is not censored
at the social security contributions threshold and contains a richer set of covariates.1 In
particular, our data set includes information on unionization at the individual rather than
at the firm level, which makes it different from all other data sets for Germany known to
us. We show that this feature makes a substantial difference for the results, suggesting that
previous studies have substantially underestimated the strong role de-unionization played for
the rise of German wage inequality.
Our second contribution is that we simultaneously consider a very large set of potential
explanatory factors for changes in the wage distribution, larger than in previous contributions.
Our set of explanatory factors covers all the major explanations for rising wage inequality that
have been put forward in the literature including rich information on worker characteristics,
firms, union coverage, information on the task composition of occupations as well different
measures of internationalization. As in other contexts, considering as many potential factors
at the same time as possible is important to rule out spurious findings and to pin down the
quantitative importance individual factors. It is very clear that, if important factors of
distributional change are omitted from the analysis, then their impact will be spuriously
picked up by the factors included. For our econometric analysis, we use a powerful tool
for distributional analysis, the RIF regression approach (Firpo et al., 2009, 2018), which
is particularly well-suited to control for a large number of explanatory variables. We also
address some issues in the empirical implementation of RIF regressions, which may be of
interest to researchers who want to apply this method.
To preview our results, we find that the most salient factors behind the recent rise in German
wage inequality were a dramatic decline of union coverage and compositional changes of
1The LIAB was used by Dustmann et al., 2009, Card et al., 2013, and Baumgarten et al., 2018, among
many others. The only other study using the GSES we are aware of is Antonzcyk et al., 2010., who use
only a subset of the waves considered by us.
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the work force with respect to age and education. These results hold after simultaneously
controlling for an extensive list of other determinants of the wage distribution including
information on job tasks, firm characteristics, measures of internationalization, regional
wage differences and the sector composition of the economy. Using information on individual
union coverage, we demonstrate that the use of firm-level information on unionization does
not fully capture the substantial effect de-unionization had on the German wage distribution.
Our results point to the fact that the mere shrinking of the part of the economy in which
wages were more compressed was to a large part responsible for the trend towards increasing
wage inequality. As the second most important factor, we identify compositional effects
related to personal characteristics, especially workers’ age and education. Such effects are
consistent with the hypothesis that the increasing demand for higher skills due to SBTC was
matched by rising supply for such skills due to educational upgrading and population aging.
This follows from the insight that, in the absence of rising demand due to SBTC, rising supply
of high skills would have depressed the wage premia for such skills which cannot be observed
in the data. We do measure some wage structure effects related to internationalization, firm
heterogeneity, task changes, and regional wage convergence, but these were very moderate
compared to the dominating effects of de-unionization and compositional changes of the
workforce.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of some related
literature. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, we describe our data and econometric methods. Section
2.5 presents our empirical results. In section 2.6, we discuss these results and provide some
conclusions.
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2.2 Literature review
In this section, we provide a selective review of contributions dealing with changes in the
German wage structure and with effects of the factors considered by us on the wage structure
in other countries. Based on administrative data derived from social security records, Dust-
mann et al. (2009) analyzed changes in the distribution of daily earnings in West Germany
up to 2004. They showed that inequality increases first started in the 1980s at the top, and
then in the 1990s at the bottom of the distribution, about a decade later than in the US.
Their analysis suggests that compositional effects of personal characteristics account for a
substantial part of inequality changes in the upper half of the distribution and nonnegligible
shares at the bottom, while compositional changes of de-unionization explain considerable
changes at the bottom but only some changes in the upper part of the distribution. Dust-
mann et al. (2009) consider each of the factors mentioned above separately and do not
provide a break-down of the quantitative importance of each factor controlling for all other
factors.
Based on a different data base, Antonzcyk et al. (2009) examined polarization effects of task
changes on the distribution of monthly wages. They find that changes in task assignment
reduced rather than increased wage inequality. Antonzcyk et al. (2010) used two waves of
the data base we also use in this article in order to study changes in the West German wage
distribution and the gender wage gap between 2001 and 2006. Their results suggest that
changes in firm-level characteristics other than those related to union bargaining were the
most important determinants of rising inequality, while changes in unionization did not have
much explanatory power when other firm-level characteristics were controlled for. Antonzcyk
et al. (2010) use a different methodology and a less extensive set of explanatory variables
than we do. Moreover, there were substantial developments in some covariates outside the
period 2001 to 2006 (esp. de-unionization), which are not covered by their analysis.
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Also using administrative data, Card et al. (2013) studied the effects of fixed person and
firm effects on the distribution of daily wages. They conclude that both increasing dis-
persion in person and in firm effects, as well as increasing assortative matching of high
person to high firm fixed effects contributed to increasing wage inequality. Based on linked
employer-employee data, Ohlert (2016) studies determinants of establishment heterogen-
eity in Germany. His study concludes that increasing differences in firm size and workforce
composition contributed to rising inequality, while changes in union coverage played no im-
portant role. Also based on administrative data but without information on union coverage,
Rinawi and Backes-Gellner (2015) examine task-composition effects on the wage structure.
At odds with Antonczyk et al. (2009), they find that task effects explain up to one third
of the rise in wage inequality. Using the same data, Ehrl (2017) attributes most of the
increase in German wage inequality to differences in returns to characteristics and identifies
occupation-specific skills as the most important single factor.
In a setup very similar to that used in our study, but based on the administrative data
sets used in the other contributions, Baumgarten et al. (2018) aim to disentangle between-
plant and within-plant sources of wage inequality in Germany. Similar to what we find in this
study, Baumgarten et al. (2018) identify an important role for de-unionization for rising wage
inequality in Germany. They also estimate significant effects due to shifts between industries,
which we do not find in our study. While the set of firm-level variables in Baumgarten et
al. (2018) is more informative than ours, we have access to more detailed information on
individual-specific covariates than available in administrative data. In particular, we have
information on union coverage at the individual rather than at the firm level. We analyze
these differences in more detail below.
There is a small number of articles that empirically address aspects of internationalization for
wages in Germany. Schank et al. (2007) and Klein et al. (2013) investigated the exporter
wage premium, while Geishecker and Go¨rg (2008) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) studied
wage penalties associated with offshoring. These articles contain useful information on
17
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the effects of internationalization on wages but do not provide a full distributional analysis
that quantifies the magnitude of these effects on the overall wage distribution. A full
distributional analysis of the exporter wage premium is given in Baumgarten (2013), who
finds that these effects are rather small when individual and firm characteristics are controlled
for. Baumgarten et al. (2018) also find moderate effects of exporting on the wage structure
in Germany.
Our short review of previous contributions on changes in the German wage distribution
demonstrates that the literature has not reached a consensus about its main driving forces.
As a related article for the US, we would like to point out the study by Firpo et al. (2014)
who have analyzed the influence of detailed task measures and measures of offshorability on
changes of the US wage distribution. Consistent with Autor et al. (2008), they find that,
while distributional change in the 1980s was very monotonic (high quantiles gained, lower
quantiles lost), this pattern became U-shaped in the 1990s and 2000s. They further show
that (in contrast to what we find for Germany) recent inequality increases were associated
with wage structure rather than composition effects and that offshorability became a more
influential factor in the 1990s and 2000s.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis in this paper uses information from four waves (1995, 2001, 2006,
2010) of the German Structure of Earnings Surveys (GSES) provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office. The GSES are linked employer-employee data, which allow us to to
consider a rich set of covariates both at the person and the firm level. We use the minimally
anonymized version of the GSES which is only accessible onsite at the German Statistical
Offices.2 From a technical point of view, the GSES are the result of a two-stage random
2This study uses the GSES as well as supplementary data from the Linked-Employer-Employee Dataset
(LIAB) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu¨rnberg, and the BIBB Labor Force Survey of
the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB).
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sample. The first stage represents a draw from all German establishments with at least
ten employees subject to social insurance contributions. The second stage is a random
draw from all employees working in the selected establishment. We use appropriate sample
weights in all our analyses to ensure that our results are representative for the population
of firms and workers studied by us. The information in GSES is highly reliable due to the
fact that firms’ participation is compulsory under German law.
Our data differ from the widely used administrative data sets provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) in that they contain information on hourly wages (rather
than daily earnings) and that the wage information is not censored at the social security
contribution ceiling. Hourly wages more directly reflect the prices paid in the labor market
than monthly or daily earnings and are thus better suited to test the theories described in
the introduction. Focussing on hourly wages also makes results more comparable to those
for the US for which most studies have used hourly wages (e.g., DiNardo et al., 1996,
Lemieux, 2006, Autor et al., 2008, Firpo et al., 2014). Another advantage is that the GSES
include a larger and more reliable set of covariates at the individual level than available in
administrative data.
The disadvantages of the GSES are that it is not a panel study and that its coverage of the
economy was incomplete in the early waves. In order to ensure comparability over time, we
have to restrict our analysis to the 24 sectors listed in table A1. A comparison of our sample
with other data sources suggest that our choice of sectors covers around 70 percent of the
German economy with an emphasis on the traditionally strong manufacturing sector. In
order to assess the implications of this limitation, we have checked in the alternative SIAB
data (Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies) how imposing our sector restrictions
influences measured inequality trends. As expected, overall trends are very similar, but
imposing our sector restrictions implies somewhat lower inequality levels (because we miss
part of the service sector). It turns out that these differences are entirely due to the lower
half of the distribution, while numbers for the upper half are practically identical to the ones
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in the SIAB (see figures A1 to A3 in the appendix).
In order to enhance the information content of our data set further, we merge complementary
information from two additional data sets, the LIAB (for firms’ export status) and the
BIBB-IAB (for occupational task measures) as well as aggregate information provided by
the Federal Statistical Office (see next section for more details). Finally, we restrict our
sample to prime age (20-60 years) men working full-time (i.e. at least 30 hours per week).
In line with the existing literature, we do not include women in the present analysis, given
their much lower participation rate in full-time work and given the potential difficulties of
sample selection bias.
2.3.1 Hourly wages
Our hourly wage measure is defined as October earnings including additional payments
from overtime and bonuses from shift work, divided by paid working hours in October
including overtime. We inflate price levels in 1995, 2001, 2006 to the 2010 level using
the German consumer price index (CPI). For reasons of plausibility, we exclude a small
number of wage observations with less than 4 euros per hour as well as those associated
with a monthly working time of more than 349 hours. Although the wage information in
the GSES is largely uncensored, a censoring threshold at 25,000 DM (approxmiately 12,782
Euro) applied in 1995. In order to ensure comparability over time, we extend this censoring
threshold to all other years adjusting for changes in the price level (for example, the implied
censoring point for 2010 amounts to 15.879 Euro). We argue that we are still able to provide
a comprehensive picture of the overall distribution of male hourly wages, as this censoring
affected only about 200 (approximately 0.03% ) of the observations for 1995 and a similar,
though slightly increasing number of observations in the other waves (2001: 0.05%, 2006:
0.16%, 2010: 0.18%). Ultimately, our sample selection criteria lead to a total number
of 1,923,542 observations used in our analysis (1995: 592,198 employees in 23,668 firms,
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2001: 359,495 employees in 15,438 firms, 2006: 533,497 employees in 15,477 firms, 2010:
438,352 employees in 13,285 firms).
2.3.2 Explanatory factors
Our analysis considers the following explanatory variables which we combine into seven dif-
ferent subgroups representing the different factors whose influence on the wage distribution
we study in our decomposition analyses. We label the different subgroups as Unionization,
Personal, Tasks, Internationalization, Firm, Sector, Region. Descriptive statistics on these
variables and their change over time are given in table A1 in the appendix.
Unionization
In contrast to other data sets for Germany, our data includes information about union
coverage at the employee level. This means firms report for each individual separately
whether or not a given worker was paid according to some union agreement (in the original
data, firms report the id of the exact union agreement used to determine the pay of the
employee). This is in contrast to the broader firm-level information available in other data
sets for Germany in which one only observes very broadly whether or not the firm takes part
in specific forms of union bargaining, but not to what extent the pay of a given employee is
determined by a union agreement.
In Germany, there are different variants of union bargaining. Sectoral bargaining refers to
the case in which unions and employers form an agreement at the sector level. Workers
need not be union members in order to be covered by sectoral union agreements. Similary,
not all employees of the firm are necessarily paid according to the sectoral agreement. Firm
bargaining represents the case in which unions and employers reach an agreement at the firm
level. Similarly, such an agreement will typically (but not always) also apply to employees
21
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in the given firm who are not union members. It is the owners or the management of the
firm who decide which bargaining regime to take part in. In particular, firms may decide
not to engage in union bargaining, to leave existing agreements, or to deviate from existing
agreements for individual workers. This includes the possibility of paying lower wages for
new hires than for incumbents after having opted out of existing agreements. There may
also be ‘opening clauses’ that exempt certain employees from union coverage. For more
information on the varieties of union coverage in Germany, see Antonczyk et al. (2010),
Bra¨ndle et al. (2011), Fitzenberger et al. (2011, 2013) and Dustmann et al. (2014).
It turns out that the distinction between the firm’s general coverage status and that of the
individual worker is quite significant. In table 2.1, we show that union coverage dropped
generally, but that a substantial part of this drop was due to the fact that fewer and fewer
workers in firms who reported to take part in union bargaining were actually paid according
to a union agreement. In addition, even in firms that generally reported not to take part
in union bargaining, some 14 percent of workers were paid according to a union agreement
in 1995. This proportion dropped to zero by 2010. In general, the drop in the number
of individuals paid according to union agreements was massive: from 1995 to 2010, the
proportion of uncovered workers increased from 26.5 percent to 61 percent, while that of
individuals paid according to sector agreements fell from 69.7 to 35.7 percent. By contrast,
the group of individuals covered by firm contracts stayed approximately constant.
Personal characteristics
In this subgroup, we include the individual’s age (8 categories), tenure (6 categories), edu-
cational qualification (6 categories) and occupational position (3 categories). Note that
our education variable is more detailed and more reliable than in the administrative data
where it is often missing or unreliable as it is not needed for the administrative purpose
(see Fitzenberger et al., 2006). As evident from table A1, these variables followed some
23
Chapter 2. Unions, Internationalization, . . . 2.3. Data and descriptive statistics
notable trends over the period under consideration. In particular, there was some aging of
the German labor force as evident from the declining population shares of age groups below
40 years and the rising shares of those above 40 years. We observe a slightly rising share
of higher tenure groups at the expense of the lowest tenure bracket (0-5 years). There
was also considerable educational upgrading which is reflected in the declining share of in-
dividuals with lower/middle secondary schooling with or without vocational training, and
the rising share of individuals with an upper secondary degree (with or without vocational
training) and with tertiary education. Finally, there was a compositional shift from skilled
blue collar work to white collar work, while non-skilled blue collar work stayed constant or
even increased slightly.
Tasks
For modeling occupational tasks, we exploit the information in the commonly used German
Qualification and Career Survey of Employees (BIBB-IAB), jointly provided by the Federal
Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
These data allow us to construct measures for the analytical, interactive and manual task
content of individuals’ jobs. More precisely, we use three independent cross sections, each
covering 20,000-30,000 individuals from the years 1998/99, 2006 and 2012, which come
closest to our sample period. Given some inconsistencies in how the task questions were
asked in these surveys over time, we follow the common practice in the literature and
consider time-constant task measures per occupation (Baumgarten et al., 2013, Firpo et
al., 2014, Bo¨hm et al., 2016). In order to make the task information independent of time,
we pool the information from all the three surveys.
Table A2 in the appendix documents the mapping of the different activities into the three
task-groups, i.e. analytical, manual and interactive. In doing so, we closely follow Gathmann
and Scho¨nberg (2010). The share of a certain task-group g is defined as the number of
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activities in group g performed by an individual i divided by the total number of tasks
performed by the same individual, i.e.
Taskig =
number of activities in group g performed by i
total number of activities in all groups performed by i
. (2.1)
As common in the task literature (e.g. Spitz-Oener, 2006), these shares are first calculated
at the person-level and then averaged at the level of 2-digit occupations. In figure A4 in
the appendix, we document that the share of analytical and interactive tasks increased over
the period 1995-2001, while that of manual tasks decreased.
Internationalization
This group of covariates is intended to represent three different aspects of internation-
alization: the exporting behavior of firms on the one hand, and the pressure on 2-digit
occupations exerted by offshoring and import competition on the other. As the GSES data
lack a firm-level variable on export behavior, we impute this information from the LIAB
using an ordered logit model for the categories No Exports, Export share 1-25%, Export
share 26-50% and Export share 51-100%, where export share represents exports in total
sales. For this imputation, we exploit a large number of individual and firm characteristics
that are available in both data sets in order to predict the export share category for each
observation in the GSES.3 Our predicted export share variable displays very similar patterns
as in the original LIAB data. As shown in the summary statistics in table A1, we observe
a steeply increasing trend for the share of the predicted Export share 51-100% category at
the expense of the lower categories, which was partly reversed after the financial crisis in
2008. By contrast, the share of observations in the No Exports category stayed relatively
3Our model includes education (7 categories), a polynomial in age and tenure, occupational status (4
categories), sector (20 categories), and firm size (7 categories).
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constant with minor fluctuations.
In addition, we use information from the German national accounts (Federal Statistical Office
of Germany, 1999-2014) at the 2-digit industry level in order to derive measures of wage
pressure on occupations due to offshoring and imports of consumer goods. We differentiate
between 77 occupations and 24 industries.4 Following Baumgarten et al. (2013) and
Ebenstein et al. (2014), we first consider the share of intermediate input imports coming
from the same industry abroad as an indicator for offshoring at the industry level. In order to
arrive at a measure reflecting the wage pressure on occupation k due to trends in offshoring
activities across industries, we compute the average of these offshoring intensities across
all industries in which workers with occupation k work (using the employment shares of
occupation k in industry j as weights). Consequently, our measure of wage pressure on the
2-digit occupation k in year t due to offshoring is given by
Offskt =
J∑
j=1
Lkjt
Lkt
Offsjt (2.2)
where Offsjt denotes the industry-level offshoring intensities and
Lkjt
Lkt
is the employment
share of occupation k in industry j in year t.
For imports of consumer goods, we proceed analogously. Let Importsjt be the share of
imports of consumer goods in industry j in year t. Our measure of wage pressure on
occupation k in year t due to imports of consumption goods in the sectors this occupation
is employed in is then defined as
Importskt =
J∑
j=1
Lkjt
Lkt
Importsjt. (2.3)
4The data include the Classification of Occupations (KldB) at the 2-digit level, i.e. KldB75 in 1995 and
2001, KldB88 in 2006 and 2010. For reasons of time consistency minor aggregations were required leading
to a total number of 77 occupations. At the industry level, we consider the 24 sectors of the economy listed
in table A1, see next section for more details.
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Firms, sector, region
Under the label Firm we include information on firmsize (7 categories) and information
on whether corporate management is influenced by the state. The distribution of these
characteristics was relatively stable over the period 1995 to 2010 (see table A1). In order
to address changes in the composition of the economy over time and changes in inter-
industry wage differentials, we include under the label Sector categorial dummies for 24
different sectors of the economy based on the German Classification of Economic Activities
(WZ), which we harmonized over time.5 There were generally no big shifts in the sectoral
composition between 1995 and 2010. Notable exceptions were a sizable decline of the
construction sector and a moderate growth of wholesale trade (table A1). Finally, we
include information on the federal state in which a person worked under the label Region
(16 categories). Including this information is potentially important as there are sizable
differences in mean wages paid in different federal states, especially if one compares East
and West German states.
2.4 Econometric methods
In order to study the quantitative importance of the different sets of covariates on the
changes of the wage distribution over the period 1995 to 2010, we apply RIF-regressions
(Firpo et al., 2009, 2018). The Recentered-Influence-Function (RIF) decomposition is based
on the recentered influence function defined as RIF (y, ν) = ν+IF (y; ν) which integrates
to the statistic of interest ν (Fy) =
∫
RIF (y; ν) dF (y) = E(RIF (y; ν)), where Fy is
5Our sector classification is derived from the 2-digit German Classification of Economic Activities (WZ).
The German Classification of Economic Activities (WZ) changed between the waves of 1995, 2001 (WZ93)
and 2006 (WZ03) as well as 2010 (WZ08). While the change from WZ93 and WZ03 should not affect our
results at the 2-digit level, we acknowledge that the latter change might give rise to minor inconsistencies
for the period 2006-2010.
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the distribution function of the dependent variable (log hourly wage in our case). In the
simplest form, the RIF is modeled as a linear function of the explanatory variables, i.e.
E [RIF (Y ; ν) |X] = Xγ, where γ can be estimated by means of simple OLS. The statistic
of interest is then obtained as ν (Fy) = E (E [RIF (Y ; ν) |X]) = E(X)γ, using the sample
counterparts estimated by OLS (i.e. νˆ = X¯γˆ).
As shown in Firpo et al. (2009), the coefficients γ of the RIF regression represent the effects
of marginal shifts in the distribution of the components of X = (X1, . . . , Xk) on the statistic
of interest. For example, if ν (Fy) is an unconditional quantile of y and Xj union coverage
status, then γj will reflect how much quantile ν (Fy) of the unconditional distribution of
wages y is increased or decreased if the share of unionized workers is marginally increased.
The RIF regression follows the classic division into ‘composition’ and ‘wage structure’ effects.
It uses the idea that the distribution of wages will change whenever the composition of the
workforce changes, even if wages paid for given characteristics stay constant (‘composition
effect’). On the other hand, it may change if the composition of the workforce stays
constant, but wages paid for given characteristics change (‘wage structure’ effect). We
will use this method to carry out detailed decomposition analyses for different inequality
measures ν (Fy) based on quantiles, such as the 85-15, 85-50 and 50-15 log wage gap, the
Gini coefficient and the variance of log wages.
Specifically, we use a refinement of this method suggested by Firpo et al. (2014, 2018), i.e.
the RIF decomposition is combined with the semi-parametric reweighting approach intro-
duced by DiNardo et al. (1996). This is done to avoid bias in case the linear specification
for the RIFs described above is not sufficiently precise, as the linear specification is only
valid locally. The basic idea underlying this approach is to create an artificial time period
01, in which the distribution of X in period 0 is reweighted to that of period 1. Using
these three periods, two separate Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are run on the recentered
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influence function, leading to
∆νO =
(
X¯01 − X¯0
)
γˆν0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νX,p
+ X¯01 (γˆ
ν
01 − γˆν0 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νX,c
+ X¯1 (γˆ
ν
1 − γˆν01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νS,p
+
(
X¯1 − X¯01
)
γˆν01︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νS,c
. (2.4)
In this equation, the detailed composition effects ∆νX,p reflect the contribution of changes
in the distribution of particular covariates (or groups of covariates) to the overall change of
the distributional statistic. For example, suppose that there are wage differentials between
sectors covered and those not covered by unions in the sense that union coverage is associ-
ated with nonnegative wage premia.6 In addition, it may be the case that inequality within
the sectors covered by unions differs from inequality in sectors not covered (e.g., unions
compress wages in the sectors covered by them). Now assume that union coverage in the
economy declines. The overall compositional effect of this decline on wage inequality may
be positive or negative depending on whether the decrease in inequality between sectors
dominates the increase in inequality due to the declining share of sectors with low levels of
within-inequality. The specification error ∆νX,c in (2.4) reflects the differences in estimated
RIF coefficients in the sample of period 0 and the coefficients estimated in the sample of
period 0 whose distribution was reweighted to that of period 1.
The wage structure effect ∆νS,p represents the contributions of changes in the effects γ
individual covariates (or groups of covariates) have on the distribution of wages. This
includes effects on pay inequality between and within subgroups. In the above example,
this would include changes in the magnitude of wage differentials between sectors covered
and those not covered by unions, as well as changes in the amount of wage compression
within sectors resulting from changes in union policies (e.g., unions might increase or loose
their ability to compress wages). Finally, the reweighting error ∆νS,c reflects differences in
the means of covariates in sample period 1 and those in sample period 0 whose distribution
was reweighted to that of sample period 1. The reweighting error will be close to zero if
6The following discussion closely follows Firpo et al. (2009).
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reweighting is successful in changing the distribution of covariates in sample period 0 to
that of sample period 1.
To our best knowledge, the RIF-OLS decomposition is the only method known that is
capable of providing a detailed, path-independent decomposition of arbitrary distributional
statistics into composition and wage structure effects. Other decomposition methods are
either confined to particular distributional statistics (e.g. based on variance decompositions,
Juhn et al., 1993), provide no detailed decomposition results (Machado and Mata, 2005,
Melly, 2005, Chernozhukov et al., 2013), or provide detailed decomposition results that
depend on some ordering of factors (DiNardo et al., 1996, Antonczyk et al., 2010). For
more details, see the general discussion in Fortin et al., 2011.
As described in the literature, detailed decompositions of wage structure effects for a set
of categorical variables depend on the choice of the omitted reference group (Fortin et
al., 2011). This also applies to the RIF decomposition described above. In preliminary
estimations, we found that the detailed wage structure effects estimated by us sometimes
considerably depended on which reference groups for the various sets of our categorial
variables we chose. This is not surprising as the intercept of a regression always represents
the average outcome for a very specific reference individual (i.e. an individual with the base
level of education, age, tenure, sector, firmsize, region etc.). The intercept of the regression
(and hence the exact value of all other regression coefficients) will therefore depend to a large
extent on how the position of the reference individual changes over time. In order to make
our regression results independent of the choice of the reference individual, we normalize
the RIF regression coefficients within sets of categorial variables such that they sum up to
zero, i.e.
∑
j∈J γj = 0, where J is a set of categorial dummy variables summing up to one
(e.g. age categories). Gardezabal and Ugidos (2004) discuss this kind of normalization for
the case of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. An advantage of the normalization
is that it only shifts the intercept of the regression, leaving the relative differences between
coefficients intact.
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Applying this normalization will not only make results independent of the choice of a refer-
ence group but will also facilitate the general interpretation of RIF decomposition results.
Given that the RIF regression coefficients for groups of categorial variables are normalized
to sum up to zero, information about the general level of the statistic modeled by the RIF
regression (e.g. a quantile) will be shifted to the intercept of the regression, while differ-
ences in regression coefficients will only reflect deviations of individual categories from this
general level.7 The intercept of the RIF regression will therefore capture general changes
in unconditional quantiles (or other inequality measures) that are not related to pure relat-
ive changes within groups of categorial variables and which therefore cannot be attributed
in a detailed way to individual regressors. They may still reflect changes in the relative
importance of groups of categorial variables (e.g. the importance of age vs. education ef-
fects), but such changes cannot be attributed to individual variables or groups of variables.
They should therefore be summarized in the intercept as a general contribution to wage
structure effects. Finally, changes in the intercept will also incorporate general changes in
unconditional quantiles (or other inequality measures) that are due to factors not included
as observables in the analysis.
It is important to point out that RIF decomposition (as most other statistical decomposition
techniques) ignores general equilibrium effects. It correspond to the hypothetical thought
experiment of changing the distributions of observed covariates without changing the wage
structure (see Fortin et al., 2011, for a more detailed discussion). Similarly, we emphasize
that the RIF decomposition results should certainly not be interpreted as causal effects.
However, they do represent a rich and informative description of how distributional change is
related to changes in observables. Even if these relationships are not causal, it is important
to identify variables through which distributional change is mediated, or with which it is
correlated.
7We illustrate this kind of normalization for the case of a mean regression below.
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2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Development of inequality
Figure 2.1 – Quantiles of real hourly wage, 1995-2010
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Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
The general development of the distribution of real hourly wages between 1995 and 2010 is
displayed in figure 2.1. For the period as a whole, quantiles near or above the median gained
whereas quantiles below the median lost. This general trend is confirmed by the results for
the Gini coefficient and the variance of log wages. The results for the 50th to 15th percentile
and the 85th to 15th percentile in figure 2.2 suggest that the inequality increases were
steeper in the lower than in the upper part of the distribution, except at the very end of the
observation period. As to the top of the distribution, there were only moderate inequality
increases between the 95th and the 90th percentile but more pronounced increases between
the 99th and the 95th percentile. Although our data excludes developments at the very top
of the distribution of hourly wages, our findings are consistent with the view that changes in
the upper part of the German wage distribution were relatively modest when compared to
other, especially Anglo-Saxon countries (see Atkinson et al., 2011, Piketty and Saez, 2014,
Bartels and Jenderny, 2015).
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Figure 2.2 – Development of inequality, 1995-2010
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2.5.2 Trends in between-group inequality
In order to prepare the distributional RIF-analysis presented below, we first examine trends
in the relationship between observed characteristics and hourly wages as measured by OLS
regressions of log hourly wages on our long list of covariates (table 2.2). This regression
represents trends in between-group inequality, i.e. in average wage differentials between nar-
rowly defined cells of workers with identical observed characteristics. In order to facilitate
interpretation, we apply the normalization described above, i.e. we center estimated coeffi-
cients around zero within groups of categorial regressors. This will provide wage differentials
with respect to a mean level of returns normalized to zero.8
8For example, the estimated coefficients for the age categories indicate that in 1995, being in the age
group 20 to 25 years was associated with a wage penalty of 13.6 percentage points compared to the mean
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Table 2.2 – OLS regressions of log hourly wage on covariates
1995 2001 2006 2010
Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std Coeff. Std Coeff. Std
Age 20-25 -0.136 0.002 -0.162 0.003 -0.184 0.004 -0.173 0.004
Age 26-30 -0.058 0.001 -0.072 0.002 -0.099 0.003 -0.093 0.003
Age 31-35 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.016 0.002 -0.022 0.002
Age 36-40 0.021 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.04 0.002 0.033 0.002
Age 41-45 0.035 0.001 0.041 0.002 0.065 0.002 0.070 0.002
Age 46-50 0.045 0.001 0.047 0.002 0.064 0.002 0.073 0.002
Age 51-55 0.054 0.002 0.056 0.002 0.066 0.002 0.061 0.002
Age 56-60 0.046 0.002 0.062 0.003 0.063 0.003 0.051 0.003
Variance age coefficients (x100) 0.383 0.541 0.777 0.709
Tenure 0-5 -0.069 0.002 -0.078 0.002 -0.086 0.003 -0.093 0.003
Tenure 6-10 -0.006 0.001 -0.020 0.003 -0.023 0.002 -0.021 0.002
Tenure 11-15 0.010 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.003
Tenure 16-20 0.010 0.001 0.028 0.002 0.025 0.002 0.021 0.002
Tenure 21-25 0.021 0.001 0.029 0.002 0.039 0.003 0.036 0.002
Tenure >25 0.034 0.002 0.035 0.003 0.036 0.003 0.049 0.003
Variance tenure coefficients (x100) 0.110 0.156 0.191 0.221
Lower/middle secondary w/o vocational training -0.109 0.003 -0.129 0.003 -0.130 0.004 -0.140 0.004
Lower/middle secondary w/ vocational training -0.061 0.002 -0.073 0.003 -0.079 0.003 -0.091 0.003
Upper secondary (German high school equiv.) -0.017 0.004 -0.013 0.005 -0.017 0.005 -0.009 0.006
University of Applied Science (Fachhochschule) 0.092 0.003 0.101 0.004 0.099 0.005 0.105 0.004
University 0.169 0.004 0.202 0.005 0.210 0.006 0.224 0.005
Missing information -0.074 0.005 -0.088 0.007 -0.083 0.009 -0.090 0.006
Variance education coefficients (x100) 0.973 1.348 1.404 1.621
Non-skilled blue collar -0.106 0.002 -0.099 0.003 -0.107 0.004 -0.117 0.003
Skilled blue collar and foremen -0.008 0.001 -0.018 0.002 -0.014 0.003 -0.003 0.003
White collar 0.114 0.002 0.117 0.003 0.121 0.004 0.119 0.004
Variance occupational position coefficients 0.809 0.794 0.876 0.929
Offshoring (0-100%) 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.001
Imports of consumption goods (0-100%) -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
No Exports -0.028 0.004 -0.028 0.005 -0.036 0.006 -0.045 0.007
Export share 1-25% -0.008 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.021 0.004
Export share 26-50% 0.009 0.003 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.023 0.005
Export share 51-100% 0.027 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.043 0.007
Variance export coefficients (x100) 0.041 0.029 0.054 0.121
Mining and other quarring -0.058 0.013 -0.118 0.051 -0.006 0.019 0.047 0.029
Food products, beverages, tobacco -0.047 0.005 -0.071 0.008 -0.081 0.009 -0.044 0.011
level of returns to age, while individuals between 51 and 55 years received a premium of 5.4 percentage
points above this mean level.
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Textiles -0.086 0.008 -0.073 0.016 -0.081 0.012 -0.124 0.017
Wood -0.026 0.008 -0.041 0.012 -0.070 0.011 -0.090 0.010
Paper -0.006 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.030 0.011 0.030 0.009
Printing 0.144 0.007 0.130 0.009 0.123 0.009 0.078 0.013
Coke and petroleum products 0.099 0.025 0.146 0.021 0.171 0.021 0.220 0.056
Chemicals 0.038 0.006 0.033 0.007 0.041 0.008 0.036 0.009
Rubber, plastic -0.025 0.006 -0.036 0.007 -0.047 0.011 -0.035 0.010
Non-metallic products 0.001 0.005 -0.017 0.006 -0.034 0.010 -0.018 0.013
Basic metals 0.040 0.007 0.054 0.013 0.042 0.013 0.038 0.011
Fabricated metal products 0.018 0.005 -0.011 0.007 -0.009 0.009 -0.026 0.011
Computer, electronic, optical products -0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010
Electrical equipment 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.008 -0.014 0.010 -0.005 0.010
Machinery and equipment 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.006 0.011
Motor vehicles, trailers 0.115 0.008 0.098 0.009 0.091 0.010 0.077 0.009
Other transport equipment 0.005 0.008 0.071 0.026 0.018 0.013 0.090 0.012
Furniture etc -0.024 0.008 -0.048 0.011 -0.083 0.012 -0.035 0.008
Electricity, water, recycling 0.084 0.008 0.110 0.011 0.114 0.015 0.073 0.012
Construction 0.058 0.004 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.006 0.017 0.008
Trade of vehicles -0.040 0.015 -0.037 0.007 -0.032 0.008 -0.076 0.015
Wholesale trade -0.078 0.007 -0.062 0.009 -0.018 0.009 -0.037 0.010
Retail trade -0.161 0.008 -0.141 0.012 -0.175 0.024 -0.243 0.015
Finance and insurance -0.060 0.007 -0.023 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.025 0.013
Variance sector coefficients (x100) 0.457 0.522 0.546 0.732
Firmsize 10-19 -0.076 0.004 -0.077 0.005 -0.089 0.006 -0.067 0.007
Firmsize 20-49 -0.051 0.004 -0.062 0.004 -0.065 0.006 -0.056 0.006
Firmsize 50-99 -0.035 0.004 -0.035 0.004 -0.041 0.005 -0.031 0.006
Firmsize 100-199 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.014 0.005 -0.010 0.007
Firmsize 200-499 0.031 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.023 0.006 0.015 0.007
Firmsize 500-999 0.057 0.003 0.065 0.006 0.081 0.011 0.046 0.007
Firmsize >1000 0.078 0.004 0.086 0.006 0.104 0.006 0.103 0.007
Variance firmsize coefficients (x100) 0.285 0.332 0.456 0.309
State-owned -0.021 0.004 -0.044 0.008 -0.027 0.007 -0.026 0.006
Schleswig-Holstein 0.100 0.006 0.079 0.008 0.061 0.008 0.068 0.011
Hamburg 0.175 0.007 0.191 0.021 0.151 0.011 0.154 0.014
Lower Saxony 0.082 0.005 0.084 0.005 0.050 0.007 0.039 0.007
Bremen 0.136 0.011 0.054 0.012 0.071 0.010 0.083 0.017
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.128 0.004 0.116 0.005 0.095 0.006 0.097 0.006
Hesse 0.106 0.004 0.127 0.007 0.122 0.007 0.106 0.008
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.096 0.006 0.089 0.006 0.08 0.009 0.080 0.007
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.139 0.003 0.142 0.005 0.148 0.005 0.132 0.007
Bavaria 0.103 0.004 0.098 0.005 0.099 0.007 0.098 0.007
Saarland 0.073 0.008 0.084 0.012 0.068 0.011 0.064 0.011
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Berlin 0.058 0.008 0.032 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.022 0.014
Brandenburg -0.190 0.010 -0.178 0.009 -0.157 0.010 -0.157 0.013
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania -0.221 0.009 -0.214 0.010 -0.189 0.010 -0.190 0.013
Saxony -0.267 0.007 -0.249 0.009 -0.22 0.010 -0.219 0.011
Saxony-Anhalt -0.239 0.008 -0.227 0.009 -0.191 0.010 -0.163 0.012
Thuringia -0.278 0.009 -0.229 0.008 -0.195 0.010 -0.214 0.010
Variance federal states Coefficients (x100) 2.700 2.322 1.775 1.728
Share of analytical tasks 0.114 0.012 0.106 0.014 0.120 0.025 0.106 0.018
Share of interactive tasks 0.110 0.012 0.112 0.017 0.111 0.027 0.159 0.021
Share of manual tasks -0.224 0.005 -0.218 0.007 -0.231 0.007 -0.266 0.009
Variance task coefficients (x100) 2.510 2.377 2.669 3.576
No union coverage 0.033 0.003 0.021 0.005 -0.009 0.005 -0.019 0.005
Sectoral bargaining -0.016 0.003 -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.005 -0.006 0.005
Firm bargaining -0.017 0.005 -0.010 0.008 0.021 0.009 0.025 0.009
Variance unionization coefficients (x100) 0.054 0.023 0.022 0.034
Constant 2.901 0.005 2.92 0.009 2.931 0.009 2.964 0.009
Root MSE 0.220 0.246 0.267 0.276
R2 0.607 0.583 0.582 0.588
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Standard errors clustered at establishment level.
Coefficients within groups of categorial regressors are centered around zero.
We briefly summarize the effects of the different covariates. In general, there was a general
trend towards widening wage differentials between worker subgroups, reflected in the rising
variance of OLS coefficients within subgroups of regressors (e.g. age). We observe a
moderate widening of the returns to age, tenure, education and occupational position. The
association of wages with offshoring was positive, i.e. occupations that were more affected
by offshoring in the different sectors of the economy did not suffer but gain from these
activities. On the other hand, we obtain a slightly negative effect of imports in consumption
goods on the wages of occupations employed in the respective sectors, suggesting an import
pressure effect. There were no changes of these wage differentials over time. By contrast,
the exporter wage premium substantially increased over time.9 Wage differentials across
9Note the plausible magnitude and high statistical precision of the estimated coefficients for our variables
based on external imputations. This proves that our imputation introduces additional information into our
data which turns out as highly significant effects in our regressions.
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sectors moderately widened over our observation period. As regards the returns to firm
size, we observe that the premia at very large firms increased, while those of medium-sized
firms tended to fall. There was considerable convergence of wages across federal states (the
variance of the regional coefficients dropped from 2.700 to 1.728). For the different task
inputs, we observe a stable positive relative return for analytical tasks, while the return to
interactive tasks increased at the expense of that to manual tasks. Note that these task
premia and all other coefficients represent ceteris paribus effects holding constant education
and a long list of further covariates.
There are interesting trends in wage differentials between workers covered and those not
covered by union bargaining (last rows of table 2.2). Over the period under consideration,
we observe a continuous trend of a deteriorating position of uncovered workers relative
to covered workers. In 1995, not being covered by some union agreement was associated
with a slightly higher pay than if the person was covered by a pay scheme negotiated by
unions. This relationship was reversed from the mid 2000s onwards. Our interpretation of
this pattern is that in the years 1995 and 2001, i.e. when union coverage was generally very
high, individual non-coverage was mainly used to pay higher wages to highly productive
workers. Towards the end of the observation period however, employers more and more
used either individual or collective non-coverage in order to limit or even reduce the wages
of uncovered workers.
Given the important role unions play in the German labor market, we also carried out the
above wage regressions separately for individuals covered and those not covered by union
agreements (tables A3 and A4 in the appendix). The results confirm the expectation that
unions considerably compressed wage differentials across practically all observable covari-
ates (reflected in the much lower variances of regression coefficients for the different sets
of covariates) and within narrowly defined groups of workers with identical observable char-
acteristics (as reflected in a lower estimate for the residual variance of the regression). It
is especially these strong differences in inequality between covered and uncovered workers
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that suggest potentially important composition effects as a result of the secular decline in
union coverage identified in the previous section (i.e. overall inequality will increase if the
more compressed part of the economy shrinks).
2.5.3 RIF decomposition
Given the local nature of the RIF methodology, our strategy is to apply RIF decompositions
separately to our three subperiods 1995-2001, 2001-2006, 2006-2010, and to aggregate (i.e.
add up) the contributions of the different factors over the subperiods.10 We start with a
graphical analysis of the effects changes of our covariates have on unconditional quantiles.
Figure 2.3 shows that the change of the distribution of log hourly wages between 1995 and
2010 was such that unconditional quantiles below the 35th percentile fell, while those above
the 35th increased. This pattern is distinctively different from the changes in the US wage
distribution over similar periods which featured a U-shaped pattern, i.e. especially middle
quantiles lost in comparative terms, while lower and upper quantiles gained (Autor et al.,
2008, Firpo et al., 2014).
Decomposing the overall change into composition and wage structure effects, we find that
the pattern of composition effects shows the same monotonic behavior as the overall change,
but that additional wage structure effects played some role in the upper middle range of
the distribution. In the detailed plot of individual composition effects (figure 2.4), the most
striking effect is that of de-unionization. The shrinking share of workers paid according to
union pay schedules both substantially depressed quantiles at the lower end of the distri-
10The RIF-regression approximates the effects of marginal changes in the distribution of covariates on
inequality measures. The approximation error will be the larger the bigger changes in the distribution of
covariates are. In order to keep approximation errors small, it is therefore best to consider changes in
covariates over the smallest subperiods available. In a previous version of this paper, Biewen and Seckler
(2017), we report more details on individual subperiods. For our estimates, we provide bootstrapped
standard errors based on 100 resamples. The resamples are a simultaneous draw from all four years and
take account of the clustering at the firm level.
38
Chapter 2. Unions, Internationalization, . . . 2.5. Empirical results
Figure 2.3 – Aggregate decomposition 1995-2010
Figure 2.4 – Composition effects 1995-2010
Figure 2.5 – Wage structure effects 1995-2010
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
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bution and lifted quantiles at the upper end. These effects were so strong that they have
the potential to account for much of the overall inequality change. Second to effects of
de-unionization, compositional effects of changes in personal characteristics also played an
important role. This was particularly true for quantiles in the upper half of the distribution
of hourly wages, which significantly gained. This result is consistent with the population
aging and educational upgrading described in the previous section. The composition effects
of all other groups of covariates were relatively modest, although we observe some increases
in unconditional quantiles in the upper quarter of the distribution associated with interna-
tionalization, and very modest changes in the upper half of the distribution related to task
compositions.
Figure 2.5 provides the break-down of wage structure effects that are related to the different
groups of covariates considered by us. These effects are less smooth than the composition
effects, and some of them counteract each other. In particular, wage structure effects
related to firm characteristics and internationalization tended to favor higher quantiles,
while those related to region, unionization and personal characteristics were detrimental for
higher quantiles. For tasks, we observe small effects whose patterns are consistent with the
polarization hypothesis, i.e. the middle of the distribution lost compared to the bottom and
the top of the distribution. Importantly, all of these effects were dominated by general wage
structure effects represented by the constant of the RIF regression. As discussed above, the
regression constant represents changes in the wage structure that cannot be attributed to
particular groups of covariates or that may be related to factors not included as covariates
in the analysis. According to figure 2.5, these general wage structure effects were such that
the upper middle part of the distribution gained, while the very top part suffered losses.
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Table 2.3 – Aggregated RIF-decompositions 1995-2010
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar 99-90 99-95 95-90
Total change 19.21∗∗∗ 8.93∗∗∗ 10.28∗∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗ 7.26∗∗∗ 6.23∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗
(0.93) (0.73) (0.64) (0.20) (0.27) (1.00) (0.89) (0.45)
Total Composition 19.83∗∗∗ 13.68∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗ 7.06∗∗∗ 5.50∗∗∗ 0.06 5.44∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.55) (0.48) (0.17) (0.21) (0.82) (0.68) (0.39)
Personal 4.63∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.41∗ 0.29∗∗
(0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.27) (0.24) (0.15)
International 1.72∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 0.24 0.47∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ -0.46 -0.94∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.33) (0.26) (0.09) (0.11) (0.49) (0.44) (0.18)
Sector -0.13 -0.45∗∗ 0.31 0.06 0.09 1.29∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.29∗
(0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.07) (0.09) (0.41) (0.33) (0.15)
Firm -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.27 0.29 -0.02
(0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.24) (0.21) (0.07)
Region 0.48∗∗ 0.08 0.40∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.14∗∗ -0.05 -0.12 0.06
(0.22) (0.10) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06)
Task 1.18∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ -0.03 0.03 -0.06
(0.20) (0.14) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06)
Unionization 12.08∗∗∗ 8.41∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 3.82∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗ -0.61 4.38∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.31) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.53) (0.44) (0.25)
Total Wage Structure 0.15 -3.21∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 0.04 0.55∗∗ 6.85∗∗∗ 5.52∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗
(0.82) (0.67) (0.63) (0.18) (0.23) (1.52) (1.41) (0.59)
Personal 0.30 4.11∗∗∗ -3.80∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗ -8.82∗∗∗ -3.48 -5.34∗∗∗
(1.03) (0.91) (0.66) (0.28) (0.36) (2.39) (2.29) (1.02)
International 3.10∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 0.99 0.65∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.14 -0.42 0.56
(0.85) (0.66) (0.61) (0.22) (0.29) (1.59) (1.33) (0.63)
Sector 0.41 1.17 -0.76 -0.04 -0.11 -4.04∗∗ -2.77∗∗ -1.28
(0.89) (0.82) (0.55) (0.25) (0.31) (1.64) (1.27) (0.86)
Firm 4.90∗∗ 2.85 2.05 1.26∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 5.72∗∗ 3.74 1.97
(2.47) (1.86) (1.48) (0.57) (0.78) (2.73) (2.57) (1.20)
Region -1.60∗ -3.41∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 4.62∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.70) (0.65) (0.19) (0.26) (1.35) (1.13) (0.52)
Tasks 4.56∗∗∗ 3.74∗∗∗ 0.82 0.73∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ -2.83∗ -2.90∗ 0.07
(1.03) (0.90) (0.69) (0.23) (0.29) (1.69) (1.49) (0.80)
Unionization -2.98∗∗ -3.34∗∗ 0.37 -0.36 -0.26 5.25∗∗∗ 1.99 3.27∗∗∗
(1.42) (1.51) (1.11) (0.29) (0.39) (1.45) (1.22) (0.86)
Constant -8.54∗∗ -10.42∗∗∗ 1.88 -1.53∗ -1.15 6.82 6.81 0.00
(3.52) (3.05) (2.19) (0.81) (1.11) (6.15) (4.97) (2.43)
Specification Error -0.85 -0.18 -0.66∗ -1.29∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -3.35∗∗∗ 1.50 -4.85∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.50) (0.36) (0.12) (0.15) (1.02) (1.07) (0.55)
Reweighting Error 0.08 -1.36∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.13 -1.73∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.29) (0.21) (0.09) (0.11) (0.30) (0.23) (0.12)
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. ∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level.
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at establishment level in parentheses (100 replications).
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In table 2.3, we provide a detailed break-down of the importance of the different factors for
the overall change in inequality. Consistent with the graphical analysis, the numbers show
that composition effects fully accounted for the overall inequality change, while wage struc-
ture effects compensated each other, resulting in a combined effect of zero. For our main
inequality measure, the 85-15 log wage differential, the strongest composition effects came
from de-unionization (12.08 out of 19.83 points) and from personal characteristics (4.63
out of 19.83 points). Some smaller compositional effects were contributed by internation-
alization (1.72 out of 19.83 points) and by shifts in occupational tasks (1.18 out of 19.83
points). Turning to wage structure effects, there were inequality increasing wage structure
effects coming from internationalization (3.10 points), firm differences (4.90 points) and
tasks (4.56 points). However, these were fully compensated by inequality reducing wage
structure effects related to union pay schemes (-2.98 points), regional convergence (-1.60
points), and the RIF constant (-8.54 points). As explained above, the latter represent gen-
eral wage structure effects that cannot be attributed to any particular group of covariates.
The results for the Gini coefficient and the variance of logs generally reproduce the results
for the 85-15 log wage gap (columns five and six of table 2.3).
Distinguishing between effects on the upper half (85-50 log wage differential) and on the
lower half of the distribution (50-15 log wage differential), we find that the same groups
of covariates generally turn out significant, but that the effects in the upper half of the
distribution generally dominate. This is also true of the strong compositional effects of
de-unionization, contrary to the results in Dustmann et al. (2009, 2014), who found that
de-unionization affected mainly the bottom of the distribution. Below, we investigate dif-
ferences between Dustmann et al. (2009, 2014) and our results in more detail, and provide
an explanation why de-unionization affected the whole of the distribution rather than just
the bottom.
The last three columns of table 2.3 display the results for top 10 percent of the distribution.
As shown earlier, most of the inequality increase occurred at the very top, i.e. within the
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top 5 percent. Compared to the rest of the distribution, we find weaker composition effects
and much stronger unexplained wage structure effects. Overall, the patterns found for the
top 10 percent of the distribution look more erratic and less precisely estimated. Also,
specification errors are larger than in the main part of the distribution. The main conclusion
is that the factors responsible for changes in the main part of the distribution do not explain
changes at the top.
2.5.4 How do data features drive the results?
One of the contributions of this paper is to use a data set that is different from most of the
data sets used in the literature on changes in the German wage distribution. As explained
above, our data have a number of features that are not available in the administrative
data often used for Germany. These include i) the availability of hourly wages, ii) no top
censoring at the social security contributions threshold, and iii) the availability of information
on union-determined pay at the individual level. The purpose of this section is to artificially
impose in our data set the restrictions present in the administrative data in order to see how
this influences the results. This will allow us to assess differences between our results and
those reported in the literature. As most of the literature has focussed on West Germany, we
also include a variation that uses West German workers only. Taken together, we consider
the following variations: i) we consider daily earnings (as in the administrative data) rather
than hourly wages, ii) we consider daily earnings and in addition artificially censor our wage
information at the social security contributions ceiling,11 iii) we only use the West German
part of our sample, and finally, iv) we include union coverage status at the firm rather than
at the individual level.
11For this variation, we proceed exactly as it is done in the literature using administrative data, i.e. we
impute wages above the social security contributions ceiling based on the procedure described in Gartner
(2005).
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Table 2.4 – Aggregated RIF-decompositions 1995-2010,
alternative specifications (main specification in bold face)
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar 99-90 99-95 95-90
Total composition 19.83 13.68 6.14 6.09 7.06 5.50 0.06 5.44
Spec. Daily earnings 18.14 12.85 5.29 5.63 6.44 4.37 -0.51 4.88
Spec. Daily earnings censored 18.29 13.00 5.29 4.71 5.50 -3.36 -2.46 -0.90
Spec. West Germany 18.75 14.33 4.42 5.89 6.40 4.76 0.22 4.54
Spec. Firm-level unionization 12.46 7.83 4.63 3.69 4.32 4.13 1.51 2.62
Composition Personal 4.63 3.32 1.32 1.38 1.61 0.70 0.41 0.29
Spec. Daily earnings 4.32 2.97 1.34 1.30 1.50 0.70 0.15 0.56
Spec. Daily earnings censored 4.38 3.03 1.34 1.38 1.58 1.16 0.40 0.76
Spec. West Germany 5.49 3.88 1.61 1.56 1.72 0.56 0.58 -0.02
Spec. Firm-level unionization 4.97 3.56 1.41 1.49 1.74 0.91 0.42 0.49
Composition International 1.72 1.49 0.24 0.47 0.51 -0.46 -0.94 0.49
Spec. Daily earnings 1.36 1.33 0.03 0.43 0.45 -0.02 -0.67 0.65
Spec. Daily earnings censored 1.37 1.34 0.03 0.39 0.41 -0.19 -0.22 0.03
Spec. West Germany 1.23 1.46 -0.23 0.37 0.38 -0.47 -0.85 0.38
Spec. Firm-level unionization 2.27 1.95 0.32 0.67 0.73 -0.23 -0.97 0.74
Composition Sector -0.13 -0.45 0.31 0.06 0.09 1.29 1.00 0.29
Spec. Daily earnings -0.10 -0.20 0.10 0.06 0.08 1.29 1.07 0.22
Spec. Daily earnings censored -0.12 -0.22 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.37 0.20
Spec. West Germany -0.31 -0.32 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.28 0.85 0.43
Spec. Firm-level unionization 0.01 -0.27 0.28 0.12 0.17 1.46 1.03 0.43
Composition Firm -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.27 0.29 -0.02
Spec. Daily earnings -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.31 0.27 0.04
Spec. Daily earnings censored -0.14 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.16 0.11 0.04
Spec. West Germany -0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.41 0.42 -0.01
Spec. Firm-level unionization 0.11 0.22 -0.12 0.10 0.08 0.43 0.21 0.23
Composition Region 0.48 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.14 -0.05 -0.12 0.06
Spec. Daily earnings 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.06 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.01
Spec. Daily earnings censored 0.33 -0.01 0.34 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.10
Spec. West Germany 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
Spec. Firm-level unionization 0.44 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.13 -0.12 -0.16 0.03
Composition Task 1.18 0.86 0.31 0.30 0.31 -0.03 0.03 -0.06
Spec. Daily earnings 1.10 0.77 0.33 0.29 0.30 -0.01 -0.09 0.08
Spec. Daily earnings censored 1.10 0.77 0.33 0.21 0.22 -0.81 -0.52 -0.30
Spec. West Germany 1.33 0.86 0.47 0.36 0.36 0.06 0.13 -0.06
Spec. Firm-level unionization 1.28 0.94 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.09 0.04 0.05
Composition Unionization 12.08 8.41 3.67 3.82 4.44 3.77 -0.61 4.38
Spec. Daily earnings 11.26 8.00 3.26 3.51 4.04 2.12 -1.20 3.32
Spec. Daily earnings censored 11.37 8.11 3.26 2.67 3.18 -4.45 -2.72 -1.74
Spec. West Germany 11.08 8.47 2.61 3.60 3.95 2.97 -0.87 3.84
Spec. Firm-level unionization 3.37 1.36 2.01 0.90 1.12 1.59 0.93 0.65
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Total wage structure 0.15 -3.21 3.36 0.04 0.55 6.85 5.52 1.33
Spec. Daily earnings 0.77 -2.02 2.78 0.56 1.12 8.18 6.39 1.80
Spec. Daily earnings censored -1.06 -3.85 2.78 1.84 2.54 14.49 9.30 5.19
Spec. West Germany 0.85 -4.46 5.31 0.15 0.80 6.76 6.27 0.49
Spec. Firm-level unionization 7.08 2.18 4.90 1.65 2.57 6.06 5.15 0.91
Wage structure Personal 0.30 4.11 -3.80 -0.68 -1.11 -8.82 -3.48 -5.34
Spec. Daily earnings -1.53 0.71 -2.23 -0.99 -1.45 -5.81 -1.73 -4.08
Spec. Daily earnings censored -1.67 0.56 -2.23 -1.84 -2.72 -5.62 1.02 -6.64
Spec. West Germany 2.82 4.80 -1.99 -0.26 -0.54 -9.38 -5.80 -3.58
Spec. Firm-level unionization -3.59 0.42 -4.02 -0.57 -1.53 -3.90 -3.12 -0.78
Wage structure International 3.10 2.11 0.99 0.65 0.81 0.14 -0.42 0.56
Spec. Daily earnings 1.94 1.35 0.59 0.48 0.59 0.96 0.36 0.60
Spec. Daily earnings censored 2.12 1.53 0.59 0.25 0.34 -1.45 -1.32 -0.14
Spec. West Germany 1.67 1.26 0.41 0.37 0.46 0.23 -0.04 0.26
Spec. Firm-level unionization 4.73 3.61 1.12 1.13 1.35 -1.19 -1.61 0.43
Wage structure Sector 0.41 1.17 -0.76 -0.04 -0.11 -4.04 -2.77 -1.28
Spec. Daily earnings -0.17 0.52 -0.70 -0.17 -0.26 -3.90 -2.46 -1.44
Spec. Daily earnings censored -0.30 0.40 -0.70 0.16 0.07 1.02 1.09 -0.07
Spec. West Germany 1.69 1.19 0.50 0.19 0.20 -2.83 -1.26 -1.57
Spec. Firm-level unionization -0.59 0.32 -0.91 -0.10 -0.27 -1.72 -2.05 0.34
Wage structure Firm 4.90 2.85 2.05 1.26 1.59 5.72 3.74 1.97
Spec. Daily earnings 3.01 1.48 1.53 0.94 1.15 4.01 2.23 1.78
Spec. Daily earnings censored 3.04 1.51 1.53 0.67 0.93 -4.48 -5.00 0.52
Spec. West Germany 2.00 1.29 0.71 0.78 1.06 6.94 5.30 1.65
Spec. Firm-level unionization 5.38 2.92 2.46 1.07 1.55 2.07 0.24 1.83
Wage structure Region -1.60 -3.41 1.81 0.01 0.02 4.62 2.55 2.07
Spec. Daily earnings -1.51 -1.06 -0.45 -0.06 -0.23 4.02 2.58 1.44
Spec. Daily earnings censored -1.23 -0.78 -0.45 0.09 -0.10 0.68 -0.32 1.00
Spec. West Germany -3.63 -3.80 0.17 -0.60 -0.65 3.22 2.19 1.03
Spec. Firm-level unionization -0.46 -1.59 1.13 0.26 0.14 2.99 1.95 1.05
Wage structure Task 4.56 3.74 0.82 0.73 0.77 -2.83 -2.90 0.07
Spec. Daily earnings 2.54 2.82 -0.28 0.54 0.46 -2.26 -1.82 -0.44
Spec. Daily earnings censored 1.71 1.99 -0.28 0.04 -0.15 2.04 2.62 -0.58
Spec. West Germany 3.96 3.06 0.89 0.88 1.02 -2.11 -1.91 -0.21
Spec. Firm-level unionization 4.13 3.30 0.82 0.86 0.62 -1.60 -2.08 0.48
Wage structure Unionization -2.98 -3.34 0.37 -0.36 -0.26 5.25 1.99 3.27
Spec. Daily earnings -1.65 -1.12 -0.53 -0.17 -0.04 2.89 1.28 1.61
Spec. Daily earnings censored -1.41 -0.87 -0.53 0.34 0.61 1.92 0.27 1.64
Spec. West Germany -3.94 -1.97 -1.97 -0.49 -0.58 4.04 1.79 2.25
Spec. Firm-level unionization 3.99 2.42 1.57 0.51 0.91 -4.48 -2.63 -1.84
Wage structure Constant -8.54 -10.42 1.88 -1.53 -1.15 6.82 6.81 0.00
Spec. Daily earnings -1.86 -6.72 4.86 -0.02 0.89 8.27 5.94 2.33
Spec. Daily earnings censored -3.33 -8.19 4.86 2.13 3.55 20.39 10.94 9.45
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Spec. West Germany -3.71 -10.29 6.58 -0.73 -0.15 6.66 6.01 0.65
Spec. Firm-level unionization -6.51 -9.22 2.71 -1.51 -0.20 13.87 14.46 -0.59
Specification Error -0.85 -0.18 -0.66 -1.29 -1.27 -3.35 1.50 -4.85
Spec. Daily earnings -1.40 -0.63 -0.77 -1.31 -1.28 -2.59 1.61 -4.20
Spec. Daily earnings censored 0.26 1.04 -0.77 -1.12 -1.12 0.81 1.80 -0.99
Spec. West Germany -1.59 -0.41 -1.17 -1.29 -1.19 -1.54 1.54 -3.08
Spec. Firm-level unionization -1.32 -0.37 -0.95 -0.71 -0.82 -0.72 0.82 -1.54
Reweighting Error 0.08 -1.36 1.44 -0.23 -0.13 -1.73 -0.84 -0.89
Spec. Daily earnings 0.18 -0.69 0.86 -0.12 -0.07 -1.50 -0.95 -0.55
Spec. Daily earnings censored 0.20 -0.67 0.86 -0.04 0.03 -0.51 -0.15 -0.36
Spec. West Germany 0.56 -1.23 1.79 -0.12 -0.00 -1.90 -0.87 -1.03
Spec. Firm-level unionization 0.99 -0.71 1.70 -0.02 0.13 -2.20 -1.25 -0.96
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
The results are shown in table 2.4. A first important conclusion from this table is that the
practice of the previous literature to focus on daily earnings instead of hourly wages does
not change the results in any important way.12 Similarly, introducing in addition artificial
censoring at the social security contributions threshold in combination with an imputation
procedure above this threshold, does not change the results in important ways, as long as
one only considers the distribution up to the 85th wage percentile. However, the right hand
columns of table 2.4 warn that this is not true for the range above the 85th percentile or
if one uses inequality measures that include the whole range of the distribution such as
the Gini.13 As a next variation, we restrict our estimates to West Germany. Considering
only West Germany induces some smaller changes in the wage structure effects (esp. for
personal characteristics), but does not challenge in any way the strong composition effects
contributed by de-unionization and personal characteristics.
Finally, we consider the variation of using firm level instead of individual level union coverage.
This produces substantial differences. In the specification with firm level union coverage,
the compositional de-unionization is drastically reduced (from 12.08 to 3.37 points), and
12The only substantial difference between the analysis of hourly vs. daily wages is the RIF-regression
constant. In addition, there are minor differences in wage structure effects in the lower and the upper half
of the distribution (esp. for personal characteristics).
13Additional graphical evidence presented in the appendix suggests that the imputation procedure pro-
duces nonsensical patterns for distributional analysis above the 85 percentile (tables A5 to A8).
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the wage structure effects for personal characteristics and union coverage are reversed. Note
that it is quite plausible that reducing information on union coverage to the firm level shifts
explanatory power to coefficients on personal characteristics. Switching to firm-level union
status also practically eliminates the strong compositional effects of de-unionization found
for the upper half of the distribution in our original specification (column three of table 2.4).
How can the substantial differences between the results with individual-level and firm-level
coverage status be explained? If firm-level union status is used, all individuals in the same
firm are assigned an identical union effect, ignoring that not all workers in a given firm are
paid according to union pay schemes. In table 2.1, we showed that such workers exist and
that their share increased over time. Indeed, the subgroup of workers not paid according to
union pay schemes is very diverse, including both high-productivity workers for whom non-
coverage is used to pay higher wages, and low-productivity workers for whom non-coverage
is used to pay particularly low wages. As shown earlier, both between- and within-group
wage differentials are much more pronounced in the group of uncovered than in the group
of covered workers (tables A3 and A4 in the appendix). Increasing the very heterogenous
portion of workers not covered by union pay schemes will therefore mechanically increase
inequality across the whole distribution, not only in the lower part.
We are now in the position to contrast our results with results reported in the literature and
to explain observed differences. Using administrative data on daily earnings, Dustmann et
al. (2009, 2014) also obtained the result that de-unionization was a leading factor for rising
wage inequality in Germany, along with compositional changes in personal characteristics.
We have shown in this paper that the use of daily earnings and censored wage information
in the administrative data does not compromise the validity of their findings. Moreover, we
provide a further validation of some of their conclusions by showing that the compositional
effects of de-unionization and personal characteristics also hold in a multivariate setting,
i.e. when controlling for a large set of factors at the same time (Dustmann et al., 2009,
2014, only considered one factor at a time, not controlling for other factors). Finally, we
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show that Dustmann et al. (2009, 2014) underestimate and partly misinterpret the effects
of de-unionization by considering only firm-level unionization status which does not show
the full extent of the erosion of union coverage, and which misses effects of de-unionization
in the upper part of the wage distribution.
Antonczyk et al. (2010) used two waves of the same data set we use in this study and a
less extensive set of explanatory factors. Employing a methodology based on sequentially
introducing explanatory factors in quantile regressions, they found no leading role for effects
of de-unionization. Apart from differences in methodology, we show above that their use
of firm-level union information tends to underestimate the full effect of de-unionization.
Moreover, they considered only the waves 2001 and 2006, while our results suggest that
there were important effects in the other waves not covered by their analysis. Ohlert
(2016) analyzed administrative wage data combined with rich firm survey data (the LIAB
data). He also found no important role for de-unionization but for firm characteristics.
Ohlert (2016) employed the regression-based decomposition methodology introduced by
Fields (2003) which also controls for many factors at the same time, but which does not
make the classical distinction between ‘composition’ and ‘wage structure’ effects. His results
are therefore hard to compare to ours.
Ehrl (2017) used a very similar method but based on administrative wage data. He concludes
that occupational characteristics are important for rising wage inequality, but his analysis
does not include information on union coverage, neither at the firm nor at the individual
level. Finally, in an analysis similar to ours but based on administrative data, Baumgarten
et al. (2018) find important effects for de-unionization but also for sectoral change. The
latter result is different from ours, which is probably due to the fact that we observe a
narrower range of sectors in our data set than they do in theirs. Our analysis suggests that
Baumgarten et al. (2018), just as all the previous literature on wage inequality in Germany,
grossly underestimate the leading role of de-unionization as their data does not include
information on union coverage at the individual level.
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2.5.5 What role is left for unobserved firm heterogeneity?
In light of recent contributions focussing on firm and establishment effects (Card et al.,
2013, Ohlert, 2016, Barth et al. 2016, Song et al. 2019), one might ask what role is left for
between-firm differences that go beyond the differences in observable firm characteristics
already included in our analysis. In order to address this question, we carry out the following
procedure. First, we obtain cross-sectional firm effects by regressing log hourly wages on our
list of observable covariates and a full set of firm dummies. Because of partitioning properties
of OLS, this is equivalent to taking the residuals from wage regressions as in table 2.2 and
computing average residuals at the firm level. We then consider the distribution of these
firm-specific wage effects. In order to assess to what extent rising heterogeneity in firm-
specific wage effects contributed to rising wage inequality, we assign to each individual in
the wage distribution of a base year the corresponding firm effect in the distribution of the
target year, assuming that the individual keeps working at a firm in the same percentile of
the distribution of firm effects. We are aware that we are unable to capture changes in
sorting of workers to firms as in Card et al. (2013) in this way. Still, our procedure will be
informative about the quantitative importance of changes in heterogeneity between firms
not captured by our firm level observables (net of additional sorting effects).
Table 2.5 – Effect of unobserved firm heterogeneity 1995-2010
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar
Total change 18.43 8.83 9.59 4.44 6.35
Unobserved firm heterogeneity 1.72∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. ∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level.
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at establishment level (100 replications).
Table 2.5 shows that assigning workers in 1995 their (more heterogenous) firm effects of
2010 increases the 85-15 wage gap by a moderate 1.72 log percentage points. This accounts
for some 10 percent of the overall inequality change of 18.43 log percentage points. Overall,
49
Chapter 2. Unions, Internationalization, . . . 2.6. Summary and discussion
we conclude that rising heterogeneity between firms beyond the factors explicitly included
in our analysis mattered for rising wage inequality but that its contribution was limited
compared to the effects explicitly analyzed in the previous sections.
2.6 Summary and discussion
This paper has analyzed the quantitative importance of a large set of explanatory factors for
the evolution of the German wage distribution over the period 1995 to 2010. A distinguishing
feature of our analysis is that we simultaneously take into account most of the factors
considered in the literature so far, and that we base our analysis on different data than
used in most of the prominent studies on wage inequality in Germany. In contrast to the
administrative data sets usually analyzed for Germany, our data include information on
hourly wages instead of daily earnings, is not top-coded, and contain richer information at
the individual level, esp. information on individual union coverage.
We explicitly analyze the differences induced by these data features. Our results suggest
that analyses based on administrative data are not compromised by the fact that these data
typically only report daily earnings rather than hourly wages (which are the best measure
of relative prices in the labor market). Similarly, top-coding does in general not invalidate
distributional results, as long as they do not include information above the 85th percentile.
Using our largely uncensored wage information, we also do not find extreme movements in
the upper part of the German wage distribution that is subject to top-coding in administrative
data, in contrast to what is known for other countries. This is good news for the users of
administrative data which often suffer from limitations due to their administrative purpose.
However, an important conclusion from our analysis is that using firm-level information on
unionization may miss an important part of the erosion of union coverage if this erosion also
takes place within firms.
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In substantive terms, our study suggests that compositional effects due to de-unionization
were by far the most important factor behind recent rises in wage inequality in Germany.
Our analysis suggests that the inequality increasing effects of de-unionization were mainly
due to the fact that de-unionization shrank the part of the economy in which wages were
more compressed. We document this by showing that wages among workers covered by
union agreements were much more compressed than among uncovered workers, both along
observable characteristics (such as age or education), and along unobservable characteristics
(within groups of workers with identical observable characteristics). It is therefore more than
plausible that a shift of more than 34 percentage points from the covered to uncovered
portion of the workforce led to substantially higher wage inequality. As the second most
important factor for changes in the distribution, we measure compositional effects related to
personal characteristics, especially workers’ age and education. Such effects are consistent
with the hypothesis that the increasing demand for higher skills due to SBTC were matched
by rising supply for such skills in the form of educational upgrading and population aging
(higher age represents higher human capital in the form of richer work experience and
acquired skills). This is because in the absence of rising demand due to SBTC, rising supply
of high skills would have depressed the wage premia paid for such skills, which one does not
observe.14
Taken together, our analysis suggests that a large part of changes in the German wage dis-
tribution can be explained by compositional changes of the workforce (around 60 percent by
de-unionization and around 25 percent by compositional changes in personal characteristics).
We do measure some wage structure effects related to internationalization, firm heterogen-
eity, task changes, and regional wage convergence, but these are smaller in magnitude and
tend to compensate each other.
We emphasize that our estimates are certainly not to be interpreted as causal effects. This
14In the previous version of this paper, Biewen and Seckler (2017), we present some evidence for excess
demand for higher skills.
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is for several reasons, one being that the factors in our analysis might be dynamically related
to each other. For example, de-unionization might have been a consequence of internation-
alization (e.g. Dreher and Gaston, 2007). In a previous version of this paper (Biewen and
Seckler, 2017), we explicitly considered this possibility by placing union coverage at the end
of a sequential conditioning scheme using the method of DiNardo et al. (1996), with the
result that it robustly remained the most important explanatory factor. Even if a factor like
de-unionization was itself a consequence of another factor, it would still be relevant to see
that changes in the distribution were largely mediated by this factor. In a broader perspect-
ive and in line with Dustmann et al. (2014), de-unionization might have been a way for the
German economy to arrive at a wage structure consistent with the needs of the economy.
Our finding that the decline in union coverage was a major determinant of the recent rise
in wage inequality is also consistent with the fact that de-unionization substantially slowed
down towards the end of our observation period, and that newer data for Germany indicate
no further increases in wage inequality after 2011 (Mo¨ller, 2016).
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Appendix A
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics
Variable
1995 2001 2006 2010
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Personal
Age 20-25 0.081 0.273 0.071 0.256 0.069 0.253 0.069 0.254
Age 26-30 0.152 0.359 0.106 0.308 0.095 0.294 0.100 0.300
Age 31-35 0.176 0.381 0.169 0.375 0.122 0.327 0.108 0.311
Age 36-40 0.150 0.357 0.190 0.393 0.178 0.382 0.132 0.338
Age 41-45 0.132 0.339 0.161 0.368 0.191 0.393 0.184 0.387
Age 46-50 0.109 0.312 0.134 0.340 0.158 0.365 0.183 0.387
Age 51-55 0.121 0.326 0.106 0.308 0.121 0.326 0.141 0.348
Age 56-60 0.078 0.268 0.063 0.242 0.066 0.249 0.083 0.276
Tenure 0-5 0.403 0.491 0.406 0.491 0.360 0.480 0.349 0.477
Tenure 6-10 0.185 0.388 0.188 0.391 0.205 0.404 0.189 0.392
Tenure 11-15 0.114 0.317 0.143 0.351 0.138 0.345 0.143 0.350
Tenure 16-20 0.100 0.300 0.084 0.278 0.115 0.319 0.117 0.322
Tenure 21-25 0.085 0.279 0.076 0.265 0.071 0.257 0.086 0.280
Tenure >25 0.113 0.316 0.103 0.303 0.110 0.313 0.116 0.321
Lower/middle secondary w/o vocational training 0.140 0.347 0.127 0.333 0.104 0.305 0.097 0.296
Lower/middle secondary w/ vocational training 0.711 0.453 0.680 0.467 0.663 0.473 0.644 0.479
Upper secondary (German high school equiv.) 0.026 0.158 0.039 0.195 0.051 0.219 0.053 0.224
University of Applied Science (Fachhochschule) 0.043 0.203 0.050 0.218 0.052 0.221 0.052 0.222
University 0.032 0.177 0.045 0.207 0.051 0.220 0.055 0.227
Missing information 0.048 0.213 0.059 0.235 0.080 0.272 0.100 0.300
Non-skilled blue collar 0.218 0.413 0.236 0.424 0.221 0.415 0.236 0.424
Skilled blue collar and foremen 0.462 0.499 0.396 0.489 0.389 0.487 0.381 0.486
White collar 0.321 0.467 0.369 0.482 0.390 0.488 0.383 0.486
Internationalization
No Exports 0.474 0.499 0.475 0.499 0.470 0.499 0.446 0.497
Export share 1-25% 0.292 0.455 0.221 0.415 0.151 0.358 0.190 0.392
Export share 26-50% 0.077 0.267 0.071 0.257 0.038 0.191 0.130 0.336
Export share 51-100% 0.157 0.363 0.233 0.423 0.341 0.474 0.234 0.423
Offshoring (0-100%) 4.020 2.311 4.177 2.380 4.405 2.771 4.062 2.841
Imports of consumption goods (0-100%) 3.267 5.138 3.274 4.764 2.993 4.816 3.220 5.116
Sector
Mining and other quarring 0.021 0.143 0.013 0.111 0.011 0.103 0.008 0.087
Food products, beverages, tobacco 0.038 0.192 0.039 0.193 0.038 0.191 0.043 0.202
Textiles 0.015 0.122 0.010 0.101 0.009 0.094 0.008 0.090
Wood 0.012 0.109 0.013 0.111 0.011 0.105 0.010 0.100
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Paper 0.014 0.119 0.014 0.119 0.013 0.113 0.014 0.118
Printing 0.020 0.141 0.023 0.150 0.020 0.139 0.011 0.103
Coke and petroleum products 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.050 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.042
Chemicals 0.045 0.207 0.042 0.200 0.038 0.190 0.039 0.194
Rubber, plastic 0.034 0.180 0.036 0.187 0.036 0.186 0.037 0.190
Non-metallic products 0.028 0.164 0.026 0.158 0.021 0.144 0.021 0.144
Basic metals 0.033 0.177 0.032 0.175 0.030 0.171 0.031 0.172
Fabricated metal products 0.062 0.241 0.070 0.255 0.069 0.254 0.069 0.253
Computer, electronic, optical products 0.035 0.185 0.042 0.201 0.040 0.197 0.026 0.159
Electrical equipment 0.030 0.172 0.036 0.186 0.038 0.192 0.035 0.185
Machinery and equipment 0.119 0.323 0.108 0.310 0.125 0.331 0.106 0.307
Motor vehicles, trailers 0.055 0.229 0.068 0.252 0.089 0.285 0.070 0.255
Other transport equipment 0.024 0.154 0.016 0.126 0.017 0.128 0.013 0.113
Furniture etc 0.021 0.142 0.021 0.143 0.017 0.129 0.048 0.213
Electricity, water, recycling 0.028 0.165 0.026 0.159 0.030 0.171 0.045 0.207
Construction 0.176 0.381 0.132 0.338 0.103 0.304 0.113 0.316
Trade of vehicles 0.032 0.176 0.038 0.192 0.044 0.206 0.046 0.210
Wholesale trade 0.076 0.266 0.086 0.281 0.098 0.297 0.113 0.317
Retail trade 0.040 0.196 0.045 0.208 0.046 0.209 0.039 0.194
Finance and insurance 0.039 0.193 0.062 0.241 0.054 0.227 0.054 0.226
Firm
Firmsize 10-19 0.074 0.261 0.079 0.269 0.071 0.257 0.073 0.260
Firmsize 20-49 0.151 0.358 0.166 0.372 0.150 0.357 0.161 0.368
Firmsize 50-99 0.134 0.341 0.125 0.331 0.130 0.336 0.125 0.330
Firmsize 100-199 0.125 0.330 0.133 0.339 0.134 0.341 0.131 0.337
Firmsize 200-499 0.170 0.375 0.159 0.366 0.161 0.367 0.159 0.365
Firmsize 500-999 0.097 0.296 0.103 0.304 0.106 0.308 0.094 0.292
Firmsize >1000 0.250 0.433 0.236 0.424 0.247 0.432 0.258 0.437
State-owned 0.046 0.210 0.023 0.150 0.020 0.141 0.037 0.188
Region
Schleswig-Holstein 0.026 0.158 0.023 0.149 0.024 0.152 0.026 0.160
Hamburg 0.023 0.148 0.023 0.149 0.021 0.144 0.022 0.145
Lower Saxony 0.076 0.265 0.080 0.271 0.083 0.276 0.087 0.282
Bremen 0.011 0.103 0.010 0.100 0.009 0.095 0.010 0.098
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.254 0.436 0.262 0.440 0.235 0.424 0.223 0.416
Hesse 0.081 0.273 0.076 0.265 0.079 0.269 0.075 0.264
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.043 0.203 0.051 0.219 0.045 0.208 0.048 0.213
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.163 0.370 0.171 0.376 0.177 0.381 0.167 0.373
Bavaria 0.166 0.372 0.166 0.372 0.182 0.386 0.183 0.387
Saarland 0.016 0.125 0.013 0.114 0.016 0.124 0.014 0.118
Berlin 0.027 0.163 0.019 0.137 0.017 0.129 0.021 0.144
Brandenburg 0.021 0.142 0.017 0.128 0.018 0.133 0.023 0.148
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Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.013 0.115 0.012 0.107 0.012 0.107 0.012 0.109
Saxony 0.037 0.189 0.038 0.191 0.042 0.200 0.043 0.202
Saxony-Anhalt 0.023 0.151 0.020 0.139 0.020 0.141 0.022 0.147
Thuringia 0.019 0.137 0.021 0.144 0.022 0.145 0.025 0.155
Tasks
Share of analytical tasks 0.276 0.142 0.290 0.150 0.293 0.151 0.290 0.151
Share of interactive tasks 0.212 0.118 0.221 0.123 0.223 0.126 0.224 0.126
Share of manual tasks 0.513 0.232 0.489 0.245 0.485 0.247 0.486 0.247
Unionization
No union coverage 0.265 0.441 0.388 0.487 0.550 0.497 0.610 0.488
Sectoral bargaining 0.697 0.460 0.569 0.495 0.401 0.500 0.357 0.479
Firm bargaining 0.038 0.191 0.043 0.203 0.041 0.198 0.033 0.178
Observations 592.198 359.495 533.497 438.352
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations. Weighted data.
Table A2 – Mapping of activities into task indicators
Task Activity
Analytical Researching, evaluating, measuring
Designing, planning, sketching
Correcting texts or data
Programming
Executing laws or interpreting rules
Manual Equipping or operating machinery
Repairing, renovating, reconstructing
Manufacturing, installing or constructing
Nursing, serving, accomodating
Transporting
Interactive Selling, buying, advertising
Teaching or training
Negotiating
Employing, managing personnel, organizing
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Figure A1 – Development of inequality, comparison GSES vs. SIAB (85-15 log wage gap)
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Figure A2 – Development of inequality, comparison GSES vs. SIAB (85-50 log wage gap)
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Figure A3 – Development of inequality, comparison GSES vs. SIAB (50-15 log wage gap)
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Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
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Figure A4 – Task composition 1995-2010
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
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Table A3 – OLS regressions of log hourly wage on covariates
(only individuals paid according to a union agreement)
1995 2001 2006 2010
Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std Coeff. Std Coeff. Std
Age 20-25 -0.122 0.002 -0.138 0.004 -0.150 0.005 -0.129 0.005
Age 26-30 -0.043 0.001 -0.053 0.002 -0.071 0.004 -0.058 0.003
Age 31-35 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Age 36-40 0.025 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.002
Age 41-45 0.031 0.001 0.035 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.049 0.002
Age 46-50 0.035 0.001 0.041 0.002 0.046 0.002 0.048 0.002
Age 51-55 0.038 0.002 0.045 0.002 0.051 0.003 0.035 0.003
Age 56-60 0.030 0.002 0.035 0.004 0.045 0.004 0.026 0.004
Variance age coefficients (x100) 0.274 0.362 0.469 0.346
Tenure 0-5 -0.058 0.002 -0.065 0.003 -0.065 0.004 -0.080 0.004
Tenure 6-10 -0.011 0.001 -0.013 0.004 -0.013 0.003 -0.014 0.003
Tenure 11-15 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003
Tenure 16-20 0.008 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.015 0.003
Tenure 21-25 0.020 0.001 0.024 0.002 0.027 0.003 0.029 0.003
Tenure >25 0.037 0.002 0.032 0.003 0.032 0.003 0.048 0.004
Variance tenure coefficients (x100) 0.089 0.106 0.107 0.166
Lower/middle secondary w/o vocational training -0.087 0.002 -0.102 0.004 -0.104 0.005 -0.110 0.005
Lower/middle secondary w/ vocational training -0.041 0.002 -0.047 0.003 -0.050 0.004 -0.056 0.003
Upper secondary (German high school equivalent) -0.031 0.004 -0.022 0.004 -0.025 0.005 -0.013 0.006
University of Applied Science (Fachhochschule) 0.085 0.003 0.096 0.004 0.088 0.005 0.092 0.005
University 0.124 0.005 0.146 0.006 0.153 0.008 0.147 0.006
Missing information -0.050 0.005 -0.071 0.006 -0.062 0.012 -0.061 0.008
Variance education coefficients (x100) 0.589 0.811 0.816 0.820
Non-skilled blue collar -0.100 0.002 -0.088 0.003 -0.092 0.005 -0.100 0.004
Skilled blue collar and foremen -0.008 0.001 -0.013 0.002 -0.016 0.004 -0.005 0.003
White collar 0.108 0.002 0.101 0.004 0.108 0.005 0.105 0.005
Variance occupational position coefficients 0.724 0.604 0.680 0.702
Offshoring (0-100%) 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001
Imports of consumption goods (0-100%) -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000
No Exports -0.012 0.004 -0.014 0.006 -0.029 0.008 -0.042 0.011
Export share 1-25% -0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 -0.025 0.006
Export share 26-50% 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.025 0.007
Export share 51-100% 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.021 0.007 0.041 0.008
Variance export coefficients (x100) 0.008 0.009 0.033 0.117
Mining and other quarring -0.080 0.012 -0.136 0.045 -0.021 0.022 -0.002 0.036
Food products, beverages, tobacco -0.043 0.005 -0.056 0.009 -0.042 0.013 -0.027 0.016
Textiles -0.102 0.007 -0.085 0.02 -0.110 0.017 -0.161 0.019
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Wood -0.011 0.008 -0.017 0.021 -0.049 0.015 -0.130 0.021
Paper 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.022 0.016 -0.005 0.011
Printing 0.153 0.008 0.164 0.010 0.164 0.014 0.155 0.037
Coke and petroleum products 0.090 0.031 0.138 0.027 0.156 0.028 0.227 0.068
Chemicals 0.038 0.007 0.027 0.008 0.031 0.012 0.024 0.013
Rubber, plastic -0.013 0.006 -0.027 0.008 -0.050 0.022 -0.043 0.017
Non-metallic products -0.013 0.006 -0.044 0.006 -0.081 0.014 -0.071 0.016
Basic metals 0.041 0.007 0.057 0.014 0.049 0.020 0.043 0.014
Fabricated metal products 0.024 0.005 -0.004 0.009 0.006 0.016 -0.010 0.017
Computer, electronic, optical products 0.025 0.006 0.026 0.008 0.046 0.01 0.051 0.013
Electrical equipment 0.020 0.006 0.024 0.009 0.016 0.015 0.032 0.011
Machinery and equipment 0.036 0.005 0.031 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.017
Motor vehicles, trailers 0.124 0.008 0.112 0.010 0.099 0.013 0.065 0.012
Other transport equipment -0.008 0.008 0.079 0.031 0.023 0.016 0.125 0.016
Furniture etc -0.019 0.008 -0.027 0.013 -0.051 0.015 0.010 0.014
Electricity, water, recycling 0.078 0.008 0.104 0.011 0.114 0.018 0.108 0.017
Construction 0.040 0.004 -0.009 0.007 -0.036 0.009 -0.013 0.012
Trade of vehicles -0.051 0.010 -0.057 0.009 -0.042 0.013 -0.028 0.019
Wholesale trade -0.110 0.008 -0.091 0.015 -0.053 0.016 -0.088 0.020
Retail trade -0.157 0.009 -0.162 0.013 -0.173 0.031 -0.233 0.023
Finance and insurance -0.066 0.007 -0.057 0.010 -0.030 0.010 -0.033 0.014
Variance sector coefficients (x100) 0.516 0.648 0.609 0.950
Firmsize 10-19 -0.051 0.004 -0.049 0.006 -0.054 0.008 -0.065 0.012
Firmsize 20-49 -0.033 0.004 -0.039 0.005 -0.040 0.009 -0.043 0.010
Firmsize 50-99 -0.028 0.004 -0.020 0.005 -0.024 0.007 -0.014 0.008
Firmsize 100-199 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 0.006 -0.014 0.007 0.006 0.009
Firmsize 200-499 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.007
Firmsize 500-999 0.038 0.003 0.036 0.005 0.048 0.010 0.038 0.008
Firmsize >1000 0.066 0.003 0.065 0.006 0.077 0.007 0.065 0.009
Variance firmsize coefficients (x100) 0.151 0.143 0.194 0.173
State-owned -0.020 0.003 -0.043 0.008 -0.025 0.008 -0.033 0.007
Schleswig-Holstein 0.075 0.006 0.076 0.012 0.052 0.012 0.028 0.013
Hamburg 0.167 0.008 0.176 0.035 0.126 0.017 0.120 0.018
Lower Saxony 0.069 0.004 0.064 0.006 0.030 0.008 0.029 0.009
Bremen 0.126 0.007 0.032 0.012 0.049 0.014 0.061 0.017
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.106 0.003 0.086 0.005 0.062 0.008 0.051 0.008
Hesse 0.076 0.004 0.072 0.006 0.059 0.009 0.054 0.010
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.099 0.006 0.083 0.006 0.076 0.015 0.047 0.010
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.120 0.004 0.131 0.006 0.126 0.008 0.112 0.012
Bavaria 0.071 0.004 0.066 0.005 0.072 0.009 0.077 0.009
Saarland 0.068 0.008 0.068 0.013 0.051 0.012 0.056 0.016
Berlin 0.056 0.009 0.040 0.011 0.021 0.018 0.034 0.021
59
Chapter 2. Unions, Internationalization, . . . Appendix A
Brandenburg -0.149 0.011 -0.149 0.014 -0.125 0.012 -0.086 0.031
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania -0.194 0.009 -0.181 0.018 -0.142 0.017 -0.184 0.033
Saxony -0.231 0.008 -0.199 0.015 -0.162 0.019 -0.140 0.018
Saxony-Anhalt -0.215 0.009 -0.190 0.011 -0.137 0.016 -0.112 0.019
Thuringia -0.245 0.015 -0.176 0.010 -0.159 0.018 -0.147 0.019
Variance federal states coefficients (x100) 2.048 1.556 1.032 0.874
Share of analytical tasks 0.165 0.011 0.187 0.018 0.188 0.032 0.192 0.026
Share of interactive tasks -0.014 0.013 -0.046 0.022 -0.059 0.036 -0.056 0.031
Share of manual tasks -0.151 0.005 -0.140 0.009 -0.128 0.009 -0.136 0.011
Variance task coefficients (x100) 1.674 1.889 1.840 1.950
Constant 2.853 0.005 2.882 0.008 2.906 0.010 2.927 0.011
Root MSE 0.186 0.199 0.209 0.205
R2 0.564 0.542 0.539 0.548
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Standard errors clustered at establishment level. Coefficients within groups of categorial regressors are centered around zero.
Table A4 – OLS regressions of log hourly wage on covariates
(only individuals not paid according to a union agreement)
1995 2001 2006 2010
Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std Coeff. Std Coeff. Std
Age 20-25 -0.162 0.005 -0.189 0.005 -0.201 0.004 -0.193 0.005
Age 26-30 -0.083 0.003 -0.086 0.003 -0.113 0.003 -0.106 0.003
Age 31-35 -0.023 0.003 -0.008 0.003 -0.020 0.003 -0.028 0.003
Age 36-40 0.016 0.003 0.033 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.034 0.003
Age 41-45 0.041 0.003 0.050 0.003 0.077 0.002 0.079 0.003
Age 46-50 0.061 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.075 0.003 0.083 0.003
Age 51-55 0.081 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.071 0.003 0.073 0.003
Age 56-60 0.070 0.005 0.081 0.005 0.065 0.004 0.060 0.004
Variance age coefficients (x100) 0.635 0.758 0.957 0.906
Tenure 0-5 -0.087 0.004 -0.098 0.004 -0.103 0.004 -0.098 0.003
Tenure 6-10 -0.007 0.004 -0.040 0.003 -0.042 0.003 -0.032 0.003
Tenure 11-15 0.013 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
Tenure 16-20 0.013 0.004 0.042 0.004 0.029 0.003 0.022 0.003
Tenure 21-25 0.031 0.004 0.041 0.006 0.057 0.004 0.043 0.004
Tenure >25 0.037 0.005 0.054 0.006 0.055 0.004 0.060 0.004
Variance tenure coefficients (x100) 0.171 0.293 0.325 0.276
Lower/middle secondary w/o vocational training -0.120 0.006 -0.138 0.006 -0.137 0.006 -0.147 0.006
Lower/middle secondary w/ vocational training -0.065 0.004 -0.084 0.004 -0.091 0.004 -0.101 0.004
Upper secondary (German high school equivalent) 0.024 0.009 0.012 0.010 -0.001 0.008 0.010 0.008
University of Applied Science (Fachhochschule) 0.081 0.006 0.095 0.007 0.104 0.006 0.108 0.006
University 0.155 0.007 0.192 0.007 0.204 0.007 0.216 0.006
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Missing information -0.075 0.008 -0.078 0.010 -0.079 0.009 -0.087 0.006
Variance education coefficients (x100) 0.924 1.304 1.429 1.630
Non-skilled blue collar -0.122 0.004 -0.124 0.005 -0.119 0.004 -0.125 0.004
Skilled blue collar and foremen -0.011 0.003 -0.024 0.003 -0.015 0.003 -0.003 0.004
White collar 0.134 0.006 0.148 0.006 0.133 0.005 0.128 0.006
Variance occupational position coefficients 1.099 1.262 1.069 1.065
Offshoring (0-100%) -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.001
Imports of consumption goods (0-100%) 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000
No Exports -0.036 0.008 -0.022 0.009 -0.010 0.007 -0.037 0.009
Export share 1-25% -0.013 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.006 -0.013 0.006
Export share 26-50% 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.015 0.007
Export share 51-100% 0.035 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.007 0.035 0.009
Variance export coefficients (x100) 0.072 0.017 0.008 0.075
Mining and other quarring 0.037 0.016 0.023 0.022 -0.021 0.030 0.096 0.017
Food products, beverages, tobacco -0.064 0.011 -0.093 0.011 -0.103 0.010 -0.062 0.012
Textiles -0.056 0.017 -0.067 0.019 -0.072 0.014 -0.107 0.021
Wood -0.032 0.012 -0.033 0.011 -0.069 0.013 -0.068 0.010
Paper -0.008 0.016 0.007 0.014 0.029 0.013 0.050 0.011
Printing 0.087 0.013 0.058 0.014 0.070 0.010 0.061 0.012
Coke and petroleum products 0.132 0.029 0.137 0.022 0.228 0.022 0.176 0.031
Chemicals 0.030 0.015 0.040 0.013 0.063 0.012 0.044 0.013
Rubber, plastic -0.026 0.012 -0.028 0.010 -0.036 0.012 -0.021 0.012
Non-metallic products 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.010 -0.015 0.012 0.006 0.015
Basic metals 0.034 0.014 0.048 0.016 0.029 0.014 0.025 0.015
Fabricated metal products 0.022 0.009 0.004 0.008 -0.009 0.009 -0.029 0.012
Computer, electronic, optical products -0.026 0.009 -0.028 0.011 -0.004 0.009 -0.011 0.011
Electrical equipment -0.035 0.010 -0.013 0.013 -0.012 0.011 -0.034 0.012
Machinery and equipment -0.011 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.011 -0.006 0.010
Motor vehicles, trailers 0.057 0.018 0.046 0.017 0.078 0.012 0.079 0.012
Other transport equipment 0.010 0.023 0.048 0.025 0.047 0.016 0.041 0.020
Furniture etc -0.031 0.018 -0.070 0.012 -0.093 0.014 -0.039 0.008
Electricity, water, recycling 0.057 0.023 0.072 0.019 0.097 0.015 0.025 0.016
Construction 0.063 0.008 0.028 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.009
Trade of vehicles -0.054 0.029 -0.034 0.011 -0.048 0.010 -0.081 0.017
Wholesale trade -0.055 0.010 -0.059 0.009 -0.037 0.010 -0.029 0.011
Retail trade -0.150 0.015 -0.111 0.016 -0.200 0.023 -0.251 0.017
Finance and insurance 0.000 0.019 0.011 0.026 0.063 0.018 0.124 0.016
Variance sector coefficients (x100) 0.334 0.313 0.664 0.698
Firmsize 10-19 -0.086 0.007 -0.090 0.007 -0.101 0.007 -0.063 0.008
Firmsize 20-49 -0.063 0.007 -0.077 0.008 -0.077 0.007 -0.057 0.007
Firmsize 50-99 -0.053 0.007 -0.052 0.007 -0.052 0.006 -0.036 0.008
Firmsize 100-199 -0.021 0.007 -0.017 0.009 -0.021 0.006 -0.023 0.008
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Firmsize 200-499 0.042 0.009 0.030 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.005 0.009
Firmsize 500-999 0.087 0.009 0.098 0.013 0.098 0.016 0.038 0.011
Firmsize >1000 0.095 0.010 0.107 0.014 0.127 0.009 0.136 0.010
Variance firmsize coefficients (x100) 0.471 0.557 0.653 0.414
State-owned 0.023 0.015 0.019 0.016 -0.005 0.011 -0.011 0.009
Schleswig-Holstein 0.123 0.014 0.069 0.012 0.053 0.011 0.078 0.014
Hamburg 0.176 0.015 0.185 0.020 0.146 0.012 0.168 0.018
Lower Saxony 0.093 0.010 0.086 0.009 0.061 0.009 0.033 0.009
Bremen 0.103 0.028 0.078 0.015 0.088 0.017 0.085 0.023
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.153 0.008 0.128 0.008 0.110 0.007 0.118 0.008
Hesse 0.144 0.008 0.162 0.011 0.132 0.009 0.110 0.010
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.080 0.014 0.081 0.010 0.080 0.010 0.095 0.010
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.165 0.007 0.150 0.006 0.157 0.007 0.139 0.008
Bavaria 0.156 0.007 0.116 0.008 0.112 0.009 0.106 0.009
Saarland 0.055 0.013 0.091 0.027 0.076 0.014 0.047 0.013
Berlin 0.034 0.012 0.000 0.012 -0.019 0.015 0.014 0.017
Brandenburg -0.223 0.014 -0.182 0.011 -0.165 0.013 -0.165 0.013
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania -0.226 0.015 -0.219 0.012 -0.200 0.011 -0.181 0.013
Saxony -0.293 0.010 -0.273 0.008 -0.233 0.009 -0.255 0.009
Saxony-Anhalt -0.263 0.014 -0.231 0.012 -0.201 0.011 -0.165 0.013
Thuringia -0.275 0.010 -0.241 0.009 -0.197 0.011 -0.227 0.010
Variance federal states coefficients (x100) 3.144 2.581 1.972 1.964
Share of analytical tasks 0.186 0.025 0.116 0.021 0.160 0.027 0.130 0.022
Share of interactive tasks 0.167 0.026 0.192 0.023 0.136 0.029 0.201 0.025
Share of manual tasks -0.352 0.012 -0.308 0.012 -0.297 0.009 -0.331 0.011
Variance task coefficients (x100) 6.213 4.839 4.410 5.562
Constant 3.000 0.015 3.027 0.017 2.960 0.013 2.968 0.011
Root MSE 0.268 0.285 0.295 0.299
R2 0.703 0.656 0.620 0.625
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Standard errors clustered at establishment level. Coefficients within groups of categorial regressors are centered around zero.
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Figure A5 – Composition and wage structure effects: daily earnings
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Figure A6 – Composition and wage structure effects: daily earnings censored
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
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Figure A7 – Composition and wage structure effects: West Germany
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
Figure A8 – Composition and wage structure effects: firm-level unionization
Source: Structure of Earnings Surveys 1995, 2001, 2006, 2010 and own calculations.
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Chapter 3
Increasing Inequality in Lifetime
Earnings: A Tale of Educational
Upgrading and Changing Employment
Patterns∗
3.1 Introduction
Growing wage and earnings inequality around the world has caused an increasing interest in
the topic among both policymakers and academics. The latter have so far mainly focused
on the increase in cross-sectional inequality over time as documented in a vast literature
(see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 for a general overview, and Dustmann et al., 2009, for
∗This chapter is based on:
Seckler, M. (2019): Increasing Inequality in Lifetime Earnings: A Tale of Educational Upgrading and
Changing Employment Patterns. University of Tu¨bingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance No.
119.
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the German case). Surprisingly, relatively little is known about how this increasing cross-
sectional earnings inequality has affected the evolution of individual long-term and lifetime
earnings across different birth cohorts. From a purely cross-sectional perspective, which
usually compares earnings distributions at different points in time, cohort differences are
usually non-distinguishable from life-cycle trends. For example, when comparing the German
earnings distribution of the early 1990s with the one two decades later, it remains unclear
to what extend the standard of living of later cohorts differs from their predecessors. This
is a consequence of the fact that observable differences in cross-sectional earnings are the
result of individuals being observed at different points of their career. Moreover, studying
lifetime earnings from a cohort perspective is likely to be more informative with regards to
an individual’s or cohort’s standard of living, which is determined by lifetime earnings rather
than by earnings at a certain point in time (see, e.g., Corneo 2015).
Recent studies by Bo¨nke et al. (2015a) and Guevenen et al. (2017) document a dra-
matic increase in lifetime earnings inequality for both Germany and the U.S. among men in
later birth cohorts. Though being an ongoing debate, the previous literature has identified
different channels underlying the increase in cross-sectional inequality, most prominently
skill-biased technological change (SBTC ), demographical and institutional factors, as well
as internationalization and changes in individual employment biographies.1 It is unclear to
what extend these factors are also responsible for the increasing inequality in lifetime earn-
ings. This paper intends to shed light on this blind spot by disentangling the increasing
inequality in lifetime earnings using high-quality administrative employment data for Ger-
many. Methodologically, the paper uses state-of-the-art RIF decomposition techniques as
introduced by Firpo et al. (2009, 2018).
The paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, the present study
reveals a lower labor market participation (both in terms of longer periods of part-time
employment and non-employment) to be the most important factor for the rise in inequality
1For a more comprehensive discussion, see section 3.2
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in the lower half of the distribution. Contrary to that, much of the rising inequality at the
top is associated with educational upgrading. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first study providing a decomposition analysis aimed at explaining the rising inequality in
lifetime earnings. Second, the results confirm previous findings by Bo¨nke et al. (2015a)
who documented a sharp rise in lifetime earnings inequality based on a different database.
Going a step further, the present paper also shows that German men born between the
years 1955 and 1974 did not only face a higher level of inequality, but equally suffered from
a stagnation in total earnings for a major part of their career. In fact, this development
stems from losses within education groups which are counterbalanced by higher levels of
educational attainment. The present paper also provides first evidence that these trends
tend to accelerate for the youngest cohorts.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes the related literature.
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the data and the econometric method. Section 3.5 presents
the empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion of the major findings.
3.2 Related literature
This section provides an overview on the most relevant literature for the present paper.
Most importantly, the study directly adds to the literature on the evolution of individual
long-term and lifetime earnings inequality. Using data for the U.S., an important contribution
by Bowlus and Robin (2004) finds that inequality in cross-sectional and lifetime earnings
appear to follow a similar pattern over time. Moreover, they show that the level of inequality
in lifetime earnings is substantially lower than inequality in cross-sectional earnings due to
earnings mobility among young workers. However, changes in earnings mobility are not
identified as an important factor in explaining the rising dispersion in lifetime earnings.
As the study builds on a relatively short panel, the used measures of lifetime earnings are
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simulated based on estimates for different parameters (job destruction/re-employment rates,
promotion/demotion rates). Kopczuk et al. (2010) provide evidence for increasing inequality
in male long-term earnings, especially for U.S. baby-boomers born after 1945. This trend
is found in all stages of the career, with the level of inequality being generally higher in
later episodes of the working life. In a more recent contribution, Guevenen et al. (2017)
document both a substantial decline in median lifetime earnings of U.S. men born between
the years 1942 and 1958 (after observing gains in earlier cohorts) and a long-run trend of
increasing inequality within male cohorts. The authors conclude that the observed changes
are mostly due to differences in early career earnings across cohorts. Importantly, they show
that later cohorts suffered from earning losses at young age that were not compensated by
a higher future earnings growth.2
In a seminal contribution for Germany, Bo¨nke et al. (2015a) documented a dramatic increase
in lifetime earnings inequality based on the Insurance Account Sample (Versicherungskon-
tenstichprobe) of the Federal Pension Register containing West German men born between
the years 1935 and 1969. The authors resort to the concept of up-to-age X earnings (UAX)
as a measure for individual long-term earnings, which is defined as the present value of
all earnings before reaching a certain age.3 By imputing earnings for periods of un- and
non-employment, they show that parts of the increasing dispersion in lifetime earnings at
the bottom can be explained by differential unemployment patterns. Moreover, they es-
tablish two other results that are important for the subsequent analysis. First, they show
that earnings mobility, which is high at the beginning of the working life, mostly vanishes
after age 40. Second, they conclude that the evolution of inequality in lifetime earnings
most likely reflects the development up to age 40. Following this argument, the subsequent
analysis focuses on earnings up-to age 40, which does not only offer important insights into
changes in individual long-term earnings for a major part of the career, but can most likely
2In fact, the study finds that women realized substantial gains in lifetime earnings (starting from a very
low level) across the study period. However, these gains only partly offset the losses suffered by men.
3Despite some methodological differences, the same terminology is also used in the present paper.
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be generalized to inequality in lifetime earnings.4 In a further contribution, Bo¨nke et al.
(2015b) provide evidence for an increase in the transitory component for younger workers
in the 1970s and a related increase in short-term earnings risk. The present paper intends
to directly add to these previous findings by trying to pin down the aforementioned increase
in lifetime earnings across cohorts to different explanatory factors.
In this aspect, the present study connects to a vast literature trying to explain the well-
documented increase in cross-sectional inequality during the last decades as described by
various authors (see, for the German case, Dustmann et al., 2009, Card et al., 2013).
These studies are usually concerned about the evolution of cross-sectional inequality and do
not explicitly address the question of how these factors affect lifetime earnings inequality
across different birth cohorts. Although not having reached a consensus yet, the respective
literature identifies several factors that appear to be important for the increase in cross-
sectional inequality, which therefore also constitute obvious candidates for the analysis in this
paper. Most notably, many studies stress the importance of skill-biased technological change
(SBTC) for wage polarization and a resulting increase in U.S. wage inequality (e.g. Autor and
Dorn, 2013). However, previous evidence on this link seems to be mixed for Germany (see,
e.g. Antonczyk et al., 2009, Rinawi and Backes-Gellner, 2015). Other contributions show
that an increasing heterogeneity between firms, combined with a matching of good workers
and good firms, can explain a large part of the recent increase in inequality (Card et al., 2013,
Barth et al., 2016, Song et al., 2019). A different strand of the literature (e.g. Dustmann et
al., 2009, Baumgarten et al., 2018, Biewen and Seckler, 2019) highlights the importance of
institutional changes in the form of de-unionization, whereas internationalization seems to to
be another potential explanation (Baumgarten, 2013). A recent study (Biewen et al., 2018)
stresses the importance of an increasing heterogeneity in individual labor market histories.
Based on a reweighting methodology, the authors link a substantial part of the rising earnings
4Also see Bo¨nke et al. (2015a), p. 186. As already argued above, this finding is also confirmed in
Guevenen et al. (2017). Another advantage of this approach is to obtain new evidence on very recent
cohorts.
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inequality to increasing heterogeneity in terms of past employment interruptions and part-
time work, especially at the bottom of the distribution.
As the present studies identifies changing employment patterns as an important factor, it
also relates to a broader literature on the evolution and earnings effects of employment
breaks and part-time employment. Previous work by Tisch and Tophoven (2012) compares
birth cohorts 1959 and 1965 of the German baby boomers. Similar to the results of the
present paper, they document an increasing incidence of part-time and non-employment
episodes in individual employment biographies among individuals born in later years. Taking
also more recent cohorts into account, Bachmann et al. (2018) find a decline in regular
employment together with a simultaneous increase in a-typical employment among west
German men born between 1944 and 1986. These trends are not only found in young
workers, i.e. as a results of substantially longer time spent in education, but across all age
groups. Although providing new insights, both studies abstain from establishing a direct
link to the evolution of earnings inequality over time. Brehmer and Seifert (2008) and Wolf
(2010) show that part-time employment is associated with lower hourly wages relative to
full-time employment. Finally, a number of studies (Beblo and Wolf, 2002, Go¨rlich and
Grip, 2008, Potrafke, 2012, Ferna´ndez-Kranz et al., 2015, Blundell et al., 2016, Paul, 2016)
provide direct evidence that both employment interruptions and part-time episodes tend to
adversely affect future earnings growth.
3.3 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies
(SIAB), which constitutes a 2 percent random sample of all employees covered by social
security records between the years 1975 and 2014.5 The data are well suited for studying
5The paper uses the weakly anonymous version of the data which were accessed on-site at the Research
Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) and via remote data access.
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changes in lifetime earnings across cohorts due to the fact that complete employment his-
tories of approximately 1.75 million individuals are provided. The SIAB also includes a rich
set of covariates related to individual employment biographies, complemented by additional
firm-level information of the Establishment History Panel, that can potentially explain the
increasing dispersion of lifetime earnings. In this regard, the data are more suitable for a
detailed decomposition analysis than the one based on the Federal Pension Register that
have mostly been used in previous research but include a very limited number of covariates
only. On the downside, the SIAB does not contain any information prior to the year 1975.
Hence, the study focuses on individuals born between the years 1955 and 1974 who can at
least be observed between age 20 and 40. To facilitate comparability with previous studies,
the analysis is restricted to male individuals working in West Germany only.
For the subsequent analysis, a sample comprised of individuals with a sufficient labor mar-
ket attachment is defined. This is achieved by imposing the following restrictions:6 First,
to ensure that individuals can be observed throughout the relevant part of their career,
a maximum age for labor market entry depending on educational attainment is imposed,
i.e. 30 years (individuals with university degree), 28 (completed high school and vocational
training), 25 (without completed high school but with vocational training) and 23 for all
others (neither high school degree nor vocational training or missing educational informa-
tion). Similarly, individuals who have their last observable employment spell more than 3
months before reaching a certain age threshold (e.g. age 40), as well as individuals with a
single non-employment spell of more than five years, are omitted from the sample. Imposing
similar restrictions is important to minimize the risk of including individuals who emigrated
or became self-employed during their working life. Second, lower bounds on both annual and
total long-term earnings are imposed. Regarding annual earnings, individuals are required to
have real earnings greater than 5000 euros in at least half of the years they could potentially
be working after age 25. For example, to be included in the up-to-age 40 (UA40) earnings
6Imposing similar restrictions is common in the literature on long-term earnings inequality. The restric-
tions used in this paper follow Guevenen et al. (2017) and Boll et al. (2017).
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sample, individuals need to have real earnings of at least 5000 euros in eight years or more.
Also, individuals are required to have total long-term earnings that correspond to an aver-
age of at least 5000 euros per year. Hence, for total UA40 covering all earnings starting
with the year the individual turns 20, a lower bound of 105.000 euros is imposed (130.000
euros for UA45). Finally, individuals with observable employment spells in East Germany are
equally omitted. Imposing these restrictions leaves 109,194 (81,271/49,864) respondents
for which complete UA40 (UA45/UA50) employment biographies can be constructed. A
more detailed overview on the number of observations by cohort is provided in table B1 in
the appendix.7
As the earnings information in the SIAB is censored at the limit for the statutory pension
fund, earnings above this threshold are imputed following the procedure described in Gartner
(2005).8 Depending on the year of observation, up to 15 percent of observations are
affected by this right-censoring. Hence, as it is common practice in studies based on German
administrative data, this paper focuses on the development of earnings inequality below
the 85th percentile of the different UAX measures. Due to this property, the subsequent
analysis might in fact underestimate the true increase in inequality given that parts of the
development at the very top of the distribution will not be captured. Starting in 1984,
one-time payments were counted towards annual earnings resulting in both an increase in
average daily earnings as well as a spurious increase in annual earnings inequality between
the years 1983 and 1984. To account for this structural break, the procedure introduced by
Bo¨nke et al. (2015a) is used, which denotes a modification of the procedure by Fitzenberger
(1999) that works on panel data.9
7This paper does not consider women. This is due to lower labor force participation rates among German
women, which in turn results in a significantly smaller number of women whose earnings biographies fulfill the
imposed minimum criteria of labor market attachment. Moreover, changing patterns in terms of selection
into employment (and ultimately into the sample) inherently complicates any long-run comparison across
cohorts.
8Appendix B presents more details on the imputation procedure.
9Note that similar strategies were also used in other studies such as Dustmann et al. (2009) and Card
et al. (2013). The procedure is outlined in the appendix
72
Chapter 3. Increasing Inequality in . . . 3.3. Data
From a data perspective, another challenge lies in the German reunification and the fall of
the Berlin Wall, allowing individuals to move freely between the formerly separated parts
of Germany. As the SIAB does not include any information on earnings in East Germany
before January 1, 1991, individuals with employment spells in the former German Democratic
Republic (which remain unobservable), who migrated to West Germany in the aftermath
of the fall of the Berlin Wall, potentially end up in the sample. However, an effect on the
decomposition results (comparing pooled cohorts 1955-57 to 1972-74) can be ruled out due
to the following reasons: For the analysis, individuals who can be observed in the SIAB before
1989 are assumed to only consist of West Germans, given the fact that the Berlin Wall did
not fall before late 1989 and East-West migration was virtually impossible. Combined with
the maximum labor market entry age of 30 (for individuals holding a university degree),
individuals born before 1959 are assumed to only consist of West Germans. Similarly,
individuals born after 1970 are not affected by relevant unobservable employment spells
in East Germany, given the fact that starting in 1991, the SIAB covered both East and
West Germany and only earnings starting at age 20 are included in the UAX earnings
measures. Hence, the decomposition results are not diluted by individuals with unobservable
employment spells in East Germany.10
3.3.1 Trends in lifetime earnings
In the analysis of lifetime earnings, this paper follows the approach suggested in Bo¨nke et
al. (2015) in calculating up-to-age X earnings (UAX) for different ages (though with some
methodological differences). The concept of up-to-age X earnings addresses and balances
10Parts of the descriptive analysis also use information from other cohorts, whose results might potentially
be affected by East-West migration following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Note, however, that restrictions
on the maximum age for labor market entry are imposed to ensure that only individuals whose (mostly)
complete earnings biographies are observable are included. Also, descriptive statistics for the first observable
employment spell do not detect any significant anomalies. Nevertheless, there might be rare cases of
individuals who started working in East Germany and migrated to West Germany before 1991 and prior to
reaching the maximum age for labor market entry.
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the trade-off between the number of birth cohorts that can be included in the analysis
and the time each individual can be observed in the data. In detail, the computation of
UAX proceeds as follows. In a first step, daily earnings are aggregated to yearly earnings
and inflated/deflated to the level of 2010 using the German consumer price index (CPI).
In a second step, cumulative earnings are calculated for each individual between the year
the person turns 20 up to and including the year the individuals is reaching a certain age
threshold (e.g. age 40 for the computation of UA40). The earnings measures only include
payments from employment subject to social insurance contributions before tax, i.e. social
transfer-payments as well as earnings from periods of self-employment are not part of the
analysis. Hence, they mirror the price of labor paid in the market.11 Earnings from marginal
part-time employment (Minijobs) are also not included for consistency reasons, as these
episodes were unobservable in the data before April 1, 1999.
Figure 3.1 – Indexed real growth in UA40
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Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the indexed (real) growth in UA40 earnings at different percentiles of
the unconditional within-cohort distribution for men born between the years 1955 and 1974.
The graph reveals three important developments. First, an increasing inequality in UA40
11Bo¨nke et al. (2015a) also add employers’ social insurance contributions to the earnings measure as
certain occupational groups, such as minors and sailors, have differing social security arrangements. As the
share of these groups is negligible in the cohorts covered in the present study, a similar adjustment is not
made.
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earnings within cohorts which is due to a monotonic development in the sense that, when
considering the overall change between cohorts 1955 and 1974, lower percentiles below the
median suffered losses whereas the upper half gained. Numerically, the 85th percentile of the
UA40 distribution increased by approximately 12%, whereas the 15th percentile decreased
by as much as 13%. Second, over the entire period of study, the graph shows a stagnation in
median UA40 earnings with the development resembling an inverse U-shape. More precisely,
median earnings increased up to the birth cohort 1965 and gradually deteriorated thereafter.
This finding is in contrast to previous studies considering cross-sectional distributions that
have documented significant gains in median hourly/daily earnings in the cross-section 1975-
2014 (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009). Third, the graphical analysis suggests that the increase
in inequality sped up dramatically among cohorts born in the early 1970s, which seems to
be driven by severe real earnings losses at the bottom and some moderate gains at the
top. Lastly, note that these developments are not a direct consequence of a delayed labor
market entry due to longer times spent in education. As can be seen from figure B1 in the
appendix, the overall picture remains mostly unchanged when only earnings starting at age
25 are taken into account.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the impact of this development on inequality in the different long-
term earnings measures (UA40/UA45/UA50). Overall, the graph reveals a strong increase in
all parts of the respective distributions with the aforementioned acceleration among cohorts
born in the early 1970s. In terms of UA40, this is reflected in a sharp increase in the Gini
coefficient from 0.168 to 0.226 (approx.+35%), which affected both the upper part (85-50
log wage gap, approx. +39%) and the lower part (50-15 log wage gap, approx. +45%) of
the distribution. In this regard, the results partly differ from previous findings on Germany
(see Bo¨nke et al., 2015a) who assigned most of the increase in inequality to the bottom
of the distribution. Interestingly, the increase at the top of the distribution was mostly
driven by cohorts born in the early 1970s that were not included in the previous study. In
line with existing evidence, inequality as captured by the different measures is increasing
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Figure 3.2 – Inequality in up-to-age-X
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Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
over the life-cycle.12 Confirming the general trends previously documented in Bo¨nke et al.
(2015a), the presented graphical evidence suggests that the development in UA40 earnings
appears to be closely linked to the developments in UA45/UA50 which can, however, only
be observed for a limited number of cohorts.
To underpin this hypothesis, figure 3.3 contains rank correlations between UA40 and UAX
at higher ages. Generally, the graph documents high and very persistent rank correlations.
For example, the dark grey line documents rank correlations between 0.96 and 0.97 between
UA40 and UA45. Similarly, results show rank correlations of about 0.92 (UA50) and 0.88
12An exception is the lower part of the distribution (50-15 log wage gap) where inequality is highest in
terms of UA40.
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Figure 3.3 – Rank correlations of UA40 with selected UAX
.
88
.
9
.
92
.
94
.
96
.
98
1955 1960 1965 1970
Cohort
UA40/UA45 UA40/UA50 UA40/UA55
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
(UA55) which can be interpreted as evidence that the evolution of lifetime earnings closely
follows the development in UA40 (compare also Bo¨nke et al., 2015a).
Figure 3.4 – Evolution of UA40 within education groups, cohorts 1955-57 vs. 1972-74
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Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
As the German workforce was subject to some major educational upgrading during the
period of study (see proceeding section 3.3.3 for more details), it is important to study the
development within the different education groups more carefully. Figure 3.4 summarizes
the evolution of UA40 within three broad educational groups, i.e. No Degree, High School
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and/or Voc. Training, as well as University, for the pooled cohorts 1972-74 as opposed to
1955-57. The graph on the left includes the development of inequality in terms of the Gini,
the graph on the right the change in median earnings. It becomes obvious that inequality
did not only increase among all individuals of later cohorts but also within education groups.
This increase was strongest within the lowest educational group (approx.+55%), followed
by individuals holding a university degree (approx.+29%), and smallest among individuals
with a vocational background (approx.+24%). Nevertheless, the impact of the sharp rise of
inequality within the lowest educational group on overall inequality should not be overstated
given the small relative group size. At the same time, the figure reveals a decrease in
median earnings within all education subgroups. These losses were strongest for individuals
without a degree (approx.-8%), in contrast to rather marginal losses among individuals with
vocational training (approx. -1.5%) and individuals holding a university degree (approx.
-1.3%). This mirrors the previous finding of losses in UA40 being mostly located at the
bottom of the UA40 distribution. As overall median earnings virtually stagnated (approx.
-0.2%), this results suggests that the losses within educational subgroups were neutralized
by a shift towards higher average educational attainment among later birth cohorts.
Figure 3.5 – Changes in UAX, cohorts 1955-57 vs. 1972-74
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To get a better understanding of changes over the life-cycle, figure 3.5 plots the difference
in up-to-age X (UAX) for different ages, once more comparing pooled cohorts 1955-57
and 1972-74. For example, the point 25 on the x-axis represents differences in up-to-age 25
(UA25) earnings between the two groups. The graph shows that some losses in the median of
cumulative earnings among individuals born 1972-74 occurred until the age of 25, reflecting
a delayed labor market entry as a result of the educational expansion. This was followed by
a period of fast catch-up in the late 20s and early 30s, which was the likely consequence of a
higher share of university graduates entering the labor market and neutralized the preceding
median losses by the age of 30. Importantly, there were no further median gains between
the ages 30 and 40, causing the previously described stagnation in UA40 earnings. Though
being somewhat speculative, the picture suggests that this stagnation is likely to continue for
UAX at higher ages that are still unobservable in the data. Simultaneously, the graph shows
that the gains in cumulative earnings at the top of the within-cohort distribution increased
continuously after age 25, whereas losses at the 15th percentile were already strong in terms
of UA25 and (after some stabilization) sped up again in the mid 30s.13
3.3.2 Trends in employment patterns
Against the background of the trends outlined in the previous section, it is insightful to take
a closer look at factors that can potentially explain this development. Hereby, it is crucial
to understand whether the observed changes are caused by changes in individuals’ labor
market participation during the working life, or whether they are due to changes in earnings
during the time individuals were actually employed (i.e. changes in lifetime hours worked
13Note that the percentiles always refer to differences in the within-cohort distributions for cumulative
earnings at a certain age, e.g. age 30. Hence, due to high earnings mobility at young ages, individuals at
the 15th percentiles of UA25 earnings are likely to be very different from those at the 15th percentile of
UA40 earnings.
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vs. changes in earnings conditional on employment).14 Although the SIAB does not include
precise information on hours worked, the data allow to consistently distinguish between
episodes of full-time, part-time and non-employment in individual employment biographies
using the information of the Employee History (BeH), where non-employment is defined
as the reference group in the further analysis. In principle, it would also be possible to
distinguish episodes of unemployment from other forms of non-employment by exploiting
information on unemployment benefits recorded in the Benefit Recipient History (LeH), the
Unemployment Benefit II Recipient Histories (LHG and XLHG), as well as the Jobseeker-
Histories (ASU and XASU) provided by the Federal Employment Agency. However, the latter
data sources are not available in the early years. Furthermore, there were several reforms that
affected the entitlement to unemployment benefits and hence, a consistent measure across
the cohorts used in this study cannot be constructed.15 As a consequence, the measure used
for non-employment is defined as all episodes in individual employment biographies (after
labor market entry) where an individual did not follow an employment subject to social
insurance contributions. Besides unemployment spells, these include marginal part-time
employment (Minijobs), self-employment as well as times spent in further education.
Figure 3.6 includes the duration spent in full-time employment (up-to-age 40) for the pooled
cohorts 1955-57 and 1972-74 for different quartiles of the UA40 earnings distribution. Al-
though full-time employment remained by far the most frequent employment form among
German men, there was a considerable reduction which is found to be strongest for individu-
als at the bottom of the UA40 distribution. For example, the average time spent in full-time
employment among individuals in the bottom quartile of UA40 decreased by approximately
16 months, or 8.9 percent, between pooled cohorts 1955-57 and 1972-74. At the same
time, there was also some reduction for higher quartiles which is, however, quantitatively
less pronounced and decreasing over the distribution. Numerically, the average time spent
14For example, Biewen and Plo¨tze (2019) show that 10-30% of increasing inequality in monthly earnings
among German men between 2001 and 2010 were due to changes in hours worked.
15Also see Antoni et al. (2016) for more information.
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Figure 3.6 – Full-time employment UA40 in months, cohorts 1955-57 vs. cohorts 1972-74
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Figure 3.7 – Non-employment UA40 in months, cohorts 1955-57 vs. cohorts 1972-74
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Figure 3.8 – Part-time employment UA40 in months, cohorts 1955-57 vs. cohorts 1972-74
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Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
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in full-time employment decreased by on average 7.8 months for quartile 2, 4.9 months for
quartile 3 and 4.6 months for the highest quartile. Simultaneously, this development was
accompanied by an increase in the incidence of non-employment which was strongest for
the two lowest quartiles, with the average increases amounting to approximately 3.6 and 4.1
months, respectively (figure 3.7). However, these numbers also show that the increase in
non-employment episodes, which has also been documented in Bo¨nke et al. (2015a), was
only partly responsible for the observed decline in full-time duration.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the evolution of part-time employment. Starting from a very low
level among individuals of birth cohorts 1955-57, the graph documents a steep increase in
the average duration spent in part-time employment in all parts of the UA40 distribution.
The graph also shows that individuals in the bottom quartile of the UA40 distribution
were by far most affected by this expansion, with the average time spent in part-time
employment increasing by on average 11.6 months. This growing importance of part-time
employment in recent decades applied, contrary to common perceptions, also to German
men (see, e.g. Brenke, 2011, Biewen et al., 2018). Besides ongoing structural changes
and a resulting demand for more flexible working arrangements, this development was also
enforced by several legal changes, such as the Teilzeit und Befristungsgesetz (TzBfG), which
increased the relative attractiveness of part-time employment. The outlined development
had a potentially twofold effect on lifetime earnings. Besides a simple reduction in lifetime
labor market participation (or lifetime working hours) and the resulting earnings losses, the
previous literature has also documented adverse effects of part-time employment on future
earnings growth (compare section 3.2).
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3.3.3 Trends in education
Figure 3.9 – Share of different education groups
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The cohorts included in the study also differ substantially in terms of their educational
attainment. Figure 3.9 displays the share of individuals within cohorts in the three broad
categories No Degree, High School and/or Vocational Training as well as University. The
graph shows the educational expansion of recent decades as similarly documented in pre-
vious research. Most importantly, there was a strong increase in the share of individuals
holding a university degree, which increased from 11.5% among individuals of birth cohort
1955 to 18.4% among those born in 1974. This development was accompanied by cor-
responding declines in both the share of medium skilled workers (i.e. individuals with a
high school degree and/or vocational training) as well as the share of low skilled workers
(i.e. individuals who neither completed vocational training nor hold a high school degree).
Note that the later decomposition analysis will use a more fine-grained educational measure
distinguishing between six categories: Lower/middle secondary without vocational training,
Lower/middle secondary with vocational training, Upper secondary (German high school
equivalent) without vocational training, Upper secondary (German high school equivalent)
with vocational training, University or Fachhochschule degree as well as Missing informa-
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tion. To improve on the education variable in the SIAB, which in some cases suffers from
both missing and implausible information, the imputation procedure (IP2A) suggested by
Fitzenberger et al. (2006) is used.
3.3.4 Trends in job mobility, migration and firm characteristics
Beyond the the described differences in employment patterns and educational background,
further important characteristics related to individual employment biographies are considered
as potential sources of increasing lifetime earnings inequality. For example, changing job
mobility patterns across cohorts might constitute another source of increasing inequality in
lifetime earnings. Against this background, the further analysis distinguishes two different
types of job mobility in line with Gius (2014): firm changes within the same industry or
occupation (job changes) on the one hand, and firm changes where both the industry and
occupation change (career changes) on the other. Gius (2014) shows this to be an important
distinction, given that the first type of job change is associated with a positive earnings
effect, whereas the latter one is found to have an adverse effect. The underlying theoretical
argument is that individuals with a high number of career changes tend to accumulate
fewer industry and occupation-specific human capital and should, on average, have a slower
earnings growth over their career. Contrary to that, job changes within a certain occupation
or industry (or within both) could potentially be linked to positive earnings effects due to
a faster accumulation of human capital. However, the net effect of this second type of job
change also remains to a certain extend unclear as it potentially includes a significant share
of layoffs or other types of non-voluntary job changes. The descriptive evidence presented
in table B2 shows that job changes were generally more frequent than career changes and
the mean of both type of firm changes moderately increased among individuals born in the
years 1972-74.
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To capture the potential impact of migration, a dummy variable indicating whether a person
is German by birth is included. According to the definition used in this paper, a person is
classified as German by birth if he or she does not have any observable employment spell
with foreign nationality throughout the working life. During the observation period, there
was an increase of individuals with migration background with their relative shares increasing
from 11 to 22 percent between pooled cohorts 1955-57 and 1972-74. Given the previous
finding that changing occupational characteristics (as a result of SBTC) potentially explain
a significant share of rising cross-sectional wage inequality (see, Ehrl, 2017), a set of 32
occupation dummies is included in the analysis. Differences across industries are captured by
the inclusion of sector dummies (44 categories). Both measures refer to the most frequent
occupation/sector an individual worked in until the age of 40.
As the previous research on cross-sectional earnings inequality points towards an increasing
importance of between firm differences (see section 3.2), the analysis includes a number
of firm characteristics that can be constructed from the data. Against the background
of the previous literature, the establishment size an individual worked at mostly denotes
a potentially important feature for the development of individual long-run earnings. For
the subsequent analysis, three firmsizes are distinguished which are small (1-50 employees),
medium (51-500 employees) and large (>500 employees) establishments. To capture firm-
level technological change, this paper follows a strategy similar to the most recent literature
(e.g. Harrigan et al., 2016, Barth et al., 2017) by exploiting information in the Establishment
History Panel on the number of engineers and natural scientists (Techies) working in an
establishment. As these numbers potentially differ systematically across different industries,
an establishment is defined as high-tech if its share of engineers and natural scientists lies
above the mean of the industry. In an analogues way, regional heterogeneities are accounted
for by the inclusion of federal state dummies for the establishment’s location (10 categories).
Once again, these firm-level measures are aggregated over an individual’s biography and
hence, refer to the type of firm an individual worked at mostly.
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3.4 Econometric methods
The subsequent analysis builds on Recentered-Influence-Function (RIF) decomposition to
disentangle the increasing inequality in UA40 earnings between pooled cohorts 1955-57
and 1972-74.16 The method represents an extension of the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition that allows to decompose changes in any distributional statistics into a part
being due to changes in the distribution of covariates while fixing the corresponding returns
(composition effect), and one due to changes in the returns to these covariates leaving the
distribution of covariates unchanged (returns effect).17 Contrary to other decomposition
techniques, the major advantage of RIF decomposition lies in the fact that it is the only
method that allows for both a path-independent and detailed decomposition of any distri-
butional statistic of interest.18 Hence, it allows to link changes in a number of inequality
measures (85-15/85-50/50-15 log wage gaps, Gini, log variance) to the different covariates
outlined in the previous chapter.
The method itself is based on unconditional quantile regression as introduced in the seminal
contribution by Firpo et al. (2009). The main idea is to run regressions of the recentered
influence function of some distributional statistic of interest ν on explanatory variables. The
RIF is a recented version of the influence function defined as RIF (y, ν) = ν + IF (y; ν).
It can easily be shown that the RIF has the same expectation as the original statistic of
interest ν and integrates to ν as
∫
RIF (y; ν) dF (y) =
∫
(ν + IF (y; ν)) dF (y) = ν (Fy),
where Fy is the distribution function of the dependent variable. Assuming that the con-
ditional expectation of the RIF is a linear function of the explanatory variables, the RIF is
modeled as E [RIF (Y ; ν) |X] = Xγ, where γ can be estimated by OLS.19 Given this linear
16Section 3.4 in parts follows Biewen and Seckler (2017, 2019). For a more in-depth description of RIF
decomposition, also see Firpo et al. (2009, 2018).
17The decomposition literature often uses the term wage structure effect. However, as this paper analyzes
long-term and lifetime earnings, as opposed to wages, the suggested terminology is used.
18See Fortin et al. (2011) for a comprehensive overview on alternative techniques.
19Fig. 1B in Firpo et al. (2009) shows that modeling the RIF as a linear function of covariates yields
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specification, an Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions using the RIF regression coefficients can
be used to split up the overall change ∆νO in a distributional statistic of interest ν into a
composition ∆νX and a returns effect ∆
ν
S
∆νO = ν
(
FY0|c=1
)− ν (FY0|c=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νX
+ ν
(
FY1|c=1
)− ν (FY0|c=1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νS
, (3.1)
where FY0|c=s, FY1|c=s denote the distributions of UA40 earnings among workers in cohort
s receiving the returns to characteristics of cohort 0 and cohort 1, respectively.
Due to their linear specification, the RIFs are only local approximations which potentially
leads to biased results in case of large changes in the distribution of characteristics.20 This
shortcoming is addressed by a refined version of the decomposition suggested in Firpo et
al. (2014, 2018), which additionally incorporates inverse probability weighting (DiNardo
et al., 1996). The main idea lies in the creation of an artificial cohort 01, in which the
cohort 0 distribution of characteristics X is reweighted to that of the target cohort 1. Using
two separate Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, the overall change ∆νO is split up into four
components
∆νO =
(
X¯01 − X¯0
)
γˆν0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νX,p
+ X¯01 (γˆ
ν
01 − γˆν0 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νX,c
+ X¯1 (γˆ
ν
1 − γˆν01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νS,p
+
(
X¯1 − X¯01
)
γˆν01︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νS,c
. (3.2)
where ∆νX,p denotes the estimate for the detailed composition effect, i.e. the effect from
changing the distribution of a certain group of covariates while fixing its returns (at the level
of cohort 0). For instance, the detailed composition effect linked to part-time employment
would reflect the change in ν that results from changing the distribution of UA40 part-time
very similar results compared to more flexible specifications in the case of quantiles. The usage of a linear
specification is also recommended in Firpo et al. (2018).
20As outlined in Firpo et al. (2014), this would for example be the case if the underlying true relationship
between Y and X was in fact convex (and not linear as assumed by OLS). In such a scenario, an upward-
shift of the distribution of X would mechanically increase the estimated coefficients even if the true return
structure remained unaltered.
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spells of cohort 0 to that of cohort 1. The term ∆νX,c denotes the specification error that
reflects differences in the estimated RIF coefficients between the cohorts 01 and 0. In other
words, it corresponds to the difference between the linear approximation of the composition
effect estimated by RIF decomposition and the estimate of the composition effect received
from applying DiNardo et al (1996)-reweighting. Hence, a small value for the specification
error indicates that a linear approximation of the composition effect is appropriate. The
term ∆νS,p denotes the detailed returns effects which capture the effect from changes in
γ for a certain group of covariates. As γ is estimated from unconditional (as opposed to
conditional) quantile regression, it represents changes both between and within subgroups.
Lastly, ∆νS,c represents the reweighting error that stems from differences in the distribution
of covariates between cohort 1 and the reweighted base cohort 01 and should, in case the
reweighting procedure was successful, be close to zero.
Fortin et al. (2011), among others, point out that the detailed decomposition results
of the returns effect for groups of categorical variables depend arbitrarily on the choice
of the omitted reference group. To address this concern, RIF regression coefficients are
normalized such that they sum up to zero within a group of categorical variables J , i.e.∑
j∈J γj = 0 (see, Gardezabal and Ugidos, 2004), effectively making the results independent
of the chosen reference group. As another advantage, this kind of normalization facilitates
the interpretation of results as information on the general level of ν are captured by the
intercept, whereas the regression coefficients mirror deviations of individual categories from
this general level. Accordingly, the intercept also captures changes in the relative importance
of different groups of covariates as well as the contribution of unobservable factors (see
Biewen and Seckler, 2017, 2019, for a more rigorous discussion).
Finally, note that the results from RIF decomposition should not be interpreted as causal
effects. This is due to the fact that statistical decomposition techniques (including RIF
decomposition) do not account for general equilibrium effects, as they generally assume
invariance of the conditional distribution. Similarly, the method does not account for the
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fact that different explanatory factors might be dynamically related, i.e. changes in one
group of covariates (e.g. job mobility) might be the result of changes in another group (e.g.
education). Despite these limitations, RIF decomposition represents a highly useful tool to
deepen the understanding of what factors are associated with the observed changes in the
distribution of individual long-term and lifetime earnings.
3.5 Decomposition results
Table 3.1 – Groups of covariates
Group Covariates
1. Non-employment Years of non-employment UA40 (= days of full-time employment/365)
2. Part-time employment Years of part-time employment UA40 (= days of part-time employment/365)
3. Education Highest educational degree UA40 (6 categories)
4. Occupation Most frequent occupation UA40 (32 categories)
5. Nationality German by birth (binary, no spells with foreign nationality)
6. Job mobility Number of firm changes UA40 (with change in both occupation/industry)
Number of firm changes UA40 (without change in both occupation/industry)
7. Firm Most frequent firmsize UA40 (3 categories)
Mostly in high-tech firm UA40 (binary)
Most frequent sector UA40 (44 categories)
Most frequent federal state UA40 (10 categories)
This section presents RIF decomposition results comparing pooled cohorts 1955-57 and
1972-74. For reasons of clarity, the previously presented covariates are summarized in
seven groups in line with table 3.1. For the baseline model, these are Non-employment,
Part-time employment, Education, Occupation, Job mobility, Nationality and Firm. In
the presentation of results, it is insightful to start with a graphical analysis. Results of
an alternative specification restricted to German nationals are provided in table B3 in the
appendix. As these are very similar, they are not discussed in more detail at this point. In
order to highlight the differences due to delayed labor market entry as a consequence of the
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educational expansion, three sets of results are presented: one for up to age 40 earnings, one
controlling in addition for age at labor market entry and one for earnings received between
age 25 and 40.
3.5.1 Results for UA40
Figure 3.10 includes the total change in unconditional quantiles together with the aggregate
composition and returns effect. The total change in unconditional quantiles was charac-
terized by a monotonic development in the sense that unconditional quantiles below the
median suffered losses in terms of UA40, whereas the upper half gained. In this regard, the
development somewhat resembles previous findings on inequality in daily/hourly earnings.
However, note once more the stagnation in median earnings which is in contrast to signific-
ant long-run gains in median daily/hourly earnings (see, e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009). The
aggregate composition effect reveals a similarly monotonic pattern, but was negative for
most of the distribution and only had a weakly positive effect above the 70th percentile. In
a similar way, the aggregate returns effect is found to be positive above the 40th percentile
and negative in the lower part of the distribution.
Figure 3.11 further disentangles the overall composition effect by displaying the detailed
effects linked to the groups of covariates. The graph shows strong composition effects
linked to changing employment patterns as well as education. The increasing incidence of
both part-time and non-employment spells played an important role at the bottom of the
UA40 distribution. Interestingly and in line with the descriptive evidence, the effect linked to
the expansion of part-time employment was even slightly stronger than the effect associated
with the increasing incidence of non-employment. Note also that both effects, despite being
strongest at the bottom, had a negative effect on most parts of the distribution. Being the
most important individual composition effect (but smaller than the joint effect from changing
employment patterns), compositional changes in education led to an upward shift of the
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Figure 3.10 – Aggregate decomposition, cohorts 1955-57 vs. 1972-74
Figure 3.11 – Detailed composition effect, cohorts 1955-57 vs. 1972-74
Figure 3.12 – Detailed returns effect, cohorts 1955-57 vs. 1972-74
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
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UA40 distribution across all quantiles. It is found to be the most important single factor
for inequality at the top. In this regard, both the results on changing employment patterns
and educational upgrading are in line with the general trends described in the preceding
chapters. The analysis also reveals a moderate composition effect linked to changes in the
occupational background as well as a minor effect of job mobility, with the other factors
being rather negligible.
Figure 3.12 provides detailed results for the returns effect, which seems to be similarly
important when compared to the overall composition effect. Besides the constant, the
graph indicates an important contribution from changes in the returns to non-employment
that led to a downward shift of the lower half of the distribution. In other words, besides
being more likely to be affected by non-employment episodes, later birth cohorts equally
faced greater losses in terms of long-term earnings following an episode of non-employment.
A possible interpretation would be that these cohorts found it increasingly difficult to re-
integrate into the labor market after an episode of non-employment, which might potentially
reflect the difficult labor market conditions in the late 1990s (which the individuals in the
cohort 1972-74 had to face at an early stage of their career), but might as well reflect
factors such as a faster human capital depreciation or a lower job match quality upon re-
entry. Note that this finding should be interpreted with some caution due to the relatively
large standard errors shown in table 3.2. The picture also suggests a positive returns effect
linked to education, which shifted up the entire within-cohort distribution. As its effect is
very homogenous, no significant effect on the different inequality measures is found (see,
table 3.2).
The analysis also reveals an important contribution of a general returns effect as captured by
the constant, which had a very negative impact on the bottom of the distribution and was
very favorable for the top. As argued in section 3.4, the constant captures that part of the
returns effect that cannot be attributed to the characteristics included in the decomposition,
but might as well reflect changes in the relative importance of different groups of covariates.
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Table 3.2 – RIF decomposition results, UA40
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar
Total change 21.35∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 12.77∗∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 7.25∗∗∗
(1.13) (0.58) (0.98) (0.18) (0.31)
Total composition 9.05∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.40) (0.47) (0.17) (0.33)
Non-employment 2.03∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) (0.15)
Part-time 2.51∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 2.18∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.16) (0.26) (0.09) (0.23)
Education 3.17∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.26) (0.19) (0.07) (0.09)
Occupation 0.92∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.15) (0.16) (0.04) (0.06)
Nationality 0.00 0.10 -0.10 0.08∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.19) (0.13) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08)
Job Mobility 0.38∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm 0.04 0.42∗ -0.38 0.03 -0.04
(0.28) (0.23) (0.22) (0.06) (0.09)
Total effect returns 9.09∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 5.47∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗
(1.40) (0.73) (1.23) (0.19) (0.40)
Non-employment 4.22∗ 0.69 3.53∗ 0.57∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗
(2.24) (0.81) (1.90) (0.29) (0.74)
Part-time -1.51∗∗ -0.19 -1.32∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.09
(0.69) (0.25) (0.59) (0.12) (0.29)
Education -1.97 -0.46 -1.51 -1.06 -4.27
(4.95) (2.77) (4.03) (0.92) (2.23)
Occupation -0.33 -0.95 0.62 -0.17 -0.11
(1.67) (1.06) (1.46) (0.31) (0.89)
Nationality -0.84 0.20 -1.04 -0.08 0.20
(1.15) (0.82) (1.11) (0.22) (0.56)
Job Mobility -0.16 0.24 -0.40 0.00 -0.15
(1.95) (0.91) (1.51) (0.34) (0.83)
Firm -1.29 -1.54 0.25 -0.38 -1.05
(1.99) (1.41) (1.51) (0.36) (0.67)
Constant 10.96∗ 5.61 5.35 4.05∗∗∗ 6.37∗∗
(5.93) (3.73) (4.80) (1.10) (2.73)
Specification Error 2.95∗∗∗ 0.33 2.62∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.03
(0.86) (0.39) (0.87) (0.05) (0.11)
Reweighting Error 0.27 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.06
(0.42) (0.14) (0.33) (0.09) (0.16)
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. ∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses
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For example, the constant might represent factors such as systematic differences in earnings
dynamics within firms as well as differing idiosyncratic shocks that remain unobservable in
administrative data.
Table 3.2 presents the corresponding numerical results for the decomposition of UA40 earn-
ings, which underpin the findings of the preceding graphical analysis. Numerically, both
the total composition (9.05) and the total returns effect (9.09) contributed equally to the
overall 21.35 log percentage points increase in the 85-15 wage gap, with the specification
and reweighting error amounting to 3.22 points. The strongest composition effects were
due to changes in educational attainment (3.17 points) as well as changes in part-time (2.51
points) and non-employment (2.03 points) patterns. Further, there seemed to be moderate
composition effects linked to changes in the occupational structure (0.92 points) as well
as job mobility (0.38 points). The bottom half of the table, displaying detailed results for
the returns effect, shows that the estimated effects are generally less precise. Besides the
previously described returns effect linked to non-employment, it equally reveals a moderate
inequality-reducing effect from changing returns to part-time employment at the bottom of
the distribution.
3.5.2 Results for UA40 controlling for age at labor market entry
Regarding the question of whether the increasing inequality in lifetime earnings was driven by
changes in labor market participation as opposed to changes in earnings received during times
of employment, the evidence presented in the previous section suggests that some 21 percent
of the overall increase was linked to a lower labor market participation among individuals of
later cohorts. However, this baseline decomposition did not control for changes in the age at
labor market entry due to its presumable very close relationship with educational upgrading.
Hence, the estimate of the effect linked to a lower lifetime labor market participation did not
capture the delayed labor market entry of later cohorts as a result of educational upgrading.
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Table 3.3 – RIF decomposition results, UA40, including age at labor market entry
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar
Total change 21.35∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 12.77∗∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 7.25∗∗∗
(1.13) (0.58) (0.98) (0.18) (0.31)
Total composition 9.63∗∗∗ 4.83∗∗∗ 4.80∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.41) (0.47) (0.17) (0.34)
Non-employment 2.05∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.10) (0.24) (0.09) (0.16)
Part-time 2.38∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.16) (0.26) (0.09) (0.23)
Age at labor market entry 2.27∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.19) (0.20) (0.06) (0.11)
Education 1.91∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 0.04 0.36∗∗∗ -0.05
(0.35) (0.28) (0.22) (0.08) (0.11)
Occupation 0.84∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.05) (0.06)
Nationality -0.15 0.04 -0.19 0.05 0.09
(0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.04) (0.08)
Job Mobility 0.37∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm -0.05 0.38 -0.43∗ 0.02 -0.07
(0.29) (0.24) (0.22) (0.06) (0.09)
Total effect returns 8.63∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 3.98∗∗∗
(1.36) (0.75) (1.20) (0.19) (0.41)
Non-employment 3.70 0.82 2.87 0.57∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗
(2.31) (0.78) (1.97) (0.29) (0.74)
Part-time -1.43∗∗ -0.16 -1.27∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.05
(0.68) (0.25) (0.59) (0.12) (0.29)
Age at labor market entry 23.39 30.01∗ -6.62 6.47∗ 9.30
(19.98) (12.19) (16.11) (3.71) (7.30)
Education -1.00 0.41 -1.41 -0.77 -3.83∗
(4.87) (2.70) (4.05) (0.89) (2.19)
Occupation 0.61 -0.86 1.46 -0.11 -0.07
(1.68) (1.09) (1.43) (0.31) (0.88)
Nationality -1.83 0.23 -2.06∗ -0.42∗ -1.01∗
(1.18) (0.82) (1.11) (0.22) (0.58)
Job Mobility -1.56 -2.41∗∗∗ 0.85 -0.22 -0.24
(1.92) (0.92) (1.48) (0.33) (0.82)
Firm 1.04 1.04 -0.00 0.25 0.35
(2.02) (1.41) (1.55) (0.36) (0.66)
Constant -14.28 -25.43 11.15 -2.87 -3.57
(21.76) (13.42) (17.56) (4.02) (8.17)
Specification error 3.30∗∗∗ 0.13 3.16∗∗∗ -0.09∗ -0.02
(0.86) (0.40) (0.86) (0.05) (0.12)
Reweighting error -0.21 -0.04 -0.16 -0.04 -0.08
(0.44) (0.15) (0.35) (0.09) (0.16)
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. ∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses
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An alternative model specification that equally controls for the age at labor market entry
is provided in table 3.3. The results of this alternative specification suggest that up to 31
percent of the increase in 85-15 might in fact be due to the overall lower lifetime labor market
participation (i.e. due to the joint effect from changes in non-employment/part-time/age
at labor market entry). However, the composition effect linked to education equally shrinks
significantly in this specification, confirming the a-priori expectation of both effects being
closely related.
3.5.3 Results for earnings between ages 25 and 40
Looking more closely at earnings between ages 25 and 40, i.e. only considering earnings
from an age where most individuals already entered the labor market, reveals further valuable
insights. The corresponding decomposition results are presented in table 3.4. This earnings
measure is better comparable with the literature which typically considered earnings starting
at age 25 (e.g. Guevenen et al., 2017). Overall, the results point towards a greater
importance of composition effects (11.71 points), which are found to be more important
than the overall returns effect (6.49 points) in explaining the overall increase of 20.01 points
in terms of the 85-15 log wage differential. Most importantly, there seems to be a much
stronger composition effect linked to education explaining up to 32 percent (or 6.38 points)
in terms of 85-15 and up to 87 percent at the top of the distribution. In fact, this finding does
not come as a surprise given that this specification does not account for forgone earnings
during times of education. Hence, the educational expansion has a mechanically stronger
effect on inequality between age 25 and 40 (as opposed to UA40). This is accompanied by
a reduction in the composition effect linked to non-employment, which likely reflects both a
generally higher incidence of unemployment among very young individuals as well as the fact
that parts of the increase in non-employment at young ages might be due to the additional
time spent in education (though only non-employment spells after labor market entry are
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Table 3.4 – RIF decomposition results, earnings age 25-40
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar
Total change 20.01∗∗∗ 7.84∗∗∗ 12.17∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗
(1.21) (0.90) (0.97) (0.20) (0.36)
Total composition 11.71∗∗∗ 7.88∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.66) (0.63) (0.17) (0.36)
Non-employment 1.40∗∗∗ 0.02 1.38∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.03) (0.39) (0.10) (0.20)
Part-time 2.17∗∗∗ -0.47∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.26) (0.34) (0.09) (0.21)
Education 6.38∗∗∗ 6.79∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.60) (0.19) (0.09) (0.11)
Occupation 1.40∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.25) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07)
Nationality -0.52∗∗ -0.23 -0.29 -0.06 -0.11
(0.22) (0.17) (0.19) (0.04) (0.09)
Job Mobility 1.04∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.10) (0.13) (0.03) (0.08)
Firm -0.15 0.30 -0.46∗∗ 0.00 -0.13
(0.42) (0.34) (0.20) (0.07) (0.11)
Total effect returns 6.49∗∗∗ -0.24 6.73∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 4.42∗∗∗
(1.42) (0.94) (1.07) (0.21) (0.45)
Non-employment 5.39∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 3.10 0.38∗ 2.34∗∗∗
(2.55) (0.85) (2.30) (0.23) (0.82)
Part-time -2.31∗∗∗ -0.17 -2.13∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.26
(0.71) (0.31) (0.65) (0.10) (0.28)
Education 2.47 -1.72 4.19 -0.29 -2.91
(5.87) (3.75) (4.31) (0.86) (1.95)
Occupation -1.62 -3.34∗∗ 1.73 -0.48 -0.41
(2.29) (1.44) (1.62) (0.31) (0.81)
Nationality -0.55 0.42 -0.97 -0.11 0.30
(1.46) (1.11) (1.14) (0.22) (0.68)
Job Mobility -2.15 -0.89 -1.26 -0.33 -1.32
(2.31) (1.24) (1.44) (0.36) (1.16)
Firm -3.01 -0.45 -2.56 -0.24 -1.03
(2.51) (1.75) (1.82) (0.38) (0.67)
Constant 8.27 3.63 4.64 4.17∗∗∗ 7.71∗∗∗
(6.97) (4.70) (5.68) (1.04) (2.50)
Specification error 1.27∗ -0.08 1.35∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ 0.07
(0.68) (0.49) (0.44) (0.05) (0.13)
Reweighting error 0.55 0.28 0.27 0.07 0.16
(0.52) (0.23) (0.44) (0.09) (0.18)
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. ∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses
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counted as non-employment). Note also that the overall share explained by the increasing
incidence of part-time employment remains virtually unchanged. At the same time, there is a
moderate increases in the relative importance of compositional effects linked to occupations
and job mobility when compared to the decomposition of UA40.
As to the returns effect, the overall picture remains mostly unchanged with a persistently
strong effect linked to non-employment (5.39 points in terms of 85-15). At the same
time, the previously found returns effect linked to part-time employment becomes more
pronounced, suggesting that it had an inequality-reducing effect of -2.13 points (or -18
percent in terms of 50-15) at the bottom of the distribution, but hardly any effect in the
upper half of the distribution.
3.6 Summary and Discussion
This study has investigated potential determinants of increasing lifetime earnings inequality
using detailed employment biographies of West German men born between the years 1955
and 1974. Adopting a perspective based on cohorts, the paper contributes to a comparatively
small but growing literature documenting an increasing inequality in individual long-term
and lifetime earnings (Bo¨nke et al., 2015a, Guevenen et al., 2017). The paper confirms
major trends previously documented for Germany using an alternative data base. It goes
beyond previous contributions by formally disentangling these changes by means of a detailed
decomposition analysis based on RIF regression.
The empirical results suggest that a lower labor market participation of younger cohorts
explains some 20-30 percent of the overall increase in lifetime earnings inequality, with the
effect being mostly limited to the lower half of the distribution. Compared to the findings in
Bo¨nke et al. (2015a), the analysis assigns a smaller part of this effect to non-employment
periods and instead highlights the growing importance of part-time employment. Neverthe-
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less, this results is not at odds with the results in Bo¨nke et al. (2015a) due to the additional
cohorts included in the present study. The findings presented in the preceding chapters also
complement Biewen et al. (2018) by showing that the increasing incidence of part-time em-
ployment among German men does not only explain increasing inequality in cross-sectional
earnings, but also adds substantially to the increasing inequality in lifetime earnings. At
the same time, changing employment patterns can only partly explain the losses in UA40
earnings at the bottom of the distribution. Hence, this points towards some similarities
with the development in the U.S. for which Guevenen et al. (2017) showed that losses in
lifetime earnings among later cohorts are mostly due to a decline in earnings conditional on
employment.
Beside changing employment patterns, composition effects linked to the educational up-
grading of younger cohorts explain another 15-30 percent of the increasing dispersion in
lifetime earnings. Importantly, these changes were favorable for all parts of the distribution
but more favorable for individuals at the top, thereby increasing inequality in the upper half
of the distribution. Beyond educational upgrading, the analysis finds only limited evidence of
skill-biased technological change (SBTC). As such, only a moderate impact from changes in
the composition of occupations in the range of 4-7 percent and mostly insignificant results
regarding their returns are found.
The analysis also points towards a potentially important returns effect linked to episodes of
non-employment, which had an adverse effect on long-term earnings for individuals in the
lower half of the distribution. A natural interpretation of this result is that individuals in
later cohorts found it increasingly difficult to re-integrate into the labor market after being
non-employed, resulting in stronger long-term earnings losses. Possible mechanisms behind
this finding may be a faster depreciation of human capital as well as a poorer job match
quality following a period of non-employment.
The present study also provides evidence for a stagnation in UA40, i.e. during a major part
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of the career, among German men born between the years 1955 and 1974. In this regard,
the development in Germany resembles the one in the U.S., though somewhat delayed
and less pronounced, for which previous research by Guevenen et al. (2017) documented
significant losses in lifetime earnings among men starting already with birth cohort 1942.
Importantly, the results of the present paper point towards moderate earnings losses within
all educational subgroups (though being strongest for the lowest education group), which
were counterbalanced by the educational expansion. This is an interesting finding given
significant gains in hourly/daily earnings found in cross-sectional data during study period
1975-2014 (see, e.g. Dustmann et al., 2014). It suggests that the cross-sectional earnings
gains were only beneficial to individuals of older cohorts, whereas younger cohorts suffered
both a stagnation and increasing inequality in lifetime earnings.
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Appendix B
Correction for structural break 1983/1984
As outlined in the main part, the information on daily earnings in the SIAB is subject to
a structural break between the years 1983 and 1984. More precisely, one-time payments
such as annual bonuses or Christmas/holiday allowances were not included before 1984,
which results in a spurious increase in both the level and dispersion of earnings between
both years. The literature suggests different correction methods (see, e.g. Dustmann et al.,
2009, Bo¨nke et al., 2015a) which usually build on the technique by Fitzenberger (1999).
Being most closely related to the present study, daily earnings are corrected following the
procedure suggested in Bo¨nke et al. (2015a). Accordingly, log earnings growth in year t is
estimated by a random effects (RE) model of the following form
∆wt = α0 + α1D1984 + α2aget + α3age
2
t + α4age
3
t + α5D1984aget
+α6D1984age
2
t + α7D1984age
3
t +D
′
qβ +D
′
qγD1984 +D
′
qδaget + 
where ∆wt denotes the growth in log earnings between time periods t and t+1 and D1984
a dummy variable indicating the structural break. The model also includes a set of dummy
variables Dq for an individual’s average rank in the earnings distribution between age 35
and 40, which intends to approximate an individual’s permanent position in the earnings
distribution and accounts for the previous finding by Fitzenberger (1999) that the effect
of one-time payments is more important for the upper part of the earnings distribution.
Moreover, three polynomials of age as well as their interactions with the structural break
dummy D1984 are included. Finally, the model includes interactions between the rank dum-
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mies Dq and both the structural break dummy D1984 and age. These are used to estimate
an age and quantile specific spurious growth factor to correct observations before the year
1984.
Imputation of earnings above the contribution limit
The imputation of daily earnings above the contribution limit is done following the procedure
suggested in Gartner (2005). Hence, wages above the censoring point are estimated by a
series of tobit models which are computed separately for each year. The regressions include
two polynomials of age, six education categories as wells as interactions between age and
education. Instead of solely using the expected values from the tobit model, which suffer
from a too high correlation with the covariates and downward-biased standard errors in
later estimations, daily earnings above the threshold are drawn from a truncated normal
distribution. The lower limit of this distribution is given by the censoring threshold, its
standard deviation is estimated from the tobit model.
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Table B1 – Observations per cohort
Cohort (1) UA40 (2) UA45 (3) UA50
1955 4602 4192 3751
1956 4894 4480 4023
1957 4961 4525 4091
1958 5003 4588 4158
1959 5283 4775 4374
1960 5253 4801 4394
1961 5516 5053 4592
1962 5736 5258 4864
1963 5845 5368 4911
1964 5869 5397 4918
1965 5795 5340 -
1966 5948 5484 -
1967 5634 5256 -
1968 5351 5007 -
1969 5252 4798 -
1970 4863 - -
1971 4555 - -
1972 4086 - -
1973 3624 - -
1974 3517 - -
Total 109,194 81,271 49,864
Source: SIAB 1975-2014 and own calculations.
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Table B2 – Descriptive statistics UA40
1955-57 1972-74
Mean SD Mean SD
Non-employment (= days of non-employment/365) 2.120 2.435 2.361 2.505
Part-time employment (= days of part-time employment/365) 0.135 0.857 0.569 1.784
Age at labor market entry 21.069 1.950 21.557 2.045
Lower/middle secondary without vocational training 0.078 0.268 0.056 0.230
Lower/middle secondary with vocational training 0.765 0.424 0.644 0.479
Upper secondary without vocational training 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.078
Upper secondary with vocational training 0.040 0.195 0.112 0.315
University/Fachhochschule 0.113 0.317 0.177 0.381
Missing information 0.002 0.049 0.005 0.068
Number of firm changes (with change in both occupation/industry) 1.731 2.621 1.929 2.441
Number of firm changes (without change in both occupation/industry) 2.183 2.712 2.475 3.427
German nationality 0.890 0.314 0.779 0.415
Firmsize 1-50 0.338 0.473 0.352 0.477
Firmsize 51-500 0.330 0.470 0.377 0.485
Firmsize 500+ 0.331 0.470 0.271 0.444
Mostly in high-tech firm 0.304 0.460 0.294 0.455
Most frequent federal state:
Schlewsig-Holstein 0.032 0.177 0.029 0.168
Hamburg 0.028 0.165 0.030 0.169
Lower Saxony 0.103 0.304 0.104 0.306
Bremen 0.015 0.121 0.012 0.110
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.290 0.454 0.269 0.444
Hesse 0.093 0.291 0.098 0.298
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.060 0.238 0.052 0.228
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.169 0.374 0.179 0.383
Bavaria 0.187 0.390 0.209 0.407
Saarland 0.022 0.148 0.017 0.129
Most frequent sector:
Agriculte and Forestry 0.006 0.076 0.010 0.097
Mining 0.022 0.146 0.004 0.067
Food products, beverages and tobacco products 0.026 0.158 0.025 0.156
Textiles 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.073
Wood and wood products 0.007 0.085 0.010 0.097
Pulp, paper, paper product 0.009 0.094 0.010 0.098
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.019 0.135 0.012 0.110
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.043
Chemicals and chemical products 0.032 0.175 0.024 0.152
Rubber and plastic products 0.022 0.147 0.021 0.145
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Other non-metallic mineral products 0.014 0.117 0.011 0.105
Basic metals 0.028 0.164 0.021 0.145
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.043 0.202 0.039 0.193
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.081 0.273 0.065 0.247
Office machinery and computers 0.006 0.080 0.003 0.057
Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.026 0.159 0.024 0.153
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.009 0.097 0.012 0.107
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.024 0.154 0.020 0.140
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.055 0.229 0.060 0.238
Other transport equipment 0.009 0.093 0.008 0.088
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.013 0.115 0.012 0.107
Electricity, Water, Recycling 0.015 0.122 0.011 0.105
Construction 0.107 0.309 0.094 0.292
Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles 0.029 0.169 0.045 0.208
Wholesale trade 0.064 0.246 0.063 0.243
Retail trade 0.044 0.204 0.047 0.211
Hotels and restaurants 0.012 0.108 0.015 0.123
Transportation 0.027 0.161 0.024 0.152
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 0.026 0.158 0.032 0.175
Post and telecommunications 0.011 0.104 0.011 0.106
Financial intermediation 0.031 0.172 0.031 0.175
Insurance and pension funding 0.008 0.091 0.008 0.089
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.002 0.048 0.003 0.059
Real estate activities, Renting of machinery and equipment 0.005 0.067 0.008 0.088
Computer and related activities 0.005 0.072 0.028 0.150
Research and development 0.004 0.059 0.006 0.074
Other business activities 0.034 0.180 0.078 0.269
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.046 0.210 0.028 0.166
Education 0.009 0.094 0.010 0.100
Health and social work 0.031 0.174 0.041 0.199
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.075
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 0.008 0.089 0.006 0.076
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.006 0.077 0.007 0.083
Other service activities 0.008 0.089 0.004 0.064
Most frequent occupation:
Occ. in agriculture, forestry, and farming 0.005 0.073 0.004 0.066
Occ. in gardening and floristry 0.006 0.080 0.008 0.090
Occ. in production and processing of raw materials, glass- and ceramic-making etc. 0.016 0.127 0.008 0.087
Occ. in plastic-making and -processing, and wood-working and -processing 0.035 0.184 0.041 0.199
Occ. in paper-making and -processing, printing, and in technical media design 0.024 0.152 0.018 0.132
Occ. in metal-making and -working, and in metal construction 0.103 0.304 0.090 0.286
Technical occ. in machine-building and automotive industry 0.147 0.354 0.144 0.351
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Occ. in mechatronics, energy electronics and electrical engineering 0.055 0.227 0.037 0.188
Occ. in technical research and development, construction, production planning etc. 0.045 0.207 0.050 0.218
Occ. in textile- and leather-making and -processing 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.072
Occ. in beverage production 0.022 0.147 0.028 0.164
Occ. in construction scheduling, architecture and surveying 0.011 0.106 0.009 0.093
Occ. in building construction above and below ground 0.044 0.205 0.032 0.176
Occ. in interior construction 0.021 0.144 0.020 0.142
Occ. in building services engineering and technical building services 0.026 0.160 0.029 0.167
Occ. in mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics, geography, geology etc 0.031 0.174 0.026 0.158
Occ. in computer science, information and communication technology 0.018 0.133 0.035 0.184
Occ. in traffic and logistics (without vehicle driving) 0.064 0.245 0.072 0.259
Drivers and operators of vehicles and transport equipment 0.071 0.257 0.049 0.216
Occ. in safety and health protection, security and surveillance 0.009 0.092 0.010 0.098
Occ. in cleaning services 0.004 0.064 0.008 0.089
Occ. in purchasing, sales and trading 0.028 0.164 0.028 0.164
Sales occ. in retail trade 0.018 0.133 0.028 0.164
Occ. in tourism, hotels and restaurants 0.006 0.074 0.007 0.083
Occ. in business management and organisation 0.086 0.280 0.103 0.303
Occ. in financial services, accounting and tax consultancy 0.046 0.209 0.048 0.213
Occ. in law and public administration 0.003 0.053 0.008 0.081
Medical and health care occupations 0.015 0.120 0.024 0.155
Occ. in non-medical healthcare, body care, wellness and medical technicians 0.006 0.077 0.003 0.058
Occ. in education and social work, housekeeping, and theology 0.012 0.109 0.012 0.110
Occ. in teaching and training 0.005 0.073 0.005 0.068
Occ. in humanities, social sciences, economics, media etc. 0.012 0.109 0.014 0.116
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2014 and own calculations.
Numbers refer to individuals with valid UA40 biography
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Table B3 – RIF decomposition results, UA40, German nationals
Inequality measure 85-15 85-50 50-15 Gini Logvar
Total change 19.07∗∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 6.49∗∗∗
(1.15) (0.67) (0.91) (0.19) (0.33)
Total composition 9.22∗∗∗ 4.76∗∗∗ 4.46∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.39) (0.47) (0.16) (0.27)
Non-employment 1.94∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) (0.15)
Part-time 2.48∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.16) (0.26) (0.09) (0.18)
Education 3.42∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.28) (0.22) (0.07) (0.10)
Occupation 1.12∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06)
Job Mobility 0.30∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06
(0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Firm -0.04 0.45∗ -0.49∗∗ 0.02 -0.09
(0.30) (0.25) (0.24) (0.07) (0.09)
Total effect returns 7.75∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗
(1.28) (0.76) (0.96) (0.20) (0.39)
Non-employment 5.06∗∗ 0.67 4.40∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗
(2.09) (0.83) (1.75) (0.31) (0.73)
Part-time -1.27∗ -0.26 -1.01∗ -0.21∗ 0.09
(0.65) (0.25) (0.56) (0.12) (0.25)
Education 0.81 -1.12 1.93 -1.09 -4.38∗
(6.30) (4.05) (4.90) (1.05) (2.65)
Occupation -1.88 -2.18∗∗ 0.30 -0.41 -0.50
(1.87) (1.06) (1.59) (0.32) (0.73)
Job Mobility -1.66 0.42 -2.08 -0.11 -0.32
(2.00) (0.94) (1.46) (0.38) (0.83)
Firm -1.43 -2.07 0.64 -0.34 -0.58
(1.92) (1.59) (1.39) (0.35) (0.64)
Constant 8.11 7.77 0.34 4.08∗∗∗ 6.35∗∗
(6.99) (4.73) (5.60) (1.21) (3.10)
Specification error 2.20∗∗∗ 0.30 1.90∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.12
(0.67) (0.40) (0.62) (0.05) (0.09)
Reweighting error -0.10 0.05 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11
(0.38) (0.13) (0.29) (0.08) (0.13)
Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2014 and own calculations.
Log wage differentials×100. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses
∗∗∗/ ∗∗/ ∗ statistically significant at 1%/5%/10%-level
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Figure B1 – Indexed real growth in earnings age 25-40
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Chapter 4
Counterfactual Quantile
Decompositions with Selection
Correction Taking into Account
Huber/Melly (2015): An Application
to the German Gender Wage Gap∗
4.1 Introduction
Decomposition analyses beyond pure comparison of means have become increasingly popu-
lar in applied economic research (for an overview, see Fortin et al., 2011). One particularly
popular approach proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly (2005) uses conditional
∗This chapter is based on:
Biewen, M., Fitzenberger, B., and M. Seckler (2019): Counterfactual Quantile Decompositions with Se-
lection Correction Taking into Account Huber/Melly (2015): An Application to the German Gender Wage
Gap. Unpublished manuscript, University of Tu¨bingen and Humboldt-University Berlin.
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quantile regression to estimate marginal wage distributions for different counterfactual scen-
arios. Building on the control function approach of Buchinsky (1998, 2001), this technique
was extended by Albrecht et al. (2009) to account for selection on unobservables. An im-
portant application of the Albrecht et al. (2009) method is the gender wage gap for which a
number of authors have assessed the impact of female selection into the labor market (e.g.,
Albrecht et al., 2009, Chzhen and Mumford, 2011).1
However, the use of this method has been called into question by Huber and Melly (2015)
who pointed out that Buchinsky’s (1998, 2001) control function approach is only valid
if regressors and error terms are independent conditional on selection probabilities. This
rules out heterogenous slope coefficients, which are often the motivation for using quantile
regression approaches. Based on this idea, Huber and Melly (2015) developed a test of the
conditional independence assumption which should be carried out before applying Buchinsky
(1998, 2001) selection corrections. If the Huber and Melly (2015) test passes, then the
results of an Albrecht et al. (2009) analysis can be trusted. If the test rejects, however, users
of this method are in the uncomfortable position of applying a method whose assumptions
are likely to be violated.
The aim of this paper is to propose a transformation of the original quantile regression model
aimed at eliminating violations of conditional independence.2 For this transformation, we
draw on Chen and Khan (2003) who used a similar transformation for the analysis of a
sample selection model for the mean in the presence of heteroscedasticity. We demonstrate
1Bollinger et al. (2011) also apply the control function approach of Buchinsky to estimate counterfactual
wage distributions based on selection corrected quantile regressions. More recently, a number of alternative
methods to account for unobserved selectivity in distributional analysis have been proposed, see the literature
review below. Some of these methods are more general but also much less practical than the Albrecht et
al. (2009) method.
2The idea to transform the dependent variable is similar to the approach applied in the companion paper
Fitzenberger and de Lazzer (2019), which estimates the selection bias in employment for male workers to
account for unemployment. However, the actual implementation of the transformation approach differs
between the two papers. Fitzenberger and de Lazzer (2019) estimate selection corrected slope coefficients
based on an identification-at-infinity assumption. Further, the empirical application and the dataset used
also differ strongly between the two papers.
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theoretically and empirically that such a transformation may be successful in arriving at a
model in which conditional independence holds and the Huber and Melly (2015) test passes.
Our application of this approach to the gender wage gap in Germany provides a real data
case in which the Huber/Melly test passes in the transformed model but overwhelmingly
rejects in the untransformed model.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we offer users of the Albrecht et al. (2009)
method a way to circumvent the Huber and Melly (2015) critique. Second, we present new
results on the gender wage gap in Germany taking into account selection on unobservables.
As Albrecht et al. (2009) for the Netherlands and Chzhen and Mumford (2011) for the UK,
we find positive selection on unobservables leading to an underestimation of the gender gap.
However, our results also suggest that this underestimation is more severe compared to that
in an untransformed model that is susceptible to the Huber and Melly (2015) critique.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 4.3 describes the data used in our empirical analysis, which were taken from the
German Socio-Economic Panel. In section 4.4, we propose the transformation aimed at
eliminating violations from conditional independence. Section 4.5 presents our empirical
findings. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
The following literature review specifically deals with contributions that aim at accounting for
selection on unobservables when measuring differences in distributions between population
groups such as the gender wage gap. For an overview of research on the gender gap in
general, see the recent reviews by Blau and Kahn (2017) and Kunze (2017).
A common approach in the literature to accounting for potential selectivity in female labor
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supply is the imputation of wages of non-working women according to different imputa-
tion rules, e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2006, and Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008. Using this
approach, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) find an increase in median wage gaps after taking
into account selection. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) study the gender wage gap in the
U.S. using selectivity corrections based on Heckman’s two-step estimator combined with an
identification-at-infinity approach. Contrary to some of the more recent literature, these
studies concentrate on the effect of selection on mean or median wage gaps.
Regarding the effect of selection along the whole distribution, a first strand of the literature
builds on the seminal contributions by Buchinsky (1998, 2001) who suggests a selection
correction technique for conditional quantile regression based on a control function ap-
proach. Buchinsky (1998, 2001) applies this method to study the impact of selectivity on
female wages in the U.S. In an important contribution, Albrecht et al. (2009) combine the
Buchinsky correction with the popular Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method
to estimate counterfactual wage distributions for the Netherlands (see also Bollinger et al.
(2011) for a similar methodological approach addressing a different economic question).
Chzhen and Mumford (2011) present a related analysis for the U.K. Both studies find size-
able positive selection effects across the distribution but Chzhen and Mumford (2011) assign
a larger proportion (i.e. about one half) of the total selection effect to unobservables. As
described above, selectivity corrections based on Buchinsky (1998) have been called into
question by Huber and Melly (2015).
Picchio and Mussida (2011) propose a method based on estimating hazard functions to
model the impact of covariates on conditional distributions. Applying methods developed
to account for dynamic selection, the study corrects for selection on unobservables in the
gender gap using panel data but without the need for exclusion restrictions. They apply
their method to studying the gender wage gap in Italy, also finding evidence for positive
unobserved selection. It remains an open question to what extent modelling assumptions
typically used in hazard rate analysis are plausible for modelling wage distributions. Popli
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(2013) extends previous contributions by allowing for multiple outcomes in the selection
equation. In order to correct for selection into different types of employment, she includes
Heckman-type correction terms into her analysis. Her empirical analysis examines the gender
wage gap in Mexico accounting for selection into both the formal and informal sector based
on a multinomial logit model.
In a recent important paper, Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) suggest a copula based method
to provide consistent estimates of quantile regressions with selection correction. They es-
timate quantile regressions while assuming a fixed copula between the conditional rank in
the wage distribution and the rank in the error term of the selection equation. The approach
amounts to estimating rotated quantile regressions, which relate the θth quantile regression
in the nonselected sample to a rotated value, which represents the rank of the θth unselec-
ted quantile in the selected sample, thus linking the two for estimation purposes. This is
an alternative to Buchinsky’s selection correction approach which estimates the difference
between the θth quantiles in the two samples. The approach of Arellano and Bonhomme
has two disadvantages. First, the authors estimate the copula while assuming a specific
functional form, and they allow only for the covariates to have a limited impact on the
joint distribution of ranks. Second, the estimation of the copula is computationally very
involved. We view the two approaches to model the relationship between the ranks or the
quantiles, respectively, in the unselected and selected sample as complementary, both hav-
ing to address the dependence of this relationship upon covariates. Maasoumi and Wang
(2019) use a variant of this method in a decision-theoretic analysis of the evolution of the
U.S. gender wage gap across time. Another very general but practically demanding method
that accounts for unobserved selection in distributional analysis has recently been proposed
by Fernandez-Val et al. (2018).
Following a different approach, D’Haultfoeuille et al. (2018) suggest a method to correct
for selection on unobservables based on the observation of extreme values that also does not
require exclusion restrictions. Specifically aimed at selection on unobservables in the context
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of the gender gap, Machado (2017) develops a technique for correcting for unobserved
selection into employment. Her setup slightly differs from other setups considered so far by
focussing on the selection on unobservables of the subpopulation of the ‘always employed’
women who are similar to the full-time male labor force. Finally, To¨pfer (2017) suggests to
extend the popular RIF decomposition technique (Firpo et al., 2018) to include terms for
unobserved sample selection and applies this method to study the gender wage gap in Italy.
The previous literature on the effects of unobserved selection on the gender wage gap
in Germany is relatively sparse. Beblo et al. (2003) applied basic correction techniques
including Heckman-type corrections. They found partly contradictory results depending on
the chosen specification. In an early contribution, Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2004) also
employed the Buchinsky (1998, 2001) control function approach but obtained inconclusive
results on the impact of unobserved selection.
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis builds on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a represent-
ative panel survey of German households that has been carried out on annual basis since the
year 1984.3 Despite some limitations such as a moderate sample size, the GSOEP is ideal
for our purpose as it comprises a large number of individual and household characteristics
including potential instruments for modeling female labor market participation. For our
analysis, we pool two years 2012 and 2013 in order to make our results less year-specific and
in order to increase statistical precision.4 We include all subsamples of the GSOEP, except
the so-called high-income sample oversampling individuals with very high incomes, which
3This paper uses the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), years 1984- 2013 (DOI:
10.5684/soep.v30).
4See, e.g., Hyslop and Mare (2005) or Blundell et al. (2007). In what follows, we fully take into
account our longitudinal data structure for all procedures of statistical inference by re-sampling from the
set of individuals rather than from the set of yearly observations.
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we exclude for robustness reasons. For our final sample, we apply the following sample
selection criteria. First, we only consider individuals aged between 20 and 60 years. Second,
we exclude the self-employed, individuals in vocational training, civil servants and retirees.
The dependent variable of our analysis is the hourly wage computed as the current monthly
gross labor income divided by the monthly working time (including overtime). For reasons
of plausibility, we omit individuals with an hourly wage below 4 Euros and respondents who
reported a monthly working time of more than 350 hours. We also exclude observations
with missing values in any of our covariates as listed below. Our sample consists of 5,697
women and 4,769 men who provided a total of 9,596 female observations (3,632 in full-time
employment and 5,964 not in full-time employment) and 8,060 male observations (6,627
in full-time and 1,433 not in full-time employment). Table 4.1 presents our variable list
along with descriptive statistics for our estimation sample. In our quantile wage regressions,
we include a set of standard covariates including dummies for educational qualifications (3
categories: (i) no degree, (ii) high school degree (Abitur and/or vocational training, (iii)
university or university of applied science (Fachhochschule), dummies for German nationality,
urban areas and marital status, as well as a quadratic polynomial in work experience (full-
time or part-time work experience in years, where one year of part-time experience counts
as .5 years of full-time experience).
Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics
Men Women
Full-time Not full-time
Variable Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Hourly Wage (Euros) 17.69 9.62 15.12 7.42 13.29 6.27
Abitur or voc. training 0.669 0.471 0.628 0.483 0.655 0.475
University or Fachhochschule 0.247 0.431 0.302 0.459 0.173 0.378
German 0.928 0.259 0.945 0.228 0.873 0.333
Urban 0.676 0.468 0.688 0.464 0.648 0.478
Married 0.578 0.494 0.369 0.483 0.665 0.472
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East 0.169 0.375 0.188 0.391 0.163 0.369
Work experience 19.68 10.94 16.47 10.91 11.39 8.47
Work experience (squared) 507.27 437.84 390.44 420.45 201.55 262.49
Age 42.91 10.36 41.28 11.13 43.08 10.62
Age (squared) 1948.74 863.32 1828.12 915.47 1968.99 890.57
Number of childen 0-2 years 0.067 0.260 0.016 0.124 0.108 0.328
Number of childen 3-5 years 0.089 0.310 0.028 0.169 0.140 0.373
Number of childen 6-11 years 0.183 0.479 0.070 0.288 0.293 0.578
Number of childen 12-18 years 0.230 0.555 0.135 0.402 0.327 0.629
Religious 0.117 0.321 0.098 0.297 0.200 0.400
Unemployment rate 7.61 2.78 7.78 2.88 7.61 2.71
Female labor force participation rate 72.20 3.17 72.40 3.15 72.07 3.16
Income of partner (thousand Euros) 0.848 1.270 1.202 2.009 1.835 2.419
Household asset income (thousand Euros) 1.138 4.115 1.184 6.858 1.078 4.686
Care 0.012 0.110 0.012 0.109 0.027 0.162
Observations 6,627 3,632 5,964
Individuals 3,842 2,149 3,548
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
In our employment selection model, we include all of these variables plus a set of additional
variables assumed to influence participation probabilities but not wage outcomes. Our
choice of these variables is similar to that in the literature, see, e.g., Albrecht et al. (2009)
or Chzhen and Mumford (2011). In particular, we include a quadratic polynomial in age,
dummies for the number of children in different age groups (0-2, 3-5, 5-11, 12-18), a dummy
for being religious, the income of the partner, the household’s asset income as well as a
dummy indicating whether there is a person living in the same household requiring care. In
addition, we include two variables representing aggregate labor market information at the
level of the federal states which reflect general macroeconomic trends and business cycle
effects (the regional unemployment rate and the regional female labor force participation
rate, see Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2015, table 2.1, and Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014,
table 5.4). As table 4.1 shows, women working full-time are more likely to hold a university
degree and have significantly more work experience. They also have fewer children, are less
likely to be married, less religious, have partners with a lower income and are less likely to
have family members requiring care.
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4.4 Econometric model
4.4.1 Quantile regressions with selection correction and counter-
factual wage distributions (Albrecht et al., 2009)
We start with a description of the approach using the Machado-Mata (2005) decomposition
approach based on selection corrected quantile regression as suggested by Albrecht et al.
(2009). The method augments the original decomposition technique by correcting for selec-
tion on unobservables using the Buchinsky (1998, 2001) quantile selection correction. For
our application, consider two groups (A) and (FT). The first group (A) represents all women
regardless of whether they actually work full-time or not. By contrast, the second group
(FT) includes only the women who in fact work full-time and therefore provide observations
of full-time wages. The description of conditional wage quantiles in the total population
(A) is given by
Qθ (yA|xA) = x′AβA (θ) (4.1)
where Qθ (yA|xA) , θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the θ-quantile of the distribution of potential (log)
wages yA for women with characteristics xA. This is the distribution of wages a randomly
drawn woman with characteristics xA would face if she decided to work full-time. The vector
βA (θ) is the vector of true, quantile-specific coefficients for this distribution of potential
wages.
However, as not all women eventually choose to work full-time, estimation of βA (θ) can only
proceed using the wages of women who are actually observed to work-full time. Conditional
quantiles in this non-randomly selected subpopulation may be higher or lower depending
on which women selected themselves into full-time work. As shown by Buchinsky (1998),
this implies the existence of sample selection correction terms hθ (z
′
FTγ) at each quantile θ
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so that the conditional quantiles in the population of women who selected themselves into
full-time work can be written as
Qθ (yFT |zFT , D = 1) = x′FTβA (θ) + hθ (z′FTγ) , (4.2)
where z is a vector of individual characteristics explaining participation in full-time work
according to the model
Pr (D = 1|z) = Pr (z′γ +  > 0|z) . (4.3)
The vector z is assumed to contain all the characteristics x that determine wages plus addi-
tional characteristics that influence selection without influencing wages. In an analogy to the
Heckman (1979) selection model, Buchinsky (1998) approximates the selection correction
term hθ (z
′
FTγ) as a function of the inverse Mills ratio using a power series of the form
hˆθ (z
′
FTγ) = δ0 (θ) + δ1 (θ)λ (z
′
FTγ) + δ2 (θ)λ (z
′
FTγ)
2
+ δ3 (θ)λ (z
′
FTγ)
3
... (4.4)
with λ(·) denoting the inverse Mills ratio. The parameters γ can be estimated using a
binomial choice model such as probit or more general models.5
To solve the problem that the intercepts in the wage and the selection model (i.e. βA0 (θ) and
δ0 (θ)) are not separately identified, Buchinsky (1998) and Albrecht et al. (2009) propose to
use identification-at- infinity arguments, implying that βA0 (θ) can be consistently estimated
in a subsample of women whose probability of working full-time is close to one without
correcting for selection.6
5In our empirical application, we initially experimented with the semi-parametric estimators developed
by Gallant and Nycka (1987) and Klein and Spady (1993). A disadvantage of these estimators is that they
exhibit occasional convergence problems leading to difficulties when computing bootstrap standard errors.
We found only minor differences between the values for λ (z′FT γˆ) resulting from a probit model and those
from the more general models so that we eventually decided to work with the probit model.
6In our empirical application, we treat women with a participation probability of over 75 percent as
being close enough to sure participation. Our results are robust to increasing this threshold, but at the cost
of higher standard errors.
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Following Machado and Mata (2005), a number of different counterfactual wage distribu-
tions can be estimated by repeatedly sampling values θ from the interval (0, 1) and values x
from an empirical distribution of characteristics. For example, if one repeatedly samples θ
from the interval (0, 1) and xA from the population of all women, one can simulate values
yˆA = x
′
Aβˆ
A (θ) (4.5)
whose distribution corresponds to the distribution of womens’ wages in the counterfactual
scenario where all women work full-time.
Comparing this resulting counterfactual distribution, denoted by F (yˆA|xA, βˆA), where βˆA
involves the family of quantile regression coefficients for θ ∈ (0, 1), with the observed wage
distribution of full-time women F (yFT ) yields the total effect of selection into full-time
employment
F (yFT )− F (yˆA|xA, βˆA). (4.6)
According to Albrecht et al. (2009), this effect can be split up into a part due to differences in
observable characteristics and a part due to differences in unobservable characteristics. The
first part is given by the difference between the observed wages of full-time women F (yFT )
and the counterfactual that would prevail if all women worked full-time and received the
returns of full-time women without accounting for selection F (yˆA|xA, βˆFT ) , i.e.
F (yFT )− F (yˆA|xA, βˆFT ) , (4.7)
where βˆFT are the coefficients for full-time working women without selection correction.
The effect of selection due to unobservables is given by comparing the counterfactual scen-
arios where all women work full-time and receive the returns of full-time women without
accounting for selection F (yˆA|x′AβˆFT ) with the counterfactual scenario used in the calcu-
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lation of the total selection effect, i.e. assuming all women work full-time and receive the
selection adjusted returns of full-time women F (yˆA|xA, βˆA). This yields the difference
F (yˆA|xA, βˆFT )− F (yˆA|xA, βˆA). (4.8)
4.4.2 Huber and Melly (2015) conditional independence test
As described in Huber and Melly (2015), the Buchinsky (1998) selection correction approach
assumes a potential outcome model of the form
y∗ = x′β + u, (4.9)
where y∗ denotes the log wage individuals with x and u would earn if they decided to work
full-time. In practice, one only observes log wages y = y∗ of individuals who in fact chose
to work full-time. Selection into full-time status is determined by
D = 1
[
z
′
γ +  ≥ 0
]
(4.10)
with z denoting a strict superset of x as outlined in the previous section. Huber and Melly
(2015) pointed out that Buchinsky’s (1998) control function approach assumes conditional
independence in the sense that the joint density fu, of the error terms of the potential
outcome model u and the selection model  is independent of z, conditional on the probability
of selection Pr(D = 1|z), i.e.
fu,(.|z) = fu,(.|Pr (D = 1|z)). (4.11)
This follows from assumptions C and E in Buchinsky (1998) and is equivalent to fu,(.|z) =
fu,(.|z′γ) as  is assumed to be independent of z.
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As a consequence,
Qθ (y|z,D = 1) = x′β +Qθ (u|z,D = 1)
= x′β +Qθ (u|z, z′γ ≥ −)
= x′β +Qθ (u|z′γ, z′γ ≥ −)
= x′β +Qθ (u|z′γ,D = 1)
= x′β + hθ(z′γ), (4.12)
where the third line follows from conditional independence. Huber and Melly (2015) point
out that this holds for any quantile θ, implying that, net of the selection terms hθ(z
′γ), all
quantile regression models in the selected sample have to be parallel under the conditional
independence assumption. In substantive terms, the conditional independence assumption
(4.11) rules out that the distribution of u directly depends on z (i.e. is heteroscedastic
in z), although it may depend on the selection probability P (D = 1|z) (i.e. it may be
heteroscedastic in the index z′γ).
To test whether this sort of conditional independence is fulfilled in our application, we
implement the Huber/Melly test, which tests the equality of quantile regression coefficients
in the selected sample. The null hypothesis of the test is
H0 : β(θ) = β(0.5) for all θ ∈ Θ (4.13)
against
H1 : β(θ) 6= β(0.5) for some θ ∈ Θ. (4.14)
Following Huber and Melly (2015), our implementation tests for departures from the H0 in a
fine grid with step length 0.01 in the regions Θ1=[0.05,0.95], Θ2=[0.1,0.9], Θ3=[0.15,0.85]
and Θ4=[0.2,0.8]. Departures from the H0 are measured using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
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(KS) and Crame´r-von Mises (CM) test statistics, i.e.
TKSn = supθ∈Θ
√
n
∥∥∥βˆ (θ)− βˆ (0.5)∥∥∥
Λˆθ
(4.15)
TCMn = n
∫
Θ
∥∥∥βˆ (θ)− βˆ (0.5)∥∥∥2
Λˆθ
dθ (4.16)
with ‖a‖Λˆθ defined by
√
a′Λˆθa and Λˆθ denoting a positive weighting matrix (as described
in Huber and Melly, 2015). The unknown distributions of the test statistics are obtained
by resampling score functions, which are linear approximations of the empirical process
√
n
(
βˆ (θ)− βˆ (0.5)
)
.7
4.4.3 Model transformation
In order to avoid the assumption that the data generating process directly meets the con-
ditional independence assumption, we suggest to transform the original model so that the
transformed model meets this assumption.8 Consider a transformation by dividing the ori-
ginal model (4.9) by h(z) > 0 (a positive, possibly nonlinear function of the covariates
z) [
y∗
h(z)
]
=
[
x′
h(z)
]
β +
[
u
h(z)
]
⇔ y˜∗ = x˜′β + u˜. (4.17)
7See Huber and Melly (2015) for more details. Our Stata implementation of the test is available upon
request.
8The idea to transform the dependent variable is similar to the companion paper Fitzenberger and de
Lazzer (2019), which estimates the selection bias in employment for male workers to account for unem-
ployment. However, there are two key methodological differences. First, Fitzenberger and de Lazzer (2019)
only transform the dependent variable while leaving the covariates unchanged, while our paper transforms
both the dependent variable and the covariates. Second, the approach taken by Fitzenberger and de Lazzer
(2019) to determine the transformation factor relies on the identification-at-infinity approach, which is
plausible in a setting where the median selection probability lies between 94% and 97%. As described
below, the transformation in the present paper is motivated by a location-scale model using an arguably
plausible assumption about the dispersion in the selective sample and the selection probability.
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If the conditional independence assumption holds in this model (i.e. if the distribution of
u˜ is independent of z but possibly dependent on z′γ), then one can apply the Buchinsky
(1998) selection correction to this model. But the validity of the Buchinsky representation
(4.12) is directly tested by the Huber/Melly test (i.e. constant quantile regression slope
coefficients and correction terms that may depend on z′γ but not on z). As a consequence,
the Buchinsky (1998) selection correction may be applied to any transformed model that
passes the Huber/Melly test. For the Albrecht et al. (2009) method, it is then necessary to
produce a prediction of Qθ(y
∗|z) referring to the untransformed values y∗ and z. But such
a prediction is easy to produce because
Qθ(y
∗|z) = Qθ(h(z)y˜∗|z) = h(z)Qθ(y˜∗|x˜), (4.18)
i.e. one reverses the transformation after computing predictions in the transformed model.9
Next, we give an example of a realistic data generating process and a transformation so
that the transformed model satisfies the conditional independence assumption, whereas
the untransformed model does not. Note however, that the argument in the previous
paragraph is completely general and independent of the upcoming example. If one succeeds
in monotonically transforming the original model so that the transformed model passes the
Huber/Melly test, then one may apply the Buchinsky (1998) selection correction no matter
how the original data generating process looks like.
The example data generating process is a standard regression model with multiplicative
heteroscedasticity (similar but more general than the one discussed in Huber and Melly,
2015), i.e.
y∗ = x′β + g(x) v, (4.19)
9This works because, given z, dividing by h(z) > 0 is a monotonic transformation so that the trans-
formed dependent and explanatory variables contain exactly the same information, and because the quantiles
of a monotonically transformed variable are identical to the transformed quantiles of the untransformed vari-
able. In principle, one might therefore also consider more complicated monotonic transformations of the
original model than dividing by a function h(z) > 0, as long as these only depend on z.
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where g(x) > 0 and v is assumed to satisfy the conditional independence assumption (i.e. its
distribution does not depend on z but may depend on z′γ). The model represents a realistic
data generating process because it includes the two features that are most interesting to
economists: location shifts depending on personal characteristics on the one hand (via β),
and heteroscedasticity depending on x on the other (via g(x)).
Using a similar idea as in Chen and Khan (2003), in this model for two quantiles α2 > α1
Qα2 (y|z,D = 1) = x′β + g(x)Qα2(v|z
′
γ,D = 1) (4.20)
Qα1 (y|z,D = 1) = x′β + g(x)Qα1(v|z
′
γ,D = 1) (4.21)
(the quantiles of v do not depend on z but only on z′γ by the conditional independence
assumption for v). This implies that
g(x) =
Qα2(y|z,D = 1)−Qα1(y|z,D = 1)
Qα2(v|z′γ,D = 1)−Qα1(v|z′γ,D = 1)
=
∆q(z)
∆v(z′γ)
. (4.22)
In this expression, ∆q(z) can be easily estimated as it is an interquantile spread for indi-
viduals with characteristics z in the selected population. The other quantity ∆v(z′γ) is
in principle unobservable. However, a natural assumption would be that in the generating
model (4.19), v represents a standardized disturbance whose quantile spreads do not de-
pend on z′γ, i.e. ∆v(z′γ) = ∆v. A natural choice would be a standard normally distributed
variable v for which one can compute interquantile spreads ∆v = Φ−1(α2)−Φ−1(α1). This
does not restrict the generality of the model in any important way because the variance
of the conditional distributions y∗|x may still dependent very generally on x through the
heteroscedastic scaling factor g(x).
In this case, transforming the data generating process by h(z) = ∆q(z)/∆v yields the
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transformed model[
y∗
∆q(z)
∆v
]
=
[
x′
∆q(z)
∆v
]
β + g(x)
[
v
∆q(z)
∆v
]
=
[
x′
∆q(z)
∆v
]
β + v (4.23)
in which the conditional independence assumption holds (by assumptions on v).
Note that it is not strictly necessary to assume that the interquantile spreads of the dis-
turbance term ∆v(z′γ) are independent of z′γ for obtaining a transformed model in which
the conditional independence assumption holds. For example, assume that the interquantile
spread takes the form
∆v(z′γ) = ∆v∗ · c(α2, α1, z′γ), (4.24)
i.e. the interquantile spread of v may be widened or compressed depending on the selection
index z′γ. In this case, one can transform the model by h(z) = ∆q(z)/∆v∗ yielding
[
y∗
∆q(z)
∆v∗
]
=
[
x′
∆q(z)
∆v∗
]
β + g(x)
[
v
∆q(z)
∆v∗
]
=
[
x′
∆q(z)
∆v∗
]
β +
[
v
c(α2, α1, z′γ)
]
. (4.25)
The conditional independence assumption still holds in this model because the transformed
error term depends only on z′γ and not on z. Assumption (4.24) is quite natural and
plausible for the location-scale model in eq. (4.19), because the distribution of the scale
independent error term v only depends upon z′γ and the error term of the selection equation
is assumed to be independent of z.
In our empirical application below, we use ∆v∗ = Φ−1(α2)−Φ−1(α1) along with α2 = .85
and α1 = .15. With these choices, the Huber/Melly test passes for the transformed model,
whereas it clearly rejects in the untransformed model (see below). Again, note that according
to our argument above, it suffices to find one transformation for which the Huber/Melly test
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passes in order to be able to apply the Buchinsky (1998) selection correction and therefore
the Albrecht et al. (2009) framework.
4.5 Application to the gender wage gap in Germany
In the following, we consider the impact of female selection into full-time employment for
the gender wage gap. As in Albrecht et al. (2009), we make the simplifying assumption
that there is no selection problem for men, which appears to be a reasonable assumption
given the high male participation rates in full-time work. For women, we define the selected
group as those who work full-time, while the non-selected group is defined as those who do
not full-time (i.e. those who do not work at all or who work only part-time).
Figure 4.1 – Raw wage gap, full-time men vs. full-time women
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
Figure 4.1 shows the raw wage gap between full-time men and full-time women. The gap is
positive, ranging from around 15 percent in the lower half of the distribution, and rising to
around 25 percent in the upper half. It is well-known that this gap overestimates differences
in wages paid between men and women with the same characteristics if the women who
work full-time have less favorable observed characteristics than men who work full-time. On
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the other hand, it may underestimate pay differences between men and women with the
same characteristics, if the women who work full-time are a particularly positive selection
of all women in terms of their unobservable characteristics.
Figure 4.2 – Raw wage gap, full-time men vs. full-time/part-time women
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
A step into the direction of asking how the wage gap would look like if female participation
in full-time work was less selective is done in figure 4.2. This figure shows the gender wage
gap including not only the women who worked full-time but also those who worked part-time
along with their part-time wages. As expected, this increases the observed raw wage gap.
On the one hand, this may be due to the fact that the women who worked full-time were
a particularly positively selected group of all working women.10 On the other hand, it may
also be due to the fact that part-time wages are generally lower than full-time wages.
In order to obtain a proper answer to the question of how the gender pay gap would look like
if not only the potentially very positively selected group of full-time women are paid full-time
wages, we follow the Albrecht et al. (2009) and compute a number of relevant counterfactual
distributions accounting for nonrandom selection into observed full-time work.
10See Biewen et al. (2018) for a related analysis of the selectivity of full-time vs. part-time women.
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4.5.1 Selection model and quantile regressions
Table 4.2 – Female participation in full-time work
Probit coefficients Marginal effects
Abitur or voc. training 0.286 0.072
(0.054) (0.014)
University or Fachhochschule 0.999 0.251
(0.061) (0.015)
German 0.018 0.005
(0.072) (0.018)
Urban 0.064 0.016
(0.036) (0.009)
Married -0.270 -0.068
(0.038) (0.009)
East 0.061 0.015
(0.084) (0.021)
Work experience 0.149 0.037
(0.009) (0.002)
Work experience (squared) -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.007 -0.002
(0.017) (0.004)
Age (squared) -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of childen 0-2 years -1.397 -0.350
(0.080) (0.019)
Number of childen 3-5 years -0.736 -0.184
(0.060) (0.015)
Number of childen 6-11 years -0.457 -0.115
(0.038) (0.009)
Number of childen 12-18 years -0.200 -0.050
(0.030) (0.008)
Religious -0.199 -0.050
(0.046) (0.011)
Unemployment rate -0.012 -0.003
(0.008) (0.002)
Female labor force participation rate 0.008 0.002
(0.009) (0.002)
Income of partner -0.042 -0.010
(0.008) (0.002)
Household asset income -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Care -0.327 -0.082
(0.123) (0.031)
Constant -0.061 -
(0.754) (-)
Observations 9,596 9,596
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.2 summarizes the results of our selection model for female participation in full-
time work. The left hand column contains the probit coefficients, while the right hand
column displays average marginal effects. All effects are in line with a-priori expectations.
Participation in full-time work substantially increases with educational qualifications and
work experience. With respect to our instrumental variables, we find the usual strong effects
of children (the younger the children, the stronger) and the negative effect of partner income
on participation in full-time work. Moreover, participation in full-time work is ceteris paribus
lower if the person is religious or of older age. The rest of the instrumental variables have
the expected signs but are not statistically significant.
Tables C1 and C2 in the appendix summarize some results of our conditional quantile regres-
sion models before any kind of transformation is carried out, with and without the Buchinsky
(1998) correction. Again, all estimated coefficients are in line with a-priori expectations.
In particular, we find strong positive effects of educational qualifications and work experi-
ence which are increasing over the distribution. There are also positive wage effects linked
to German citizenship, living in a city and a wage penalty associated with living in East
Germany.
4.5.2 Huber and Melly (2015) test and transformation
In order to test whether our untransformed model satisfies the assumptions necessary for
the Buchinsky selection correction, we run the Huber/Melly test. Table 4.3 shows that the
null hypothesis of conditional independence is overwhelmingly rejected (all p-values close to
zero). We therefore apply the transformation described in section 4.4.3 to our model.11 We
then run the Huber/Melly test on the transformed model. Table 4.3 demonstrates that our
transformation drastically reduces problems with the conditional independence assumption
11The corresponding estimated quantile regression coefficients of the transformed model are provided in
tables C3 and C4 in the appendix.
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as detected by the Huber/Melly test. After the transformation, the Huber/Melly test easily
passes in almost all of the cases, the only exception being the Kolmogorov-Smirnov version
for the extreme quantile range of 5-95 percent. As already pointed out in Huber and Melly
(2015, p. 1157), it will be hard to avoid rejection of the null hypothesis in the tails of the
distribution where the quantile regression estimator performs poorly if one does not make
strong assumptions on the tail behavior of the underlying density (particularly in the case
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic which picks out the supremum deviation).12
Table 4.3 – Huber-Melly (2015) test (p-values based on 1,000 resamples)
θ ∈ [0.05, 0.95] [0.10, 0.90] [0.15, 0.85] [0.20, 0.80]
Original model
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crame´r-von Mises 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transformed model
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.029 1.000 1.000 0.997
Crame´r-von Mises 0.992 0.999 0.996 0.960
Source: Own calculations.
4.5.3 Selection effect and counterfactual comparisons
We now present an analysis analogous to Albrecht et al. (2009), but based on the trans-
formed model. For better comparability, we follow exactly the same sequence of scenarios
as in Albrecht et al. (2009). We also compare the results of our transformed model to those
from our untransformed model.
Figure 4.3 plots the total selection effect across the quantiles of the female wage distribution.
The left panel shows the result based on the untransformed model, while the right panel the
one based on the transformed model. This total effect of selection is given by the difference
12We thoroughly tested our implementation of the Huber/Melly test (details are available on request).
In our experience, the test tends to exhibit a ‘switching’ behavior in practical applications, i.e. p-values are
either small or quite large.
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Figure 4.3 – Total selectivity in female population: observed full-time wage distribution minus
wage distribution assuming all women work full-time and receive selectivity corrected wage
returns
(a) Without transformation
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(b) With transformation
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
between the observed wage distribution of full-time women and the counterfactual scenario
where all women are assumed to work full-time and receive the selection-adjusted returns of
full-time women. In line with a-priori expectations, the wage effects of full-time selectivity
are positive in the sense that women actually working full-time have a higher earnings
potential in full-time work relative to all women. This effect is stronger in the upper part
of the distribution. Comparing the untransformed with the transformed model, we find
the estimated selection effect to be somewhat stronger in the transformed model. At the
same time, we notice a moderate widening of the bootstrapped confidence intervals in
the transformed case, which is due to the fact that the transformation contains estimated
quantities. Note however, that the width of the intervals is already quite large in the
untransformed case so that uncertainty added by the transformation plays only a minor role.
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Figure 4.4 – Observed selectivity in female population: observed full-time wage
distribution minus wage distribution with observed characteristics of all women
(a) Without transformation
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
Lo
g 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Quantile
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
The next figure 4.4 shows the part of the overall selection effect that can be attributed to
differences in observable characteristics between full-time women and their part-time or non-
working counterparts. Recall that the observed selection effect is defined by the difference
between the observed wages of full-time women and the counterfactual scenario that would
prevail if all women worked full-time and received the returns without correcting for selection
(equation (4.7)). This result matches the descriptive evidence presented above showing that
full-time women are on average more educated and have higher work experience than the
women not observed in full-time employment.
Figure 4.5 displays the effect of unobserved selectivity defined by equation (4.8). It represents
the difference between the estimates uncorrected for sample selection and the ones corrected
for sample selection. It shows how much full-time pay for women is overestimated if one
ignores that those women observed to work full-time are positively selected. This effect is
rising towards the upper part of the distribution, suggesting that participation in high-wage
full-time activities is particularly selective. Still, unobserved selection is also positive at the
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Figure 4.5 – Unobserved selectivity in female population: full-time wage distribution with
observed characteristics of all women minus distribution that in addition assumes selectivity
corrected returns
(a) Without transformation
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(b) With transformation
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
bottom of the distribution, because even in the case of a low earnings potential, those
women with more favorable unobserved characteristics find it harder to resist participation
in order to pursue child care duties or to depend on other income sources in the household.
Figure 4.6 – Impact of transformation: difference between unobserved
selectivity effect in transformed vs. in untransformed model
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
Lo
g 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Quantile
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
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Although the patterns in figure 4.5 based on the transformed and the untransformed quantile
regression model look quite similar, there is a economically significant difference between
the two which depicted in a more explicit way in figure 4.6. The figure suggests that the
untransformed model underestimates unobserved selectivity effects, particularly towards the
upper part of the distribution.
Figure 4.7 – Selectivity corrected gender wage gap: full-time
men vs. selectivity corrected full-time wages women
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
We now apply these corrections to compute corrected versions of the gender wage gap.
Figure 4.7 displays the selection-adjusted wage gap between men and women, i.e. the wage
difference that would prevail in a counterfactual scenario in which all women (with their
given observed characteristics) work full-time and receive the selection-adjusted returns of
full-time women. As a consequence of the positive selection effect described in the previous
paragraph, this wage gap considerably widens compared to the raw gap displayed in figures
4.1 and 4.2, and it is higher in the transformed model.
Finally, figure 4.8 shows the wage gap between men and women if both selectivity in to
full-time work status is corrected and the fact that women have on average less favorable
observed characteristics than men. This corresponds to the counterfactual scenario in which
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Figure 4.8 – Gender wage gap if all women worked full-time and had
male characteristics but womens’ selectivity corrected returns
(a) Without transformation
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(b) With transformation
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2012/2013, and own calculations.
Confidence bands based on bootstrap (100 replications).
women earn the selection-adjusted returns of full-time women but have men’s distribution
of characteristics. Compared to the previous figure 4.7, this narrows the wage gap as women
have less favorable observed characteristics than men. Still, the pay difference between men
and women remains much bigger than suggested by the raw wage gaps in figure 4.1 and
4.2.
4.6 Summary and discussion
This paper proposes a remedy for the problem pointed out by Huber and Melly (2015) that
counterfactual decomposition methods accounting for unobserved selectivity are not applic-
able if the underlying quantile regression model does not satisfy a conditional independence
assumption. This conditional independence assumption can be investigated using the Huber
and Melly (2015) test. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically for our application that
applying a transformation to the original model may make the Huber and Melly (2015) test
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pass, while it rejects for the untransformed model. The transformation can later be reversed
for the computation of quantile predictions. We illustrate this approach by an application
to the gender wage gap in Germany. Our substantive results are in line with previous con-
tributions like Albrecht et al. (2009) for the Netherlands and Chzhen and Mumford (2011)
for the U.K. in that they show positive unobservable selection of women into full-time work,
biasing estimates of the gender pay gap downwards. However, our results also suggest
that this downward bias is underestimated if an untransformed model is used rather than a
transformed one that passes the Huber and Melly (2015) test.
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Chapter 5
Dissertation Summary and Conclusion
Over the last three decades, Germany has experienced profound changes in its wage and
earnings distribution. These trends have not been unique to Germany but could be observed
to varying degrees both in the U.S. as well as in many other European countries. Against
this background, the present doctoral thesis is dedicated to a scientific inquiry into different
dimensions of the German wage and earnings distribution. A particular focus of the analysis
is on the application of modern econometric estimation methods, including the further
development of a method for the estimation of counterfactual quantile decompositions with
selection correction in chapter 4.
Chapter 2 investigated changes in the German wage distribution among men over the period
1995-2010, i.e. a time when Germany experienced a sharp rise in wage inequality. We are
particularly interested in determining the relative importance of the most prominent factors
known from the literature which are simultaneously accounted for in the RIF decomposition
(Firpo et al., 2009, 2018) analysis. Another important aspect is the fact that, contrary to
previous studies based on administrative data, we are able to include hourly wages that are
not censored at the social security contribution threshold. These represent a more direct
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measure of the prices paid in the market as they are, contrary to the commonly used daily
earnings, not confounded by labor supply decisions and offer differences in hours worked.
Our results show that the described restrictions in administrative data do not pose a major
threat to the validity of previous studies as neither the usage of daily earnings nor an ar-
tificial censoring at the social contribution threshold change our result in an economically
meaningful way. We find that observed changes in the German wage distribution can largely
be explained by composition effects, i.e. by distributional changes in observable charac-
teristics of the population. The study especially highlights the importance of unions and
further shows that significant parts of de-unionization occurred within establishments, an
aspect that has not been considered in the related literature (see, e.g., Dustmann et al.,
2009, Baumgarten et al., 2018). Hence, we conclude that previous studies likely underes-
timated the role played by de-unionization relative to other prominent explanations such as
SBTC, internationalization or firm heterogeneity. At the same time, our findings on the
significance of personal characteristics coincide with the SBTC hypothesis in the sense that
the increasing demand for higher skills was met by educational upgrading as well as by a
demographically-induced aging of the workforce.
While chapter 2 was devoted to an inter-temporal comparison of cross-sectional wage distri-
butions, chapter 3 broadened this perspective by pursuing a cohort approach in the study of
distributional changes in lifetime earnings among German men of birth cohorts 1955-1974.
From a theoretical point of view, this type of analysis provides important additional insights
due to the more direct connection with individual consumption possibilities and the possib-
ility to uncover differences across cohorts. Thereby, I add to a relatively new but growing
literature by providing a first attempt to disentangle recent changes in lifetime earnings by
means of a detailed decomposition analysis. The results suggest that changing employment
patterns, both in terms of an increasing incidence of part-time and non-employment, ex-
plain a substantial share of increasing inequality. At the same time, the ongoing educational
expansion during the period of study was generally beneficial to individuals of later cohorts,
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but increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution. These findings are also con-
firmed in alternative specifications which equally show the composition effect of education
to be partly due to resulting changes in the age at labor market entry. Furthermore, con-
trolling for detailed occupations only yields a very moderate effect, which I take as evidence
that the influence of SBTC was primarily reflected in the educational upgrading of later co-
horts. In this respect, the results on lifetime earnings show clear parallels with the findings
on wages, despite the partly different modeling approach (the decomposition in chapter 2
includes BIBB-IAB tasks, whereas the one in chapter 3 directly controls for occupations).
Also similar to chapter 2, the results for the detailed returns effects show a less clear picture.
However, they reveal potentially important effects in relation to employment interruptions
in the sense that, at the bottom of the distribution, periods of non-employments seem to
have been associated with higher long-term earnings losses for later cohort. In addition to
increasing inequality, the results also show an overall stagnation of earnings up-to-age 40
which were accompanied by losses within education subgroups. This finding is of special
policy relevance as it shows that the younger cohorts did not benefit from the cross-sectional
wage gains usually found during the study period 1975-2014 (see, e.g. Dustmann et al.,
2014).
As the comparison of female wage distributions over time is inherently complicated by a
changing selection into the workforce, the analysis in chapters 2 and 3 is limited to male
distributions. Chapter 4, by contrast, includes a study which, in addition to its method-
ological contribution, evaluates the importance of selection effects in the context of the
gender wage gap. Our econometric approach enhances the Albrecht et al. (2009) method
by providing a practical solution to the problem outlined in Huber and Melly (2015). Us-
ing the Huber/Melly test, we show that conditional independence is in fact rejected in a
typical application which invalidates the results. We then introduce a transformation which
effectively eliminates violations of conditional independence. In addition, we illustrate the
functionality of this approach from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We
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believe this to be an important contribution as it points a way to shield users of the Albrecht
et al. (2009) method from the critique raised in Huber and Melly (2015). Our results reveal
that a positive female selection on unobservables potentially leads to an underestimation of
the gender pay gap in Germany. Importantly, we show this bias to be aggravated when our
transformation is not applied. Given the sparsity of the previous literature, we highlight our
findings on unobservable selection as a second important result of the study.
The presented results provide many opportunities for future research. With regard to chapter
2, there remains an open question as to why wage inequality has not increased further
after 2010. Due to the late publication of the GSES 2014 and the comparatively difficult
data access, the answer to this question goes beyond the scope of the study. Given the
findings from this thesis, follow-up research should place particular emphasis on the impact
of unions on the most recent development. This seems all the more important as the
analysis indicates that the slowdown in the increase in inequality between 2006 and 2010
was also accompanied by a reduced pace of de-unionization. Similarly, possible interactions
with SBTC and internationalization should be investigated further, as it seems unlikely that
the sharp decline in collective bargaining coverage occurred independently of these other
factors. In chapter 3, it would be interesting to see whether de-unionization has played a
similarly important role in changing the distribution of lifetime earnings. This question is
not addressed in the thesis due to the lack of information on unionization in the SIAB. An
investigation on the development of lifetime earnings on the household level could denote
another promising field of study, assuming the availability of suitable data. For example,
the adverse trends found for men of later cohorts could potentially be moderated by higher
earnings of women. In addition to its methodological contribution, chapter 4 provides
important insights into the effect of unobservable female selection on the gender wage gap
in Germany. Thereby, it would be desirable for future research to equally study the impact of
male selection, which is a particularly challenging task due to the difficulty of finding suitable
instruments. In answering this question, the method of D’Haultfoeuille et al. (2018), which
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requires no additional instruments for selection, offers a possible workaround. Another
promising path for future research could be to allow for heterogeneity in the selection rule
itself, which potentially varies for women in different parts of the German wage distribution.
In a recent contribution, Machado (2017) suggests a possible implementation which is,
however, limited to the subpopulation of ‘always employed’ women.
In conclusion, the distribution of wages and earnings remains a highly relevant topic as well
as an active area of research. My dissertation contributed to this discussion in the form of
three empirical studies, each of which deals with a different dimension of wage and earnings
inequality in Germany. While the thesis delivered important new insights, both economic
and methodological, the preceding chapters also show that the topic still offers numerous
possibilities for future research.
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